


ANGLICAN REACTION TO THE REVOLUTION OF 1688


Gerald M. Straka

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ANGLICAN REACTION TO THE REVOLUTION OF 1688

by

Gerald M. Straka

THE STATE HISTORICAL SOCIETY OF WISCONSIN

for

THE DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY, UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN

Madison, 1962

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TO

Lois Straka


—for love

Louise and Milton Straka

—for sympathy

Marian Silveus, F. E. J. Wilde, W. L. Sachse

—for inspiration



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INTRODUCTION

"No successful attempt has yet been made to estimate the influence of the Anglican Church upon the political and social development of England during the period in modern times when its power was greatest, although eighty years have elapsed since Macaulay pointed out that the pulpit was the main organ of public opinion." Since Godfrey Davies made this observation in 1928, much has been done to increase our understanding of ecclesiastical social and political influence. Indeed, one can ask whether the statement was completely true when Davies made it. Macaulay himself did a rather complete study, albeit negative in its conclusions. John Stoughton and G. V. Portus at the turn of the century succeeded in relating Anglicanism as an influential force to English social and political developments in the seventeenth century. In recent years the works of Sykes, Hart, Every, Mullett, and Bahlman have clarified this connection. Nevertheless there is still much to be done; indeed, it was because of this awareness that I embarked upon a study of the Anglican Church and its relationship to the Glorious Revolution.

It occurred to me that a body of thought such as was contained in the writings of the Caroline and Restoration Church could not have disappeared overnight when William of Orange became king. Divine right, passive obedience, and nonresistance were too strongly ingrained in the Anglican temperament to be erased by a single act of Parliament. Furthermore, I saw that contractarianism could not have convinced most conservatives, and that Locke could not have satisfied Anglicans about the supposed natural right of depo-

sition. The first months of investigation quickly revealed that both suppositions were true. On the one hand, I discovered divine right and its correlations preached and published in Anglican thought with equal vigor as before 1688, and on the other that Anglicanism had produced a complex justification of the Revolution which made little or no reference to the social contract. It became fascinating to observe how churchmen overthrew the divine right of hereditary succession for the divine right of providential election, pointing out that William, like Henry VII, had succeeded to the throne through the right of conquest and God-given victory. Furthermore, they justified William's right to the throne on grounds that were in all respects constitutionally sounder than Locke's.

It became clear that the Whig concept in Revolution historiography—and there has been no other since Macaulay—has given a wrong view of the Revolution. It was possible to give another justification of 1688, one that was probably more widely held at the time than the contractarian. The Church was not secretly yearning for James's return. Its post-Revolution divine right was Williamite and not Jacobite; its passive obedience was patriotic in its intent and not nonjuring. The Church's justification, that God had blessed the undertaking and that it was consistent with the laws of England and England's Church, did more to satisfy Anglicans than any other explanation.

The Revolution Settlement, although nominally credited to Whig and Tory, has too long been cherished as part of the former's tradition. But here too, nineteenth century liberalism has mistakenly emphasized the role of the social contract in the Bill of Rights, and has given the false impression that the Revolution was the triumph of Parliament over the Crown. The social contract never became part of English law, and while the Triennial Act and the Act of Settlement defined the character of the constitution, they never went so far as to make Parliament supreme or to do anything more than establish qualifications for kingship. These features were pointed out by the Church and convinced Englishmen that the Revolution was not revolution and was consistent with ancient usage. Locke becomes irrelevant after one reads the Anglican explanation of the Revolution, for nothing changed after 1688 except the monarch, and there was nothing unique in what

Parliament did when it recognized (not elected) William as king. When toleration was extended to the dissenters, Parliamentary elections regularized, and the monarchy declared Protestant, the Church announced that the Henrician and Elizabethan polity had been fully restored and that neither nonjuror nor republican could claim that a revolution had occurred.

It was rather a simple task to identify the materials for this study since they always have been available to any scholar who would take time to examine them. If this work has any merit it is because it tries to restore to the general historian a knowledge of works which have been ignored since the eighteenth century. The Anglican approached the Revolution from the view of the educated Elizabethan, and undoubtedly this did not appeal to the nineteenth century utilitarian. Locke, Hume, and Macaulay were more appealing to the Victorian than Sherlock, Lloyd, Burnet, and Stillingfleet. Equally, the sermons of the Revolution era, full of implied and expressed Anglican political theory, have remained unread since William's reign, yet these also have been available for study for years.

Much of what the modern student understands of the Revolution is naturally based on current political theory. Most of us are concerned with the roots of democracy and cabinet government, and justly so. But we must not lose sight of a contemporary view which saw things in the light of mediaeval-renaissance-reformation contexts. From this angle religion and ancient usage were more important than the newer rationalism. Thus from the view of the Revolution Anglican, the Revolution was not a departure, but a restoration of true divine right Protestant monarchy and a return to the national unity of Elizabeth's great days. It probably will be most difficult for the modern reader to understand this, but unless he does, he will have no sympathy for the Anglican position recreated in the succeeding pages.

Among the names that must appear here for their inestimable help and advice are Professor W. L. Sachse of the University of Wisconsin, whose direction gave the first shape to this study. Mr. Reginald Bassett and Professor K. B. Smellie of the London School of Economics and Political Science provided excellent help and encouragement. Mr. Allen of the

British Library of Political and Economic Science, Harold Laski Collection, patiently sought out many rare books, and Mr. Roger Thomas, librarian of the Dr. Williams's Library, eased the search for others, including the manuscript of the Roger Morrice diary. Thanks are due also to the staffs of the Senate House Library, the British Museum, and the Lambeth Palace Libraries. Finally, a name that should appear for many reasons at the head of this list of credits, that of my wife Lois, whose side-by-side assistance followed every step in the study's preparation.

G. M. S.

Michigan State University Oakland
Rochester, Michigan
October 17, 1961

CHAPTER 1

The Background: The Revolution and the Voice of the Nation

On December 2, 1688, John Evelyn noted in his diary: "Visited my L. Godolphin, then going with the Marquis of Halifax, & E: of Nottingham as Commissioner to the Prince of Orange: He told me, they had little power: Plymouth declared for the Prince & L. Bath: Yorke, Hull, Bristoll, all the eminent nobility & persons of quality throout England declare for the Protestant Religion & Laws, and go to meete the Prince; who every day sets forth new declarations &c. against the Papists; The Greate favorits at Court, priests & Jesuits, flie or abscond: Every thing (til now conceiled) flies abroad in publique print, & is Cryed about the streetes: Expectations of the Pr: coming to Oxon: Pr: of Wales & greate Treasure sent daily to Portsmouth... Adresse from the Fleete not gratefull to his Majestie: The Popists in offices lay down their commissions & flie: Universal Consternation amongst them: It lookes like a Revolution. . . ." ¹ And a Revolution it was! Events moved with frightening rapidity to the sixty-eight year old Evelyn and his contemporaries. Only the summer before James II seemed at the height of his power, and now the Prince of Orange was before the gates of London. Eight months before, James had confidently issued his second Declaration of Indulgence, and the seven bishops who had petitioned against it were brought to trial in June. Though they were acquitted, this piece of good news was balanced by the knowledge that on June 10 a son supposedly was born to their majesties. In July, James made an inquiry as to how many Catholic officers he had in the ranks spread out on Hounslow Heath. On August 24, writs for the autumn elections were sent out, and rumor had it, on good grounds, that the crown's agents were to watch these elections carefully for those men "who are likely to come

up to the King's measures."² Stuart absolutism, backed with a Stuart army and Parliament, would now take seed under James II and mature under James III.

But by late summer there were rumors of an invasion afoot from Holland. Zuylstein's mission, to bring William's congratulations to the royal parents, was regarded as a strange maneuver by those who knew the Prince's real feelings on the matter; but few then realized its actual purpose: to complete the arrangements for William's coming. Vice Admiral Russell, acting in behalf of seven influential men, had gone to Holland to deliver an invitation to the Prince, assuring him of the nation's support would he but land. At James's court there was no sign of panic, although Louis's intelligence had learned of the matter in July. Barrillon, the French ambassador, hastened to assure King James that no invasion would be undertaken until the spring. It would be foolhardy to hazard the sea in autumn. However, in October the atmosphere at court grew tense, became confused. On October 5, James dissolved the Ecclesiastical Commission, and on the seventeenth all the charters were restored to the municipal corporations. My Lord Sunderland, the architect of the pro-French policy, was dismissed from office. What could explain this sudden change of heart but that James feared William's declaration of September 13 to invade England, and hoped for as much support as conciliation could bring? It was evident that James was being forced to come around. William was at sea and there was no French fleet to stop him.

"The wind," noted Evelyn, "which had hitherto ben West, all this day East, wonderfull expectation of the Dutch fleete." All the worried James could learn from Dartmouth, head of the English fleet which was to have stopped William, was: "Remember, I pray sir, how prophetically I have foretold you your misfortunes, and the course you might have taken to avoid them [though] I did not think seamen would have troubled themselves about Parliaments." And later, "Your Majesty knowes what condition you left the fleet in." With the court breaking up, defections among the lords and the army, a naval commander making excuses instead of taking action, James thought it best to flee. On December 11, at three in the morning, he followed his queen to the coast. His capture and return to London proved

too embarrassing to those who were a party to William's venture, and so, before the year was out, James II was allowed to slip quietly away a second time, leaving William a free hand in the kingless country.

In the space of a few months the seventeenth century struggle with the crown was concluded in a brief skirmish. Although the fact of the Revolution, that the House of Stuart was deposed for a new Parliamentary creation, is significant enough, its real significance is found in the situation that followed the event. The same parties and issues remained after 1689, but by removal of the cause of dissension, James himself, parties and issues crystallized, and a civil war could be carried on in the popular press without the continuing influence of Stuart policy in operation. It used to be said that the Revolution of 1688 was justified after the fact, but this is understatement. The Revolution was fought after the fact. In the political pamphlets and tracts of William's and Anne's reigns, men charged and countercharged, hoping to carry every bastioned opinion before them. What makes the battle real is that none of the combatants could know to whom the final victory would fall.

Indeed, it looked for years as though James might very well return. In 1690, their most hopeful year, the Jacobites believed that "the late King shall enjoy his own again;--which is so clear by its own Light, there needs no further Illustration."³ In May of 1689, an English fleet had been unable to stop a French fleet from landing supplies for James in Ireland, which was in rebellion. Since the English had lost the encounter at Bantry Bay, a French invasion could come at any time. Later, the French fleet controlled the Channel after the English defeat at Beachy Head. Scotland was known to be swarming with Jacobites, and in England itself estimates were made of some 40,000 who were actively seeking James's restoration.⁴ Included were many great names in the government, Marlborough and Godolphin among them. The House of Lords seemed to be full of intriguers; the Commons possibly contained as many as 150 Jacobites.⁵ During an invasion threat in 1692, rumor had it that the Jacobites were buying up all the best horses at the fairs, and that the "greatest Number of the Lieutenancy. . . and. . . great Numbers of the Nobility, Gentry and Clergy. . . would immediately declare for King

James."⁶ Loyal Williamites were astonished to discover that many Protestants were lukewarm toward the government of their Protestant prince and toward the Revolution that had rescued their religion. Apparently there was widespread indifference to the Revolution Settlement, not necessarily because its ideals were forgotten, but because the fortunes of a large number of people were at stake. Should James return, it might not be well to have associated with his enemies.⁷

Confusion, caution, and indifference characterized the public mind early in the Revolution. During the Convention Parliament Evelyn sadly noted that there was no accord among its members as to policy or procedure. Some were for a regency, with James holding titular power only; some would have Princess Mary made queen; some were for inviting James back under certain limitations; and there were the "Republicarians" who would restore a commonwealth. Still others could make no sense of the Revolution whatsoever. Why should William invade England since his real enemy was France? Parliament after all could restore its own rights without the help of an invasion. The Church of England could fare no better in having a Presbyterian instead of a papist as its head.⁸

Even some who went along with the popular argument that James had abdicated when he fled the country still thought it the wiser course to retain him as king. We see the origins of Jacobitism among those who would recognize no "other King than James the Second, who is our Lawful Sovereign while he lives."⁹ This recognition, they pointed out, was merely consistent with the Prince's first declaration upon landing. One even argued that James had a perfect right to "visit" France since, by his title, it was part of his domain. Indeed, if William would but restore the House of Stuart as he had the liberties of England, he would continue to be re-regarded as a great deliverer.¹⁰ But this was more flattery than sense. What frightened this conservative element at bottom was that precedents might be set to alter the essential constitution of the English government, by changing an hereditary into an elective monarchy. William, it was hoped, would be above deposing the king; besides he had no immediate title to the throne since King James was still alive. Thus, there seemed to be only one condition under which James could be lawfully kept from the throne, this being that the

charges against him--that the "Prince of Wales is an Impos-
ture; That the King has made a league with France to cut off
the Protestants of these Kingdoms; and that his Brother and
the Earl of Essex were murdered by his appointment"--should
be proved.¹¹ But this too was obviously a tactical device.
These crimes could not be proved, and the real issues charged
against James and later embodied in the Bill of Rights were
tacitly ignored by the legitimists.

The Jacobites were a powerful political factor at the start
of the Revolution.¹² The solid core of the party, as might be
expected, contained Catholics personally devoted to James,
but it also included many Protestants devoted to the lawful
succession if not to royal prerogative. Jacobitism had a fairly
broad base of support because its tenets were never set down.
Thus any dissatisfied or querulous party might claim allegiance
to James without the necessity of accepting a specific Jaco-
bite program. All Jacobites were united by a desire to see the
Stuarts back upon the throne. Beyond this they became little
more than a factious group of malcontents with never a uni-
fied plan of action. There were the compounders who would
invite James back upon conditions that would have made of
him a constitutional monarch; there were the noncompounders
who would have him back at any cost; there were many non-
jurors, both of the Church and laity, who could be called Jac-
obites but whose opinions varied. As to plans of action,
some would rely on French aid, others confined their energies
in James's behalf to drinking to his health. At the time of the
Turnham Green assassination plot there was strong opposition
within the party to killing William, and there is evidence that
neither James nor Louis knew anything of the plan.

James himself can be blamed for his lack of real leader-
ship, for he never fully realized the power he could have
wielded as the head of an opposition party.¹³ Instead he con-
tented himself with the efforts of others. Essentially the fail-
ure of a counter-revolutionary movement can be blamed on in-
difference. Most of the King's supporters in 1688 had allowed
the Revolution to run its course, wishing only to see James
hurt. When they saw how far it had gone, they were sorry
for it, declared against it; but if position or social status
made compromise expedient, they took the oath to William
and Mary and contented their consciences with rituals that

were neither effective nor dangerous.¹⁴

All of the Jacobite literature was bitter and designed in its bitterness to paint a bleak picture of things to come. The Catholics attempted to point out that the real enemy was the dissenter, for from "Jack Calvin... have flowed, not only all past Stirs made by the stubborn Hereticks, . . . but even the present monstrous Revolution."¹⁵ The Dutch yoke was a favorite theme. Holland had been England's enemy in trade; now, with her prince as conqueror of England, she had a perfect opportunity to see to it that England would lose maritime supremacy. The new demands for revenue to support the war gave grounds for the belief that, under William, Englishmen would soon be taxed like the French, "as may be guessed by the Saying of one of our modern Patriots... 'that if a Colt of a Month old could bear a Pound Weight, the next Month it would bear two; and so in a very few Months, might become a very good Beast of Burden....' A very fit Allegory, first 12d. in the Pound, then two and three shillings in the Pound, a doubled Poll, and in a little time a Supply unstinted."¹⁶ Not only did the fiscal policy smack of tyranny, but even to many supporters of the Revolution it seemed that one tyrant had been exchanged for another. William dissolved the Convention Parliament quite unexpectedly on February 6, 1690, by royal proclamation and in a manner quite reminiscent of the dissolution of Charles II's Oxford Parliament. Evelyn noted how the precipitate prorogation at the end of January was "to the discontent & surprizal of many members [and] produc'd as universal a discontent against K. William... as was before against K. James," for it appeared that William only was concerned with financing his war. Once the Commons had granted the required supplies, he would have no further use for Parliament. Others said that "the time and manner of its dissolution surprized every man that had been active in the Revolution with a sense of his danger...."¹⁷ This the Jacobites seized on, predicting that Parliament would go the way of the Estates-General.

Another source of attack was the illegality of the Convention Parliament. The argument was simple: if Parliament could be summoned only by the king, which had not been the case, then what sanction would its deliberations have?"Can they act lawfully upon an unlawful Call, or an unlawful Con-

vention make him a lawful King? We are taught by an English Proverb, that no Stream rises higher than its Fountain; how is it then possible for them to give him Authority to govern that have none but what they receive from him, who by our Law can have none to give."¹⁸ A regard for order should be the paramount consideration, since otherwise "we shall become the Reproach and Scorn of all Nations: it cannot be otherwise when Subjects attempt to Judge and Deprive their Sovereign!"¹⁹

The Revolution could be regarded also as an immoral act of political expediency, designed to gain difficult ends by easy but unvirtuous means. The end never justifies the means, explained one writer, and if it were conceded that any means might be used to rid England of an unpopular monarch, there would be no end to unjust exactions to maintain the House of Orange in England.²⁰ It was perhaps to the credit of the nonjurors that they would call a halt to the vacillations of the "Vicars of Bray" in the Church and out, by standing by the sacredness of their oaths. To these men, Revolution theory was mere cant designed to win support for William. At the death of Archbishop Sancroft in 1693, there was occasion to review the brave stand of the man who had withstood the demands of James II, yet had refused to break his oath to that same monarch: "...he had rather suffer under his lawful Prince, than flourish under an Usurper."²¹ Some four hundred churchmen had lost their livings for this reason, possibly for fear of losing their souls, perhaps because they were aware of the precedent implied in the Revolution. They believed that the Parliamentarians were bent on making the monarchy elective so that any future king, if he proved unpopular, could be replaced by another act of Parliament. Such a blow at legitimate monarchy would be a blow at established Church theory as well. The sacredness of monarchy had to be defended. If Parliament had the right to rule that James abdicated by his flight from England, monarchical sacredness would be dependent upon Parliament's whims.²²

The events of 1688, to the republicans, called for a break with the old constitution. To them this was a time for re-doing the whole structure, for "If the Government be dissolved, the Power devolves on the People... the People may

set up what Government they please. . . ." ²³ A scheme was put forth for a national convention made up of the representatives of the community, much larger than both Houses, and in control of them. The suggestion seems to have been that a new constitution would be provided by this convention. In a pamphlet entitled "Now is the Time," a plan was put forth for a bicameral legislature in which members would be paid, triennial elections and annual meetings held, and varying terms of tenure for membership established to allow a constant rotation. ²⁴ A few of these proposals were to be taken up in the nineteenth century by the Chartists, but for those who had lived before the Restoration of 1660, republican proposals could claim no validity because of their very source.

Criticisms of legality, of deposition and abdication, of the nature of sovereignty and prerogative were as important to the followers of the Revolution as to its critics. But on one thing most agreed: some way must be found for a settlement and that settlement could not include James Stuart.

To most participants in the Convention and those vitally interested in its decisions, a review of the whole structure of power and sovereignty had to be made. No doubt for this reason Hubert Languet's *Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos*, first published in England in 1581, was revived again in a printing of 1689. Here was the familiar argument that princes had no right to usurp the consciences of men, that it was a natural right to resist the commands of an evil monarch: "so far be it from us to believe, that we are bound to obey a King, commanding anything contrary to the Law of God, that contrarily in obeying him we become Rebels to God. . ." ²⁵ This old battle cry was one of the bases of the concept of the social contract, and in the context of 1688 it meant that the King had broken the contract when he "abdicated" the throne by his flight. The power of the state had reverted to its "original," the community. The social contract--that most popular of seventeenth century political assumptions--stated that in the beginning there was a pure state of nature, man being a part of that natural order. "If Adam had stood and persevered in his primitive Integrity, his Posterity would never have stood in need either of Laws or of Magistracy; Man... would have been a Law to himself,

and would have acknowledged no Government, but that of reason only. But sin pushed reason from control whence all the trouble, with unbridled passions lusting for absolute power."²⁶ A compromise was worked out in order to secure order in society. The community in England decided to place all authority in three representative elements, King, Lords, and Commons, with a transfer of the "Supreme Power Real" of the people to the "Supreme Power Personal," vested in the triune government.²⁷ Thus the right of William and Mary to reign was by Parliamentary sanction, and this was the only legality necessary. Williamites claimed that there were but two original sources of kingly power, force of arms and election. Once established and recognized, government must be regarded as a trust: the Parliament a law-making trust, the monarchy an executive trust. Obviously, then, when King James sought to subvert the rule he was under to raise the executive above the other parts, he became a tyrant, and "tyrants may be deposed" in order to bring "Things back to their first Original...."²⁸ Here the argument divided, for some saw that in the breaking of the contract the corporation was dissolved, its authority reverting to the people as a whole once more.²⁹ Others did not wish to push the dissolution beyond Parliament, for they maintained that at least two of the old elements were still intact, Commons and Lords. The legislative element which held supreme governmental authority had the right, it was held, to grant the executive its power as a trust. Should that trust be broken, then the legislative could vest its power in another agent.³⁰ But at no time did those who held this latter view regard the people as capable of exercising a sovereign right.

In George Petyt's *Lex Parliamentaria* (1689), meant as a handbook for the members of the Convention, there is found synthesized the extreme prerogatives which seventeenth century Parliamentarians claimed as theirs: "That which is done by [Parliament's] Consent is called firm, stable, and...is taken for Law. The Parliament abrogateth old Laws. 2. Maketh new. 3. Giveth order for things past, and for things hereafter to be followed. 4. Changeth Right and Possessions of private Men. 5. Legittimateth Bastards. 6. Establisheth Forms of religion. 7. Altereth weights and Measures. 8. Giveth Form of Succession to the Crown. 9. De-

fineth of doubtful Rights whereof is no Law already made. 10. Appointeth Subsidies, Tallies, Taxes and Impositions. 11. Giveth most free Pardons and Absolutions. 12. Restor-eth in Blood and Name. 13. As the highest Court condemneth or absolveth them who are put upon their Trial. And to be short, . . . the Parlement of England . . . representeth, and hath the Power of the Whole Realm, both the Head and the Body; for every Englishman is intended to be there present, either in Person, or by Procuration. . . ."³¹ A Parliament that claims to be both head and body of the state and cannot depose a king and place another in his stead is no Parliament. The nation stood in need of a prince, but "neither as to its being, nor well-being, but only to its better being. . . ."³² The prince was only a part of a larger scheme; thus in the Revolution there had been a change in the governor only, not in the government.

There was little difference between political philosophy and propaganda during the Revolution's early years, and the extent of this philosophic propaganda was very great. It was seemingly apparent to the Williamites that a good deal of talking and writing had to be done to make the Revolution glorious in the eyes of every Englishman. The Jacobites complained that judges were now used to encourage people to pay their taxes and to support the government, that instead of speaking of things relative to the law in charging juries, one judge delivered "romantic Praises of the Prince of Orange, for having so Christianly and heroically stepped in to save our Religion. . . ."³³ The same held true of the pulpit, which, as in ages past, continued to serve the state and those in power. Jacobites might well complain of this propaganda, for some of it had early degenerated into mechanical propositions such as those contained in James Fraser's "Doctrine of Passive Obedience and Jure Divino disprov'd, and Obedience to the present Government prov'd. . . ."³⁴ The former monarch was painted by William's partisans in the blackest possible colors. To counter the argument that now that true government was re-established James could be safely restored, evidence was gathered to show that even if he promised to rule under law, he could not be trusted to keep his word. Papists were supposed to lie in order to further the "true religion." A popular ballad of the day played up the

base treachery of James in a parody of one of his Irish declarations:

Then be assured, the first fair Weather,
We'll call a Parliament together....
Where with united Inclination
We'll bring the Interest of the Nation
Under our Adjudication;
With whose concurrence we'll redress
What we ourselves think Grievances.
All shall be firm as words can make it;
And, if we promise, what can shake it?
As for your Church, we'll still defend it;
Or, if you Please, the Pope shall mend it....
We'll never violate the Test
'Till 'tis our Royal Interest;
Or till we think it so at least,
But there we must consult the Priest.
And as for the dispensing Power,
(Of Princes Crowns, the sweetest flower)
That Parliament shall so explain it,
As we in Peace may still maintain it.³⁵

Jacobites and nonjurors were warned that if James returned, it would mean French control and Jesuit religion, and that none but Catholics would find preferment. A restored James would be a worse tyrant than before, for, "There is nothing to be so much dreaded, as the disposition of a Prince... grown wild with long exilement, and... enraged at the ignominy he has received."³⁶ And to frighten England into resistance should an invasion come, one pamphlet luridly described the atrocities French Jesuits practiced on their enemies: "Some they keep from sleep, for seven or eight days together, relieving one another, to watch them night and day, to keep them awake continually. They use to throw buckets of water, and torment them a hundred ways besides, holding over their heads, kettles turned downwards, and drum upon them continually, till the poor creatures have lost their sense."³⁷ John Macky's *A View of the Court of St. Germain, from the Year 1690 to 1695... Directed to the Malcontents Protestants of England* was the master dissuasive for Protestant Jacobites. It revealed how shabbily James had treat-

ed his Anglican supporters since his flight to France, giving all promotions to Catholics and declaring that only those of his religion would be allowed to have a hand in his restoration. Macky correctly stated that James was not encouraging Protestant Jacobites. He also guessed accurately when he said that Louis would never start a general war merely to put a Stuart back on the throne.³⁸ While the French were portrayed as blackguards, the Dutch were described in glowing terms by at least one pamphleteer, who tried to acquaint English readers with their new allies by describing their customs, manners, and their respect and admiration for England.³⁹

The Revolution was a remarkable thing to its contemporaries. Not a drop of blood was shed, and yet within six months the entire court was changed. Clearly, "if the Hand of God is to be seen in human affairs, and his Voice to be heard upon Earth; we cannot anywhere (since the ceasing of Miracles) find a clearer and more remarkable instance, than is to be observed in the present revolution."⁴⁰ It was a conservative Revolution with the fighting confined to the pen and the Parliamentary chambers. Perhaps it was because of the fear of another prolonged civil war, and of those types "who...make it their business to rip up old Sores...instead of helping on the healing Designs of our true Patriots...."⁴¹ The combatants in this epoch seemed to be aware that "Innovations without Precedent, are always dangerous, especially of this nature,"⁴² and that after all it was more important for men to "rather think who should represent them, than who should fight for them."⁴³ The real revolution may have been one in men's minds, that when confronted with a political emergency they agreed at last to repudiate violence and work towards a peaceful compromise.

To Evelyn's contemporaries William was the Revolution. It is difficult for the twentieth century to think of institutions in terms of men, but this was still the age when the monarch was the personal executive, and all there was of Bill of Rights and Toleration Act was the person of William whose very life decided the success of the Settlement. Equally, James was the Jacobite movement. While he and his heirs remained, the movement received encouragement enough. We know the outcome of the battle of ideas that

raged around the two men. The Revolution as an English political institution was able to survive the death of its champion, for it was never fully dependent upon him in the first place; but Jacobitism failed of its goal because it lost whatever English roots it had when its leaders allowed themselves to become identified with first a French and then a Scottish cause.⁴⁴ In any case, these things were not realized in the early years of William's reign, and to contemporaries there was an imperative for the pamphlet battle to rage on. Certainly to Evelyn there was no positive outcome foreseeable: "What it will yet end in, God onely knows, may he of his Infinite mercy to this sinfull & miserably divided Church & nation... restore peace & quietnesse...."

CHAPTER 2

The Ecclesiastical Orientation of Political Life

During the trying months of the Sacheverell affair and the hot election of 1710, a sophisticated French observer commented: "La Religion ne sert que de pretexte et comme de signal à l'un et à l'autre party pour couvrir ses veues particulières et pour réunir ses forces."¹ Perhaps there was no surer sign that men had entered the age of reason than that they should regard religious ideals as a mere cover for political struggles. During the Civil War forty years before, no one had questioned the sincerity of Puritan or cavalier religious sentiments. But between the Restoration and the Revolution there grew in a few quarters sentiments that we would call "modern," and that expressed themselves in the paganism of Charles II's court, the poetry of Rochester, and the politics of Shaftesbury. Machiavelli, whose works were first popularized in Elizabeth's day, was viewed as a cause of the prostitution of religion in politics. John Eachard's *The Grounds and Occasions of the Contempt of the Clergy and Religion* (1670), an early attempt to undermine Church influence in public life, pointed out that "the Church in Danger" cry was too often the tool of faction. Anticlericalism was a growing tendency, based on the realization that "in almost every Age it hath been a Trick of State, for the Civil Power to strengthen their Designs with putting on the Cloak of Religion. . . . This Roman Emperors knew very well, which made them add to their Dignity the Titles, not only of Consuls and tribunes, but also of *Pontifex Maximus*, High Priest. . . ."²

Nevertheless, these critics of Church politics realized that "the Generality of the People have a kind of Veneration

for those who have the managing of Holy Things," and that if religion was a cloak to hide party ends, the "Danger of the Church" was nonetheless a real fear to the English mind.³ Throughout the seventeenth century, religious convictions, linked with a sovereign regard for "conscience," were the ideals for which men fought, and the expression of their politics. To the Anglican, liberty meant the right to suffer for conscience's sake, as well as the rights granted in the common law. Equally, political convictions, seeking ever to be united with universal moral law, built their foundations on theology. The result was that religion and politics, in both theory and action, were unavoidably intermixed. No political philosopher dared build his system without either linking it to the law of God (nature) or His word (revelation and holy writ). There was thus an ironic unity even in late seventeenth century politics, for both of the parties that emerged at the end of the century, no matter what their conflicting interests, appealed to the divine sanction. *Vox populi, vox dei* was as much a divine right theory as the *jure divino* of kings. In this sense also, the point of view both of Locke and Filmer was in reality identical. Both believed that there existed a God-created state of nature, and that true principles of politics could in some way be discovered by investigation into it.

During the struggles with the early Stuarts, Sir John Eliot noted, "it is observable in the House of Commons... that wherever... mention does break forth of the fears or dangers in religion... affections are much stirred; and whatever is obnoxious in the State... then is reckoned as in incident to that."⁴ This inclination generally held true in William's time as well, for since the Church was established by law, it was a part of the government, and when men talked of the breaking of the civil contract, it was clear that the Church was in danger as well as the state. During the elections to the Convention Parliament, candidates found it necessary to be in favor of the Penal Laws and the Test Act to win the vote.⁵ Even after the Convention had completed its work, only to find Sancroft and the nonjuring clergy against its decisions, Parliament dared not take punitive action against them, remembering how the nation had rallied behind the persecuted Seven Bishops. It was regarded as

a "great pity, that persons of your worth and integrity, should at this time desert your publick stations, while you may in such a critical conjunction be instruments of much good to both Church and State...." ⁶ Considering the power the pulpit exercised, the sermon acting as the weekly editorial, it was vital to have a Williamite clergy, and easily half the volume of revolutionary propaganda was "written for the satisfaction of some of the Reverend Clergy who yet seem to labour under some scruples concerning... the Settling of the Succession to the Crown." ⁷

The Church itself was conscious of the weight it carried in the control of public opinion. Gilbert Burnet, as soon as he became Bishop of Salisbury, issued a *Pastoral Letter to the Clergy of his Diocese, Concerning the Oaths of Allegiance and Supremacy to K. William and Q. Mary*, stating the conservative Church views against which he had written during the height of the Revolution, imploring his charges to venerate the House of Orange as they had the Stuarts. He recognized the place of the clergy in the public's regard and hoped to make the Church an effective agent in winning greater support for the Revolution. Another churchman readily admitted it was necessary to have "the Present Government commended from the Pulpit, because it is one of the readiest and most effectual Means to confirm the People in that good Opinion which they are naturally enclin'd to entertain concerning it: and therefore it were to be wish'd that the Clergy did lay hold on all proper Occasions of insisting on this Subject...." ⁸ Usually these "proper occasions" were celebrations of the national deliverances: November 5 (the Gunpowder Plot), May 29 (the Restoration of Charles II), and that most grim and grand holy day, January 30 (the "murder" of Charles I). Although some Williamites after 1688 attacked the continued observance of January 30, around which a minor pamphlet controversy raged, ⁹ they continued well into the eighteenth century. In the hands of the Revolution bishops these occasional sermons were turned to good use in defense of William and his government.

The Church of the Revolution was far from a unified polity. There had been periods--during the middle years of Elizabeth's reign and for a time immediately after the Restoration--when its members, in the face of common dangers,

catholicism and republicanism, united to form something like a strong front. But throughout the seventeenth century questions of organization, liturgy, or policy came again and again to plague its search for unanimity. Throughout James II's reign the Church waged a relentless literary battle against the Catholic court chaplains, throwing up at them all its reformation theory of primitive Christianity, passivity, and nonresistance as against the papal claim of supreme power to depose monarchs. No sooner had this war been won than the Revolution swept upon it, and all its weapons of passive obedience and divine right, used so persistently against the Catholics, were turned against the Church. Nonresistance was hardly the type of doctrine suited to the conduct of a revolution. While the Church remained consistently passive, men of action came to regard her inaction as irksome and a little ridiculous.

But this is not to say her members were the ridiculous sort described by Macaulay: men who could give no reason from scripture or ecclesiastical history for their beliefs and who habitually disobeyed the Church's precepts. Many of them were widely educated, and it has been shown that socially the clergy were the near equals of peers, with a corresponding influence in society far above that of a "plebeian class."¹⁰ The Church laity of the period included men of genius and integrity: Robert Boyle, the ideal lay Churchman of the day, scientist, and founder of the annual Boyle lectures "for the defense of the Gospel against infidels of all sorts"; Edward Stephens, son-in-law of Sir Matthew Hale, lawyer, and the somewhat erratic genius who helped to found the Societies for Reformation of Manners; John Strype, ecclesiastical historian and biographer, a major contributor of sixteenth century documents to the Harleian collection; John Evelyn, diarist, man of universal taste; finally, the great Newton himself, who regarded his scriptural scholarship more highly than his natural philosophy. Among those in Church orders were Thomas Bray, founder of the SPCK and the SPG, and of eighty libraries in America; William Sherlock, author of forty-three works on theology and probably the most controversial man of his day; Robert South, a most popular preacher, who set his parishioners to laughter with his clever sermons, and who set a model life of poverty and self-denial;

and Henry Wharton, the short-lived scholar who attempted to master every known avenue of learning, in the course of which he amassed a great manuscript collection. Finally, there were the bishops produced by the Church of the Revolution: Edmund Gibson, scholarly custodian of Lambeth Library, who codified the Church's canons, a pious Bishop of London; Benjamin Hoadly, who, as Bishop of Bangor, started the great Bangorian controversy of the eighteenth century, a champion of the Revolution; Simon Patrick, Bishop of Ely, the first to sign the declaration against James's Declaration of Indulgence, and the first to take the oath to William and Mary, noted for his charitable works and as one of the age's great Biblical scholars; John Sharp, Archbishop of York, another man of universal tastes, noted for his preaching and his piety, and as an expert numismatist; William Wake, successor to Tension of Canterbury, who conducted the defense against Atterbury's attempt to make Convocation independent of monarchical control, who also encouraged the Gallican movement in the eighteenth century French Church. If there were men like Crewe, the trimmer, their influence was more than balanced by the integrity of Lloyd of St. Asaph, Stillingfleet of Worcester, and especially the two Archbishops, Tilotson and Tenison.

The Church, since the days of Henry VIII, had been sensitive to the opinions of kings, and at the start of William's reign these sensitivities were sharpened by the new monarch's Presbyterian tendencies. The disestablishment policy in Scotland and the endowment of the Presbytery of Ireland no doubt frightened a number of the clergy. When it was proposed in a speech in Parliament that sectarians should be permitted to enlist in the Irish war regardless of the Test Laws, the suggestion was violently rejected by both Houses, and Burnet noted that the proposal "very much heightened the prejudices against the king, as bearing no great affection to the Church of England."¹¹ But William appreciated the power of his Church and he early filled its bishoprics with men favorable to his broad Church views. These men supplied him with the necessary support. It was Mary, brought up in the Anglican faith and liturgy, whom the Church regarded as its champion. At her death in 1694, it felt a great loss which was compensated to some degree by William's sincere acceptance and devotion to his wife's Anglicanism. The

Church was never to be without a Church of England sovereign again.

At the start of the Revolution it was noted that "The several Sects of Dissenters are glad to get rid of Popery...; but now they expect glorious Days for themselves, and what they expect God Almighty knows.... Now consider how difficult it will be, for any Prince, who has but a crazy Title to the immediate Possession of the Crown, to adjust this Matter so, as neither to disgust the Church of England, nor the Dissenters...."¹² The problem was aptly stated. Fortunately the Church had already taken the lead in the matter of the dissenters. Archbishop Sancroft, in one of his last official acts, had, through the offices of Nottingham, introduced in the House of Lords a bill "for uniting their Majesties Protestant Subjects." This attempt at comprehending all subjects in the national Church dissolved quickly before the inflexibility of the mass of the clergy, who would not have the Church's liturgy changed. Besides, a bill for toleration had been introduced in Parliament at the same time as the Comprehension Bill. Since it received royal support, toleration quickly became the answer to a problem which had vexed the nation since the days of Elizabeth.¹³

There were two Convocations during William's reign. A study of the debates on the nature of the Convocation itself reveals the depth of the split that the Revolution had caused in the Church. From the start, the lower house, made up of the lesser clergy, was at odds with the more liberal Williamite bishops of the upper house. There were petty disputes in the 1689 Convocation between Tillotson and Compton, between Burnet and Jane, over precedence and authority. The 1701 Convocation produced no better record, for by then Atterbury had welded the lower house into an effective tool of high Toryism, obstructing every proposal put forth by the bishops. During the years between the Convocations of 1689 and 1701, a larger controversy had grown up around the place of Convocation in the state. Bartholomew Shower, Charles Leslie, and Atterbury became intent on making Convocation an effective Church legislature with privileges equal to those of Parliament. In their claims for autonomy, there was implied a desire for freedom from the personal will of the king and from the legislative authority of Parliament in Church affairs. But the movement, tied

as it was to the larger issues of party politics, lost its strength with the final triumph of Erastianism in 1714.¹⁴

However important these considerations of comprehension, toleration, and the rights of Convocation were in themselves, they were but reflections of the Church's relation to the Revolution. We have seen already how ecclesiastical and political issues were closely linked in this age: "There are no Contentions so fierce as those about Religion; this gave Life and Spirit to the Prince's Design, and had the main Stroke in this late Revolution. . . ."¹⁵ Pierre Jurieu, the leader of French Protestantism, who lent his pen in support of the Anglican cause, linked it to the whole European scene when he stated that "Either the Protestant Religion must of necessity perish in a little time, or [it] must remain entirely victorious by a miracle of Providence."¹⁶ That miracle was provided by the Church, for without its assistance, the cause of Protestantism would never have been championed against a dispensing power aimed at establishing Catholicism on a par with its sworn enemies.

In this light, as Herbert Butterfield put it, James II "raised an issue between two religious interests, not between two principles of government, and that error cost him his throne."¹⁷ It is true that the doctrines of the sacredness of majesty and the sin of rebellion, all things being equal, should have protected James in his hour of need. At least, so James thought. But what he failed to realize was that any attempt to undermine the source of these convictions, the Church itself, would lead to their suspension, at least as far as the man who had exploited them was concerned. The Revolution assumed the nature of a struggle with popery, and in its victory the Church felt that it led the fight alone. The dissenters observed a tacit truce with James while the Anglican Church "stood in the gap" against Popish penetration.¹⁸ James had successfully wooed the non-conformists with toleration. When the Convention Parliament met, the majority of its members were ardent Episcopalians, a sign of how strongly the Church finally was supported in its fight, and whatever else the Parliament disputed, there was never any doubt about its wholehearted rejection of a Popish head for the State and Church of England. Indeed, some have seen the Church's lead in the Revolution

as being so great as to justify the term "the moral Revolution of 1688," indicating that it meant far more to the Church than a mere political coup.¹⁹

During the summer of 1688, the most popular men in England were the Seven Bishops who had refused to read James's second Declaration of Indulgence from the pulpit, and had drawn up a remonstrance against it. During their trial, the public looked upon them as making a noble stand against James's designs. The trial became a trial of the dispensing power, although the Seven were charged with seditious libel. When the jury returned a verdict of not guilty, "there was a most wonderful shout, that one would have thought the Hall had cracked." While the churchmen made their way from the court, people asked their blessings on their knees. The city was in turmoil, that night guns were fired, bells were rung, and the usual bonfires were lit, as they always were when a great deliverance was celebrated--- "a joyful deliverance to the Church of England." From this time to the meeting of the Convention, Sancroft and the Church played a part in national life comparable to that which Langton played in John's reign.²⁰

The first consideration was that of presenting a united Protestant front to the king. The Church itself was united on the issue, but the position of the dissenters had to be determined. Sancroft issued admonitions to the clergy of his province instructing them to show a friendly spirit to the nonconformists, to visit them and have them in their homes, to let it be known that the Church was the implacable foe of popery, that there was a good chance for reconciliation with dissenting ideas. Pamphlets began to appear with broad hints of a future comprehension for the dissenters, who were called "brothers," and pointing out that a toleration that was dependent on prerogative could be withdrawn by prerogative. From Holland, Burnet issued a work assuring the nonconformists that their cause and the cause of the Church was identical.²¹

On October 16, James sent for Sancroft, telling him that since the Prince of Orange intended to invade England, it would be fitting for the bishops to draw up a declaration against the project. The Archbishop pleaded that all the bishops had left London for their duties, and that the invasion

threat was mere rumor. James let the matter drop until he saw the first of William's declarations, then Compton was summoned and shown the paragraph stating that the Lords Spiritual had invited William to save England. Compton, of course, had been one of the signatories, but when James asked him if he had signed it, or knew of others who had, he answered, "I am confident the rest of the Bishops would as readily answer in the negative as myself," a reply that in a Papist Compton would have pronounced Jesuitical. There were more such meetings on November 2 and November 6 with others of the clergy, and more attempts to get a statement from them repudiating William's action. But if James had not been blind, he might have judged that nothing could be gained by dealing in such a manner with the very engine of his undoing. For the clergy, early in October, had submitted a proposal to him which he had ignored, drawn up by Sancroft, listing a number of "Matters as they judged necessary for his Majesty's Knowledge and Consideration." The propositions read not unlike a first draft of the Bill of Rights: the Ecclesiastical Commission should be dissolved, the dispensations to Catholics recalled, the rights of the universities restored, the Jesuit schools in London closed, the *quo warranto* proceedings against the municipal corporations ended with the restoration of their charters, the dispensing power suspended while Parliament inquired into its proper use, writs issued for a "fair and free Parliament...to sit to redress all Grievances, to settle matters in Church and State upon just and solid Foundations, and to establish a due Liberty of Conscience." Finally, James should consent to listen to "such Motives and arguments...as might...bring his Majesty unto the Communion of our Holy Church of England...."²² Noncompliance with the terms of this ultimatum obviously would mean loss of Church support--how could James expect cooperation from a clergy whose advice he ignored?

Meanwhile, others like William Lloyd, Bishop of St. Asaph, were busy preparing the ground for the Revolution in their writings. Burnet, William's advance agent, realized the importance of the printing press in his master's campaign.²³ With characteristic zeal, Burnet played the part of the uncompromising revolutionary. When Clarendon, act-

ting for James, suggested a reconciliation by the calling of a Parliament, Burnet told him that it was too late: "there must be no Parliament. It is impossible!" And when Clarendon mentioned the possibility of a negotiated treaty, Burnet stormed, "What treaty? How can there be a treaty? The sword is drawn."²⁴ In London, we see the spectacle of Bishop Compton, in a purple velvet coat, jack boots, a brace of pistols in his belt, charging out of the city, sword in hand leading the way for Princess Anne's coach on its way to William's camp. Later Compton played a part in the local election to the Convention by writing and speaking "not only to his Clergy but to the Laity to give their voices for Sir Charles Gerard and Mr. Hawtry," two strong Williamites.²⁵

When the Convention Parliament finally took its seat to debate the state of the nation and decide the fate of the crown, the bishops' Lambeth Palace meetings to formulate their plan of action were also taking place. The group soon became notorious among arch-Whigs as the "Lambeth Club" and the "Holy Jacobite Club," the latter term quite out of keeping with the nature of the discussions presided over by Sancroft. Although it is true that at this time most of the bishops wanted to invite James back to his throne, none would have him back but upon conditions. The Primate himself was in favor of taking away all James's power, investing it in a regency. The most radical view was that of Compton, who would have Mary made Queen Regnant. When it came time for the Lords to vote on the issue, it is remarkable how close the vote for a regency came to winning the issue (forty-nine to fifty-one). If Compton and Bishop Trelawney of Bristol had voted with their brothers, the Lords would have been committed to making William regent. With the failure of this tactic the Church lost its leadership, for the repudiation of the regency by Parliament marks the beginnings of the nonjuring movement led by Sancroft himself. Why this man, who played such an active part in Church life as Dean of St. Paul's and as Archbishop, should suddenly abandon its leadership at a time when it most needed intelligent direction, is a question that may never be solved. All we have of Sancroft's intentions during 1689 are a number of excuses and evasions, pleadings of illness whenever William or the bishops wished to confer with him, and not one direct statement as to his exact feel-

ings. In a few months, the man who had helped to direct one of England's most difficult crises virtually excluded himself from any company but that of embittered and muttering malcontents.

Those, like Lloyd, who were able to swallow their disappointment at the failure of the regency principle, took the oaths and were busy in the early months of the Revolution helping to secure it among their fellow clerics. Bishop Ken was nearly convinced of the rightfulness of taking the oaths, but at the last moment he refused. Yet he would not become a stumbling block to his friends and urged many of them to comply with the government. The mass of the clergy undertook to exhort their flocks to unity, to join in Christian support of the new monarch. For those who required weighty arguments, they employed every clerical, constitutional, historic precedent possible to win support for William.

CHAPTER 3

The Conservative Revolution, The Church, and the Via Media

"It is a Question not easily determined, whether a State of Liberty, without any restraint, that leaves all Men to a full freedom of acting as they please; or a State of Restraint, that shuts out all Liberty, is the more miserable of the two. The one subdues whole Nations to the Humours of one flattered... Tyrant; and the other exposes Men to the Frauds and Violences of all their Neighbours; this keeps all Men in a constant State of War, and that makes them languish under a base depression of Spirit. In one word, the one makes Men Beasts of Prey, and the other makes them Beasts of Burden. The Mean between these two Extreame, is a Just Government, that conducts those that are under it, by constant and fixed Rules, that limits Mens Rights, and restrains their Passions; ... and ... that renders every Man safe, and that puts him in a way to make himself happy."¹ Thus, Burnet extolled the virtue of the just British constitution, which he felt was preserved by the moderation of a Revolution that had retained all that was truly fundamental without going to an excess of reform. The ideal of liberty had not become license, nor had the belief in state sovereignty grown into absolutism. The mean, the "via media," that had ever been the mark of Anglicanism, was preserved in this glorious Revolution.

Historians in the nineteenth century tradition, attempting to make sense out of the spectrum of political parties that emerged in the Revolution era, have always tended to place the "Church party" among the highly conservative, even reactionary, elements of the seventeenth century. The Church's doctrines of divine right, nonresistance, and passive obedience, have been held up as proof of the Church's

desire to hold back "progress," and it has been inferred that these doctrines, were it not for heroic Whigs, would have made England into a French or Prussian style monarchy by the mid-eighteenth century. There is, indeed, enough truth in the facts of late seventeenth century politics to give a sound of validity to this generalization, especially if one views them in the light of nineteenth and twentieth century developments. The "divine right of kings" must have seemed a monstrously ridiculous sentiment in Macaulay's age, for in a world which encouraged the romantic revolutions for freedom in Latin America, in Hungary, Germany, Greece and Italy, passive obedience and nonresistance were greater sins than the liberal could bear.

The churchmen of William's time viewed their position in another light. Many of them had personally experienced popular and irresponsible rebellion in a civil war that had destroyed more than it had created. In their world it was necessary to have a holy regard for the laws and for a prince who was able to maintain them. Order was the paramount consideration in a society whose susceptibility to the disease of anarchy demanded the cure of a brave and powerful prince. On the other hand, this cure must be moderate, for the prince could destroy society with a power that was absolute; James Stuart had shown that danger to be real. Thus the Church, as the conscience of the body politic, regarded its various stands as pointing ever to the golden mean between anarchy and absolutism, as maintaining a well-ordered state of social and political unity.²

The churchmen of the Revolution regarded their teachings as lying between the extremes of "those who have taught the People...to Mutiny and take Arms against their Sovereign Lords" and "those who would persuade Governors to Rule by Arbitrary Power, and not to have respect to the Laws, and the General Good...."³ Two parties in the nation were regarded as undermining the government—the one by subversively attempting to introduce popery, the other by attempting to destroy divine right Protestant monarchy. Obedience and nonresistance alone could combat rebellion, while Protestantism would destroy Popery. Thus obedience and Anglicanism had saved England in the glorious days of Queen Bess. Abednego Seller published his excellent *History of Passive*

Obedience since the Reformation (1689), with the express purpose of showing that passive obedience and nonresistance were not innovations of clever Stuart policy, but had been basic tenets of the Church from its beginnings, designed to counter the claimed deposing power of the Pope and the pretended right of popular deposition. Of all the contending parties of the seventeenth century, the Church alone had at all times remained loyal to the king's government.⁴

According to good Anglican theory, which viewed the Pope as falsely claiming a secular authority which Christ had not granted, the Reformation had purged England from "the Rights of Investiture, the Exemption of Clerks, the Protection of Sanctuaries, the Cognizance of Civil Causes in Courts Christian, and other like pretences of a Church wholly Independent [of] the State [which had] brought Infinite Scandal and Trouble to our English Nation."⁵ When, during Elizabeth's reign, the Pope had excommunicated her and freed her subjects from obedience, the doctrine of non-resistance was brought into play to protect that monarch and "beat down the unjust Power the Pope pretends to, of absolving Subjects from their Oath of Allegiance."⁶ The fear of the deposing power had so impressed the minds of the clergy that it was little wonder the bishops of the Convention voted so strongly in favor of a regency. A Church of England deposition would have linked it with the beliefs of the century's most popular bugbear, the crafty Jesuit, a mean creature who would hazard his own soul for the advancement of his religion, or so it was said.⁷ The Church could hardly wish to be associated with Romanism.

Next to the fear of Catholicism came the fear of republicanism. Charles Leslie, one of the leading nonjurors, saw in the whole dissenting movement the aim of destroying monarchy in another "Ursurpation of Forty one." "We know their Principles," he cried, "It is not the First time. Therefore we must look to ourselves, before it be too late. Will a Toleration Lessen or Encrease their numbers? We must take our Measures accordingly. And if they Snarle now, will they Bite e're long."⁸ The nonjuror loved to point out the danger to the Church:

Henry the Eighth pull'd down
Abbeys and Cells;

But Henry the Ninth will pull down
Churches and Bells.

"By Churches and Bells they understand the Episcopal Church and Ceremonies....And they think, that Henry the Ninth, and the Time is now come."⁹ Leslie went so far as to "discover" that the republican dissenters were but Jesuits disguised, who had achieved freedom to plot under the Toleration Act, for "it is the Receiv'd Maxim of the Politicks at Rome, that the first step to be made towards Destroying the Church of England, is giving Toleration to the Dissenters..."¹⁰

Leslie's tactic of linking republicanism with dissent, though it may have confirmed his fellow nonjurors in their abhorrence of the Revolution Settlement, did not convince the majority of the juring clergy. The Revolution churchmen viewed republicanism in terms of a general fear of anarchy and atheism, the product of too great a love of liberty and too little love of religion. If most Anglicans could not accept contract theory as enunciated by the arch-Whigs, it was because of the implications of a levelling democracy involved in its assumption: "what are the Ends they are driving on?...are they not rather such as would undermine the Government, both in Church and State, and reduce us to a State of Nature, wherein the People are at liberty to agree upon any Government, or none at all?"¹¹ Sherlock pointed out that the contract had not been broken, for under the British constitution, which the Convention had followed, the king never dies, and the crown, being successive, cannot be disposed of by the people.¹² Even after his enemies had forced him before the bar of the House of Commons, Edmund Bohun, a firm believer in the Revolution, wrote in his diary that he would never deny that hereditary succession was eternally opposed to popular election, that the doctrine of passive obedience was a firm safeguard against popular rebellion, and that the allegiance sworn by the subject to his king was an oath that could not be broken by an assumed power of deposition.¹³ But since republicanism posed no actual danger to the government in 1689, Gilbert Burnet concluded that the nation was cured of popular eruptions and the constitution was strong enough to withstand any tendencies toward disorder and disobedience.¹⁴

A new party, which came into being as a result of the Revolution, formed a third group against which the Church felt compelled to contend. These were the nonjurors, who dwelled in a quixotic world of pure legalism, pure conscience, and pure fantasy. It is seldom given the world a chance to see, except perhaps among Indian mystics or Trappist monks, the results of man's refusal to come to any terms with the stark realities of a life that in most of us demands a compromise. The nonjurors were the group of whom Macaulay said: "Something is to be said for the man who sacrifices liberty to preserve order. Something is to be said for the man who sacrifices order to preserve liberty But the nonjuror sacrificed, not liberty to order, not order to liberty, but both liberty and order to a superstition as stupid and degrading as the Egyptian worship of cats and onions."¹⁵ A bit severe, no doubt, but nevertheless the nonjurors, who, had there been no oath of allegiance forced upon them by William's government might have stayed with their Church after the Revolution, made of the oath an end in itself. If the nonjuror had kept the debate on the oath confined to the moral argument that it imperiled one's immortal soul to take it, he might have kept the respect of the whole nation; but the argument went beyond this to accuse the whole Establishment of being apostate in yielding to an unlawful usurpation which had no authority to deprive ecclesiastics of their temporal livings. They insisted that in his flight James could never be said to have abdicated, since neither the king nor the people could dissolve what God had ordained.

About 400 of the clergy finally were deprived by the government, and their stations ranked from the Archbishop to the lowliest village priest. On the whole, the nonjurors had looked upon their office as sacred, and not merely as a trust. The communion was to them a sacrifice, the priest's place in the ritual regarded as necessary for the miracle. Their Anglo-Catholic position has been compared with that of the Oxford Movement's reaction to governmental interference in spiritual affairs in the nineteenth century.¹⁶ There was little else that unified the nonjurors beyond these basic sentiments, for this group formulated no political platform other than that implied in a united regret that the Revolution

had ever happened. Bishop Cartwright went into exile with James, but with his death and that of Thomas and Lake in 1689, the movement lost some of its leadership. Turner and Sancroft, however, lived to set up their own nonjuring Church outside the Establishment. Frampton and Ken, in contrast to these two, refused to encourage the schism, and in 1710 Ken abandoned his pretended title to Bath and Wells. The attack on the Revolution was directed by George Hickes and Thomas Wagstaffe. Wagstaffe was an excellent doctor whose son became the Anglican chaplain to the old and young pretenders; Hickes, who took refuge for a time with White Kennett, the Williamite, became one of the age's great scholars, an expert in languages and theology. These two, with Jeremy Collier of greater fame, formed the unyielding core of the movement. In contrast, Robert Nelson, noted for his charity, and Henry Dodwell, the Oxford historian, led a group of nonjurors back to the Church in 1710. The arguments of the nonjurors against the Revolution and its churchmen would fill a library, all of them righteous in tone, some sound in argument, many of them bitter, and some cruel and unfair.¹⁷

Although the Church's reaction to the nonjurors was varied, most of the juring clergy felt that "There is a Respect due to such as are willing to Suffer for their Consciences."¹⁸ There were proposals early in the Revolution to allow a number of the bishops freedom from taking the new oath, and Burnet, Lamplugh of York, Thomas, and Cartwright attempted to win such a concession from the government.¹⁹ Bishop Compton, on the other hand, would have nothing to do with the nonjuring; he harried them out of his province, excommunicating some who would not leave.²⁰ Stillingfleet felt that the nonjurors were taking too lofty a stand, "and would have it taken for granted, that the whole Nation (themselves excepted) [are] under the guilt of Perjury and Rebellion."²¹ The Church pointed out that these self-righteous ones who had not taken up arms for James during the Revolution were as responsible for William's victory as those who had worked for it, since they had helped to select the Convention Parliament's members who in turn had granted William the throne. Indeed, Burnet and others had interpreted Sancroft's silence throughout the Revolution as

giving assent to the course the nation was following; for if the nonjurors "did then judge [it] so unlawfull. . . they ought to have thundred both with their Sermons and Censures against it, especially in the first fermentation, when a vigorous Opposition might have had considerable Effects. . ." ²² But with the damage done, and James off the throne, "they think to make him amends, by a sullen disclaiming of the present King's Sovereignty." ²³ With some cause for anger, churchmen indicated that it was Sancroft and his bishops who had precipitated the Revolution and later deserted those whom they had led into it. Throughout the debates in the Convention nothing could satisfy those who were becoming nonjurors. They had rejected the contract theory, found fault with the word "abdication," and could not bear with Parliament's declaring the throne vacant. As for the power of the state to deprive the nonjurors, the Church of England had always been incorporated in the state, argued Stillingfleet, and the state had supremacy in ecclesiastical appointments. The Reformation restored this temporal power which demanded that clerics be deprived for offenses against the state. Besides, it was common sense that the nonjuring clergy should be deprived because of the influence they might have in preaching doctrines of rebellion against the new government. ²⁴

The charge of innovation was probably the most interesting argument used against the nonjurors. Churchmen regarded the idea of regency, which Sancroft had advocated, as a policy that would have made King James a mere figurehead by the restrictions placed on his person. And once back upon the throne under such conditions, would James not claim that his promises were void because they were made under duress? These constitutional difficulties were avoided, said one clergyman, by the declaration that James had abdicated. Now that James was so suddenly and successfully deprived of his throne, would it not be better to leave things as they were, rather than see a repetition of all the old abuses and go through the old struggles again? ²⁵

The Revolution had posed for the juring as well as the nonjuring clergy a problem not easily overcome. During the early days of William's reign it was admitted that if the Church complied with the Revolution its enemies could

claim it had preached doctrines it no longer intended to practice. On the other hand, if the doctrine of passive obedience was to be condemned, "then we own that our Church has been all along, before this Revolution, a false Guide...."²⁶ The problem of who should be regarded as the rightful monarch was not to be easily resolved. Not only were there conflicting theological and political interests to be considered, but it was recognized that the Church's regard for nonresistance had been so great that "we have almost lost our liberty of thinking freely, and judging impartially of these matters."²⁷ Yet even in the midst of these quandaries, moderation cautioned against excessive behavior. It was true that rebellion was a sin, but the Church was warned not to go so far as to abandon all regard for basic English liberties merely because these had been espoused by republicans; it would not abandon the doctrine of Christ because the papists also claimed it as theirs. Equally, the more liberal minded of the Church were cautioned not to go to the other extreme by rejecting strong monarchy as the creation of Catholic political theory, for it was the Jesuit himself who believed in deposing and subverting Protestant monarchy.²⁸

Sherlock and others hastened to show their fellows that the Revolution in fact presented no dilemmas, for men could "swear Allegiance to King William and Queen Mary without Perjury, and without renouncing any Principles of the Church of England; nay...the...Church of England requires us to do so...."²⁹ Nonresistance and passive obedience, although they may have been overstressed in the late reigns, were regarded as still needful. Edmund Bohun's *History of the Desertion* (1689), one of the earliest and best accounts of the Revolution, was written for the purpose of showing to all that the old doctrines were not violated by the decision of the nation. Edward Stillingfleet pointed to the true conservative nature of the Revolution, showing that "the Matter in dispute is not whether rightful, lawful Kings are to be obey'd, but who in our present Circumstances is our rightful, lawful Sovereign; not whether Kings be not God's Viceregents, but whether God doth not sometimes confer the Right of Sovereignty by... the Law of Nations, which establisheth such a Right upon the Success of a just

War; not whether Sovereign Princes are not accountable only to God, but whether Allegiance be not due where the Rights of Sovereignty are plac'd, by an extraordinary Act of Providence, and the concurrent Consent of the Nation." ³⁰ In extraordinary political circumstances some way must be found for government to continue. If a prince is able to put his commands into force, if the majority of the nation is behind him and recognizes him as king, if he dispenses justice and maintains order, then the golden mean in government is discovered. After all, it is "good Government, and Laws well Executed, which must make the Societies of Men tolerable and useful to each other." ³¹

The message of moderation had been impressed upon the nation by churchmen during the deliberations of the Convention. The Parliament was cautioned not to experiment with unknown forms and not to regard itself as a constituent assembly. Burnet warned in his sermons against letting the passions rule or allowing anger or reforming zeal to precipitate injudicious changes in the constitution. The first chapter of a work entitled "Agreement betwixt the present and the Former Government," warned in its heading, "Unnecessary Changes in Government are to be avoided as dangerous." Christ, it was shown, had been no innovator, having come to fulfill the Old Testament, not to destroy it, just as the Convention ought to strengthen, not destroy, the old British constitution: "it seems much the Concern of the New State... to make as little Alteration in the former Maxims and Customs... as is possible, lest the old Leven should work again to the prejudice of the new Establishment." ³²

The favorite nonjuring analogy compared the Revolution of 1688 with the events that led up to the execution of Charles I. But the case of the desertion of James, as demonstrated by Sherlock, indicated that there had been no rebellion, for "To take a Crown from a Prince, and his Liberty and Life with it, and to suffer him to leave his Crown if he pleases, and to desert his Government, are two very different things." ³³ The Revolution was not a movement designed to overthrow an old system in favor of a new order; it was a mere repudiation of an odious policy and of the prince who had reformulated that policy. It was not that

the people had rebelled, but that when James had been faced with a foreign invasion he had not been able to count on the support of those whom he had alienated. It had been a part of the belief in nonresistance that if one should find oneself commanded by a prince to do an unchristian act (such as aiding in the destruction of the Church), he must not rebel against that prince, but passively refuse all orders to assist in the execution of the act. Far from rebelling, the Church could say that in the Revolution the nation had been merely a passive witness, for, as Bohun put it, "tho I am bound not to resist, I am not equally bound to assist, my hands may be tied both ways... And this was the case of England, we were persecuted... by a handful of Men, who expected to ruin us by our own hands; and we were bound not to assist them in this wicked and foolish Project..."³⁴ There had been no disloyal exhortations from the pulpit to persuade men to fight for either the Prince of Orange or King James, and, counseled the Church, if some few men had declared for the former too hastily, they had to look to their own souls. James had decided everything by leaving England to the Charge of King William, while the nation stood by passively. No guilt thus could be associated with what had not been a national rebellion.³⁵

Probably no single feature about the Revolution has impressed modern historians as much as the Parliamentary creation of King William and Queen Mary. Contemporaries, too, were impressed by what seemed a great precedent, clearly a sign that the kings of England had become elective. But what seemed such a great stride toward constitutional monarchy was little more than a revival of ancient tradition going back to Anglo-Saxon and Anglo-Norman precedent. In submitting their claim to the national assembly, and in Parliament's selecting the next in line, the Prince of Wales's claim having been dismissed, William and Mary and Parliament were adhering to the ancient concept of hereditary right and popular acclamation. The Church hurriedly argued this point to the disaffected clergy: William had received the throne by the consent of Princess Mary without entrenching upon the right of succession which was kept in the same line. Furthermore, Parliament had given assurance that it would respect the lineal descent by placing Princess Anne's

children in succession before those William might have by another wife should he outlive Queen Mary. There was complete truth also in the statement that under the constitution it was not necessary that the next immediate heir should succeed, and even the conservative Dr. Sherlock admitted that "the King, together with his Parliament, may... regulate and entail the Succession, as shall by them be thought fit...."³⁶ The Revolution certainly was not the first time a king had been judged unfit to carry on the government. It was foolish then to say that Parliament made the monarchy elective and that the constitution was altered, since the throne had never been purely hereditary from its beginnings. Even as late as Henry VIII's reign, it was pointed out, Parliament had had a hand in determining the succession, for both Mary I and Elizabeth succeeded to the crown on the strength of Henry's Act of Settlement.³⁷

It is the conclusion of most historians that the monarchy became limited in the modern sense when William was granted the throne in return for his acceptance of a Bill of Rights which contained the famous contract theory. The crown thereafter was supposedly the gift of the people of England, and William had traded sovereignty for support in the French wars.³⁸ But at closer inspection, the conditional nature of the Declaration of Rights becomes negligible, since the offer of the crown was never made explicitly contingent upon acceptance of the Declaration. In fact, the final form of the Bill of Rights did not appear until some months after William and Mary had been safely crowned, at which time it was given royal approval. Furthermore, when the monarchs signed the Bill, it no longer contained reference to the breaking of the social contract. It is true that in an earlier stage of debate, in February of 1689, the contract had passed both houses; but it was eventually dropped, possibly because the Whigs felt compelled to give support to the Church, and because the common lawyers, when asked about the validity of the contract, refused to give legal sanction to a political fiction they could not find among the laws of England. Thus, in a very real sense, the Bill of Rights was the victory of Church theory, for the alternative to the contract, the abdication, made no mention of the origins of government and kingship, which could still be as-

sumed to be of divine right, requiring a continued obedience and nonresistance to the new monarch.³⁹

"Why Sir, here is no Occasion to talk of a Deposition," explained one pamphleteer, "the King is gone of his own accord freely; and [the Convention] are only to consider whether we shall perish in a State of Anarchy, [or] recall him, and suffer over again all that is past...."⁴⁰ Others, in reply to those who claimed that the authority of William would depend on Parliament, replied, "Did Queen Elizabeth or King James I. owe all their Authority to the Parliaments which recognized their respective Rights?"⁴¹ The Church hastened to point out that the abdication principle indicated that Parliament would have nothing to do with the right of deposition, and although the Declaration of Rights listed a great number of grievances, Parliament did not call James to account for them, nor did it declare that the king is accountable.⁴²

Thus, at the close of the Revolution the Church was able to point with some pride to the large part it had played in the Settlement. The *via media* had been preserved, not only in the spirit of the Church, but in the spirit of English law: "The Monarchy is the same still, and the Three Estates of the Nation the same; the Church of England, and the Laws and Liberties of the Nation secured...."⁴³ There was more of restoration than revolution in the events of 1689, for the constitution had been saved from the innovations that James had introduced, just as the Restoration of 1660 had preserved it from the innovations of the Commonwealth.

It is true that although both nonjuror and Jacobite were aware that the contract had not been made a part of the constitution, they considered the fact of little consequence and were not won over.⁴⁴ There were others who complained that the monarchy had not been sufficiently placed within restraints. The suspending power had been removed entirely, but the dispensing power was thought to be only provisionally limited: "A Dispensing Power assumed by any Prince doth fatally threaten the Liberties of a People where it is practised...it was indispensably the Duty of a Reforming Prince...and Parliament, to have decided this Controversie.... But our Parliaments have thought fit to leave

it where they found it, dark and undecided to this Day...!"⁴⁵ Roger Morrice, the nonconformist who had left the Church with Baxter at the Restoration, was bitterly disillusioned at the failure of comprehension.⁴⁶ The Revolution, as with any political act, could not fail to displease some; but its popularity among the people consisted in its conservation of a liberty and a religion with which they were familiar. It was not that the king had been too absolute, but that the wrong king had been too absolute; it was not that the monarchy was to be thoroughly limited, but that a Catholic monarchy was to be excluded. The Revolution, as the expression of the *via media*, was a rejection of revolutionary innovation in favor of a church and state polity approved by the long usage of history, the ancient precedence of the law, and the spirit of reformed Christianity.

CHAPTER 4

The Oath of Allegiance and the Origins of Government

In studying the Church's relation to the Revolution, there can be no correct analysis unless one considers the oath of allegiance. There is a paradox involved in the oath, however, because it was at once the most significant and the least significant feature of the work done by the Convention Parliament. Because of the oath the Church was forced to hazard a split that might have destroyed the old establishment; but the oath was overshadowed by the greater issue of sovereignty which went beyond mere considerations of allegiance. If the "illegal" Parliament and crown had the right to impose a new oath, it also had the right to enforce it by depriving of their offices those who failed to take it. Thus the oath became the test of the new government's powers, for as long as men continued in offices granted by the previous sovereign, they could exert their powers, if they chose, in his behalf and according to the allegiance they bore him. The Convention could do little if its authority, and that of William's were questioned, which is precisely why the nonjurors chose to ignore the oath and continued to officiate in their offices as if they constituted the real Church of England. In maintaining such a fiction they avoided the necessity of admitting that the Revolution government existed; by not recognizing the governmental deprivations, the apostolic succession would remain unbroken. Thus the oath was important as the cause of the nonjuring movement because the nonjurors applied it far beyond its original intent; but for those churchmen who swore the oath, while they felt compelled to examine their

reasons for doing so, the oath was merely a symbol of their acceptance of the Revolution.

The new oath of allegiance was produced during the latter half of March and early April, 1689. During the debates in the Lords, it looked for a time as though it might not be imposed on any but those whose loyalty was doubted. However, the Commons would not tolerate such a compromise, and although it accepted the loose wording, it insisted that the oath be taken by any person who was to hold office under the government, including those of the Church of England and the two universities. With this requirement, the bill passed Commons on March 18.

The seeming harmlessness of the wording showed how much of a compromise it was: "I, A. B., do sincerely promise and swear that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to their majesties King William and Queen Mary, So help me God." Its most notable feature was the absence of a declaration of right. The swearer was not called upon to believe that William and Mary were "rightful and lawful" sovereigns; and in contrast to the oath of 1660, the clergy were not forced to declare that their previous oath was unlawful or that the doctrine of resistance was to be held in abhorrence. These last two provisions had effectively eliminated Presbyterians from the Church at the Restoration, but the new oath was designed to keep as many men as possible from deserting to James. The scruples of good Episcopalians like Nottingham were thus respected, and a means of accommodating some of the willing though reluctant nonjurors was found.¹

Another conservative feature of the oath was the provision for its execution. According to the terms of the bill, all clergymen could continue in their offices until August 1, 1689, after which time, if they had not taken the oath, they were to be suspended from their duties. Six months would then be allowed for them to study the point, and if by February 1, 1689/90, they still refused, they were to be deprived. At one point in the debates on the oath it was suggested that twelve of the higher clergy be freed from swearing, according to the procedure usually followed in the case of incumbent clergy, but no exceptions were allowed. By far the greater majority of clergy, to the number of some

10,000, took the oath well before the date of deprivation; but, as Morrice noted, large numbers of the disaffected clergy, who held off until February 1, came into London from the provinces during that week to beat the deadline.²

From the time the new oath left the hands of Parliament to the date when the deprivations were to commence, no issue so occupied the printers as the oath. The nature and history of oaths in general was a favorite topic of conversation. The clergy and the scrupulous laity were concerned because an oath was a religious act which bound the swearer to its terms as long as those terms were in force. Thus many pondered the question of the prior oath they had taken to James, which according to Anglican theory, might still be in force, for "'Neither the Pope, nor the Parliament, nor any Council, nor any Governour Ecclesiastical or Civil, hath the Power of Dispensing in Promises, Contracts, or Oaths....'"³ The clergy in particular therefore felt they might easily have continued in their offices if Parliament had not thought fit to press the taking of the oath. One letter reveals that many Anglicans regarded the matter as choosing between two sins, treason and perjury.⁴ Perhaps the most common attitude was that if the oath were not taken a person might well find himself in trouble with the authorities; therefore it was good policy to comply, "for Bishop Sanderson tells us... 'if besides the command [to take the oath], force be added, so that there be no refusing without the greatest danger, it is to be determin'd that a truly Religious Man may admit of such an Oath.'"⁵

Other churchmen pointed out that there need be no fear in taking an oath that required no judgment of rightful sovereignty. In Stillingfleet's *a posteriori* casuistry, oaths were of two types, one demanding a declaration of right on the part of the swearer, the other merely requiring a submissive allegiance without the declaration. He and other Anglicans gave much publicity to the fact that Parliament intended the latter usage.⁶ If this argument was not convincing, it could be further shown that since William was a monarch in his own right, and not a common rebel, allegiance was due to him on these grounds. If all Europe, except Louis XIV, recognized his government, what right would the private citizen have in denying it?⁷ Further than

this, if the new monarch fulfilled his part of the requirement by protecting his new subjects, they should certainly feel obliged to do their part by swearing allegiance to their protector. Allegiance, after all, could be given only to a prince while that prince was able to maintain a right to it, and if a new monarch replaced the old, allegiance must go to his successor. This had been the rule throughout English history, regardless of the manner of succession.⁸

The most able discussion of the problem came from the pen of Bishop Edward Stillingfleet. He pointed out in his *Discourse concerning the Unreasonableness of a New Separation, On account of the Oaths* (1689), that those who quibbled about the new allegiance had concerned themselves too much with the nature of oaths and too little with their function. It was true, he said, that there seemed to be a contradiction in taking the new oath, and that there was a personal obligation consequent upon any oath, but "the Rule and Measure of it, is not to be taken from such Intention of the persons [who require allegiance], but from the General Good, which was chiefly intentioned in such things. For, there is a Common Good of human Society, which Mankind have an obligation to, antecedent to that obligation they are under to particular persons. For, as Magistrates were designed for a general Good, so the obligation to them must be understood..."⁹ The rule by which Stillingfleet measured allegiance was that of the public good, and his argument became the theme of succeeding pamphleteers. Those who insisted on the perpetuity of the obligation in their oath to King James were told they were blind to their prior obligations to their Church and nation. There was no question in the minds of the Revolution clergy but that allegiance was an indispensable duty without which society would be ruined, but they also stated that there must be a limit to allegiance, especially when a whole nation was confronted with a king who would turn allegiance into bondage.¹⁰ The basic rules by which any government maintained itself were regarded as sound and workable, but occasionally, even in the best run of kingdoms, an irregular eruption might put to a standstill the usual rules and guides. When the interest of the magistrate was in conjunction with public safety and happiness, the prince could

claim the loyalty of every citizen. But this was not always the case, as the Revolution proved. In reality, the Revolution was not a test of any group's loyalty, but a test as to how well a nation and a Church could withstand the effects of an unusual dynastic change. Both nation and Church recovered quickly from the initial shock of revolution, perhaps because of the moderating influence of the Church, and because the issue of the oath, kept reasonably limited by the greater necessities of the nation, did not prove an effective bar to the continuance of the new government.

It has been mentioned that the oath to William and Mary was only a small part of the larger debate on sovereignty. In this age it was difficult to discuss an issue without discussing first principles. The new oath was taken or rejected as the philosophy of sovereignty which it implied was accepted or rejected. Thus, the Church felt compelled not only to analyze the nature of oaths, but to re-study the very origins of society and government in an attempt to keep its bearings in a rapidly changing world.

There was no question but that God's order still ruled the late seventeenth century universe: "God is the Fountain of all Government, being not the Author of Confusion but of Peace, and hath establish'd Order among all Creatures; in the Angelical Nature he hath constituted several Orders, Angels and Archangels, Principalities, Powers and Dominions; in the Celestial Bodies, the Sun to rule by Day, and the Moon by Night, and one Star differing from another star in glory. And when he made the first man, he gave him dominion over all the Works of his hands.... And when the Families of the Earth were multiply'd, so that one Father or Family could not claim authority over the rest; and considering the great Corruption of Nature, it was impossible but Violence and Injustice would be practis'd, Mankind saw a necessity of setting up one common Father over many Families, to suppress Violence, redress Injuries, and distribute Justice...!"¹¹

When men examined the very foundations of their societies, it was the duty of every writer who explored political philosophy to trace his concept back to a point of origin, an ultimate source. The search for this ultimate and pure state, the Church believed, would lead one to God and His word. No other answer could satisfy. But the governance of the

universe was not a question of God's permissiveness, for the concept that He was "not the Author of Confusion but of Peace," introduced the idea of a God of supreme order and logic. Natural philosophy was esteemed as the science of God's creation, so that when this science discovered order throughout the spheres of creation, it was natural to assume that order was one of God's supreme attributes, an expression of His love. Thus the way to best understand that order and love was through the Bible and the actions of nature and men, for science and theology were as yet united.

In this same sense, the Bible was regarded as a study of the beginnings of human society, a God-given record of man's past. Filmer had made such a study of it in developing his patriarchal theory. Bishop Lloyd, in the same way, used the Bible, giving a careful historical account of the early kingdoms of the earth. Tenison was not unaware that the Bible was significant as a historical source, for its records were originally set down so that the Israelites might not err in the repetition of past mistakes; God "caus'd those Statutes and Wonders to be written down; not leaving them to the uncertainty of Oral Tradition, which sometimes either passeth by things of moment, or delivers them down very imperfectly; and too often brings it to pass, that the Legends of one Age, become History in Those that follow."¹² The story of the Bible was still terribly pertinent to the unfolding developments of William's reign, and the prophecies and judgments recorded therein had power still to warn and direct people living under the new dispensation. "For certainly the Pen of this Divine Scribe was not made in vain."¹³ Human nature remaining the same throughout history, Old Testament history could be applied to the problems of the day: "'the thing which hath been, is that which shall be, and there is no new thing under the Sun,'" quoted Burnet.¹⁴ However, the danger that lurked in the use of the Bible as a political handbook was that it placed that source among a host of others--the common law, human history, moral and natural philosophy--and it could not but lose its force as the fiat of God. Once faith became fact, that fact would become vulnerable to verification, as in the application of higher criticism, and what had before been absolute, would become liable to the laws of relativity.

Nevertheless the Bible was still a potent force in the Church's justification of the Revolution. While the non-jurors stressed its importance, asserting that to leave its principles was to abandon religion to atheism, the Church concurred by drawing its chief arguments from the word of God. For the first time in an English coronation, a Bible was presented to William and Mary as "the most valuable thing that this world contains." If some clergymen, such as Peter Allix, were to reject the pertinence of Biblical guidance in political affairs,¹⁵ their example was not to be followed by a Church that was charged by its opponents with transgressing Biblical sanctions.

Possibly the most reiterated Biblical passage of the later Stuart Church was Romans 13, verses 1-7. Upon the general statement, "the powers that be are ordained of God," much of the fabric of divine right was built; upon "Whosoever resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God," passive obedience and nonresistance were upheld; and, "they that resist shall receive themselves to damnation," was to become the rallying cry of the nonjurors. The Church, from the time of Cranmer to that of Butler, believed in the authority of Romans 13 and other such Biblical statements. These gave to government the very sanction of God's ordinance. The theme of every sermon that in any way dealt with matters of state expressed the belief that "Magistracy and Government is an undoubted Ordinance and Institution of Almighty God. It is the Will and Appointment of Heaven that all Nations should have some Government and Order among them: That some one, or more, should have Authority to rule, and the rest should reverence, love, and obey that Authority."¹⁶ On this one point there was agreement between nonjuror and juror, for both regarded the concept of sovereignty as primarily a religious issue, the chain of authority running from its pure source in God to the authority of the father of the humblest family.

The order of such a chain of authority was seen as part of the grander order of the universe, for nature and reason were supporting arguments for religion. "Men have Three Rules to walk by," it was said, "Nature, Reason, and Religion." Nature was the basic law of preservation

of life; reason directed men to society and social aims; religion showed the way to their salvation. Thus government was seen as part of the grand scheme of God, and a major means to man's salvation. The very existence of governments throughout history and in all lands, indicated that God had clearly implanted the social instinct in all humans. Therefore the divinity that existed in both man and nature dictated that government was of God's creation, and was itself divine.¹⁷

The primal aim of government, according to basic Pauline and Augustinian doctrine, was the protection of the individuals in its charge. "All Rulers...are obliged by the Almighty and Supreme Sovereign, to Exert their Governing Power for the promoting his Service and Honour, and to exercise their Authority for the Safety, Welfare, and Prosperity of those over whom they are established."¹⁸ *Salus populi*, according to the writings of Hooker and Sanderson, was the supreme aim of all government. It was clear, as Lloyd tried to convince Clarendon, that if any government could do this, it was just for the citizen so protected to give his allegiance to that government.¹⁹

The question that interested most thoughtful Englishmen during the seventeenth century, and which fashioned their individual opinions regarding sovereignty, was that of the origins of government. Men searched carefully through every ancient document looking for some hint as to how God had established government. God's will was of paramount importance, for without it, no theory could find its absolute sanction. Some men believed that God had made a delegation of supreme authority to the people in general; some, that He had granted it to Adam, the first ruler; some thought that nature had granted authority to the strength that conquerors used to defeat nations in trials of combat. Bishop Lloyd observed that all these forms of origin were Biblically sanctioned, from the direct grant of power to Saul, to the triumphs of meritorious Roman conquerors.²⁰ But while there were many origins to choose from, it remained true that man required some form of government.

It is impossible to say which of these theories of governmental origin most churchmen of the Revolution favored. Probably the one most familiar to them, however, was patri-

archal theory, which Filmer perfected and Leslie raised to great heights of respect among the clergy. According to Leslie, "a family is a little Kingdom, and a Kingdom is nothing but a great family." It was an idea that appealed to most clergymen because of its Biblical simplicity. Adam, as the first father, had obviously received from God the first right to rule, a right strengthened by the fifth commandment. Sherlock held the uncomplicated view that the power of the greatest king was derived from the paternal authority of the father over his son. Even Burnet, who stated that the family was the only government which was founded on the law of nature, accepted patriarchal theory, but in reflecting on the case of King James, he inserted the interesting speculation that if a father "goes about to destroy his Children," then the children have a perfect right to defend themselves.²¹

If one objected to the implications of divine right patriarchal theory, one could easily accept some form of the compact, easily the most widely held belief of the day. The social contract needs no great explanation, for the idea had been in use from the days of Old Testament covenant to the formation of modern federated government, every age having produced some variation of it. The seventeenth century knew the idea from its knowledge of the *foedus* of the civil law, the mediaeval feudal oath, the writings of Hooker, Languet, and Hobbes, and, before the appearance of Locke's study, from Jurieu, the French Huguenot leader who had given it wide publicity during the Revolution. The social contract had, however, suffered in its reputation during the civil wars since it had been the tool of republican dissenters who had rebelled against and killed a king in its name. Hooker and Languet, in their formulation of the idea, had given no mandate for the people to rebel, for they had in mind only the limitations that a prince should be under in a reformed Christian state. Languet stressed that only the aristocracy should play a part in resisting the unchristian acts of a prince. Social and constitutional levellers of Cromwell's army had made the contract an unpopular argument with the Church of England; but in France Jurieu and Peter Allix still understood the idea in the context of the *Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos*, and in France that context was still respectable among Protestants. Perhaps

this explains why Allix, after he joined the Anglican Church, was one of the few churchmen who employed the contract without the apprehensive qualifications placed on it by his English brethren.

Allix dismissed the concept that government originated in natural law or in the right of parents over their children. He had early mastered the elements of British history, and, from works like the *Mirror of Justice*, he conceived the idea that the social contract had originated in England as a constitutional limitation on the crown: The Britons " 'chose themselves one King to reign over them, to govern God's People, and to maintain and defend their Persons and their Goods in Peace by Rules of Law. And at the beginning they made the King to swear, That he should maintain the Christian Faith with all his Power, and govern his People by Law'" Thus, for Allix, the contract remained a part of the constitution in the implied obligation taken by the monarch at his coronation, "the Seal of that Original Contract."²² The coronation oath as contract was for most churchmen an acceptable interpretation. Stillingfleet believed that if there were a contract, it certainly was derived from feudal allegiance and the reciprocal duties that king and vassal assumed at the coronation. Burnet also believed that the very term "allegiance" rose out of the feudal law, for in the fealty that the vassal swore there was implied an original contract.²³

A number of Anglicans held contract theory even higher than did Allix. And although these were few, some did maintain that "God did at first derive an Original Power from himself to the People, to settle among themselves their own Supream Magistrates and Governours, which afterwards they lodg'd in their Trustees the Parliament."²⁴ Before he abandoned the democratic implications of the contract theory, Burnet considered government as a compromise by which the people resigned their rights to a single person, assuming that the right must have been lodged with them from the beginning.²⁵ Perhaps the most sensible explanation of the contract, based on the Church's belief in *salus populi*, was that stated by the Reverend Samuel Masters, who did not consider the contract an explicit act of covenant, but as a tacit agreement between king and subject to observe those

common usages which by immemorial prescription became the common law of the land.²⁶

Thus contract theory had not lost all merit with Revolution churchmen, but just as the Church fought against being linked with the popish doctrine of deposition, so it could not fully accept an idea that republicans had made scandalous. Jeremy Collier, in his *Vindiciae Juris Regii* (1689), brilliantly attacked the contract on its democratic assumptions. If man, he said, was the reasonable creature some contractarians believed him to be, why was the odious authority of government maintained, when all governments ought to be disbanded and every man have his original charter returned to him. "But English-Men of all others, have the least reason to make Panegyricks upon the Discretion, and Governableness of the People. For not to mention the Barons Wars, How many Tylers and Cades, and Kets and Flammocks, have we had within the compass of Four Hundred Years?... how near was the State being overturn'd by the Rebellious Levity, and Madness of the Multitude? And after all these Instances of Confusion, we have certainly little reason to think that *Vox Populi* and *Vox Dei* are the same; or that Right and Wrong depend upon Numbers."

In England, government was certainly founded on conquest, said Collier, and because they have through all the centuries been vanquished by Saxon, Dane, Norman, and now Dutch, the English people could claim only those liberties granted by the conqueror. Essentially he believed that whatever rights had not been specifically confirmed upon the people must still be supposed to be lodged in the crown. Collier became a nonjuror because he did not believe the crown had granted the right of rebellion to the people, and the Revolution to him was plainly rebellion. The Parliamentarians had no right to set up a new monarch, he said, for by the oaths of allegiance and supremacy they had sworn to King James, they were still subject to him. In his version, contract theory became as silly as any fairy tale: "Once upon a time, when every Man was weary of Governing himself any longer...."²⁷ Collier was not alone, for to many churchmen there was no need for previous contracts between prince and people because divine law already commanded the prince to rule for the benefit of society;

any magistrate who transgressed this rule ceased to answer the end for which magistracy was instituted.²⁸

There certainly was nothing new in the formulations of sovereignty that came from the pens of these Revolution theorists. Yet the continued emphasis placed on the part that God played in the world, derived from the Bible, and the supreme sanction He gave to all governments, meant that any Anglican justification of the Revolution was bound to be fundamentalist in its approach. The Church was beginning to feel the effects of deistic arguments in theology and of secularistic policies in government. To avert what it felt to be a growing trend toward atheism, it turned man's attention to the eternal verities of holy writ in justifying the Revolution, in hopes of proving that God had not abandoned His world.

CHAPTER 5

Right by Conquest and the De Facto Monarch

There was no question in the mind of the average Anglican that the ordinary rule of succession to the crown of England was hereditary, for it prevented the dangerous consequences of disputed titles; but when faced with the events of 1688-1689, one observer recognized that "in extraordinary Interruptions and Convulsions of State, against the ordinary Course, our Laws and the Constitution do allow the Estates such a King as can actually be had for the Time being, till the ordinary Rule can be fairly recover'd" ¹ The search for the ordinary rule drove men to find familiar precedents with which to compare the "extraordinary Interruptions" the Revolution had brought on. The unusual nature of the Revolution moved one pamphleteer to say, "I verily believe our late King James is the first Instance of any Prince that ever ran away from his Government, and quitted the Crown without striking a stroke for it. . . ." ² This observation, however, did not solve the constitutional problem that faced the Convention Parliament. Its failure to find a precedent that could clarify the situation led to the pretense that James had abdicated and that the throne was vacant. In the absence of a Parliamentary or official doctrine to explain how the throne came to be thus vacant, the Church came forward with an explanation of the Revolution as an act of conquest which was "agreeable to the Laws and Practice of all Countries, to the Laws of our own Nation, to Reason, and which is more, unto Scripture itself." ³

The seventeenth century had considered the question

of where allegiance should lie in the event a king were replaced by a conqueror. Grotius and Pufendorf both came to the conclusion that if a conqueror were placed safely upon the throne, and the majority of the people recognized him as their sovereign, then the obligation to restore the former king lapsed. It was a recognized principle that possession of the throne was derived not only from heredity, donation, and law, but also by right of occupation, as the prize of a successful and just war. Perhaps, too, the acceptability of conquest doctrine was a legacy of Tudor ideas of sovereignty which placed greater emphasis on the ability than on the right of the king to rule: "the sword hath always been better than half the title to get, establish or maintain a kingdom."

From the bare fact that William came to England as the head of an invasion force, churchmen constructed an interpretation of the change in monarchy as having occurred as the result of a successful conquest. Bishop Lloyd possibly regarded the conquest idea as a solution to the problem of the interregnum. When James left England, the Bishop said, he left as a vanquished monarch whose place was immediately filled by the victor. Conquest had this virtue as well: it appealed to the Church's regard for divine sanction, for it could be shown that William had placed the issue of the Revolution in the hands of God by an appeal to battle.⁴ According to conquest theory, however, the appeal to arms had to be made in a good cause. A number of such causes were assigned to justify William's war. His personal interest was involved since he, through his wife, was heir to the throne, and James, by a "Jesuitical contrivance," had tried to impose upon the nation a supposititious son in order to disinherit the House of Orange: this "beinge [William's] belief and opinion, and there beinge no way for one Prince to sue another, nor way to determine their controversies, but the sword, I dare not condemne the Prince absolutely for makeing war on that occasion, tho' against an unkle and father."⁵ After James refused to have the succession determined by Parliament as William requested in one of his declarations, it was said that the Prince had no recourse but to invade England. Burnet considered that William as heir to the crown could not stand

by while his uncle was busy placing the nation under the foreign jurisdiction of Rome. Rather than see his inheritance wasted away by a tyrant's exploitation, he had every right to protect what was his and his wife's. There was yet a greater cause that made war just, for any monarch could go to battle in behalf of another's subjects, especially if they were on the point of becoming slaves.⁶

The practice of the primitive Church also was used to persuade men to allegiance. The Reverend Samuel Masters looked upon the nonjurors' adherence to their former oath as an interpretation of allegiance which had never been recognized under the constitution of the Church. In the same vein, Edmund Bohun attacked "this new Doctrine of standing by wicked persecuting Princes" after they had been defeated, because it "was never heard of in the Church before, was never taught or practised by the primitive Christians; and is not any part of the Doctrine of Passive Obedience or Non-resistance."⁷ Masters and Bohun attempted to charge the nonjurors with innovation, attacking them for going beyond the practice of the early Christians in not yielding allegiance to a successful conqueror.

It was common knowledge that during the first four centuries of the Church emperor after emperor had risen to the purple with the aid of poison, the assassin's blade, the conqueror's army, and this argument was not spared by the Anglican writers. This was not to say that the early Church approved these methods of succession, but it remained the Christian's duty to yield obedience to the authority that protected him. Throughout the Roman Empire's last centuries, Christians had always given allegiance where allegiance was due, without distinguishing between lawful emperors and usurpers. Christ himself had "paid tribute to Caesar, who could pretend no Right, but Conquest over the Jews...." Romans 13, with its general statement that "the powers that be are of God," was always taken by the primitive Church in its "plain and literal sense.... Conquest, Election, Usurpation, were to them all alike, ...once the Man was establish'd in the Throne...."⁸ It was possible, of course, to point out that while Roman emperors were absolute princes, the constitution of England limited its monarchs; but this merely strengthened the

belief that English subjects were as much bound to submit to the lawful commands of their kings as were the early Christians to submit to the emperors. With their precedent in mind, Burnet challenged the nonjurors to show one instance from history where the clergy had failed to acknowledge a revolutionary government.⁹

The sanction that history gave to the conqueror's right was as strong as the sanction of primitive Christianity. Looking at the history of European monarchy, Thomas Comber, Dean of Durham, drew the conclusion that the thrones of Europe generally were founded on conquest. Even in his own day countries on the Continent continually exchanged monarchs in the course of wars.¹⁰ The implication was that conquered peoples of Europe had often to change allegiance. In England especially, which had seen many a conquering usurper disregard the natural succession, the subject had always to change his allegiance, "or else the whole Nation was perjur'd in most of the Reigns from the Conquest to H[enry] 8, for the two Williams, six at least of the seven Henries, King Stephen, and King John were all Kings *de facta* . . . for they came not in as next Heirs in a lineal Descent. But still Oaths of Allegiance were taken to them; and no such Scruples appear to have been made all that time; nor any charge of Perjury, on those who did what our Law and Constitution required."¹¹ William Rufus had not respected his brother Robert's claim; Henry IV had ignored the claim of the Earl of March; Edward II and Richard II even had been deposed, and their successors' titles recognized by the nation. In each of these many revolutions since the establishment of Christianity, when bishops frequently were deprived from their sees, sometimes without ecclesiastical proceedings, the clergy never questioned but that allegiance was due to the recognized successor.¹²

The case of Henry VII provided the precedent *par excellence* for the Anglican justification of William's conquest. Henry Tudor, according to the much-read biography of Bacon, seized the throne with nearly as little trouble as did William, from a monarch who had become about as unpopular as had James. Henry also had called a "convention parliament" which had recognized his title, had married into the direct line of descent, though the marriage took place after his

own elevation, and he had also to contend with lukewarm and factious support during his early years as king. In his effort to win as wide support as possible, Henry had passed a treason law (11 Hen. VII, c. 1) by which no subject was to be tried for treason in the event of a successful Yorkist recovery of the throne on the basis of having served under his command. Although not all the provisions of the act were to remain in force,¹³ this attempt to indemnify those who acted for the "king for the time being" continued in force. Coke commented on it extensively; Sir Harry Vane and Henry Martin pleaded it, though unsuccessfully, at the Restoration. It became one of the main props of the Anglican argument for giving allegiance to William's government. In nearly every Williamite pamphlet, it was broadcast that allegiance could be given to the king in being, however infirm his title might afterwards appear, for the law itself protected subjects from future retribution.¹⁴

These writers also revived another legacy from the uncertain kingship that Henry enjoyed, for they applied the doctrine *coronat tollit omnes defectus* to William's case, a doctrine which "the Lawyers found... upon Henry the Seventh's enjoying the Crown, notwithstanding an Attainder of High-Treason, that stood unrepeal'd against him; and they did not think it worth the while to repeal it, because... 'the Crown takes away all manner of defects.'"¹⁵ If William's taint of monarchical illegality could be purged away by his assumption of the royal title together with the submission of the people, then his subjects, like Henry's, could freely grant him allegiance and serve him. No doubt, to the embittered nonjuror, this precise legalism beclouded the fact that Henry and William were both wicked usurpers. Williamites were willing to concede "that Hen. 7. himself had... made use of the same Liberty former Kings and Parliaments had taken, of taking his Vengeance on those that opposed him: He was too fond of the Crown.... This criminalizes him in his Morals, proves him to be a Man whom Interest did Rule... [but it] proves no more."¹⁶ Indeed, William's position was sounder legally and morally because in Henry's case, Parliament had passed over Elizabeth of York's immediate claim, giving its allegiance to Henry well

before their marriage, while the Convention Parliament, it was pointed out, took due care to protect Mary's claim before William's was considered.¹⁷

Early in the pamphlet war for the Revolution, churchmen like Stillingfleet recognized the significance of Henry's precedent to William's situation by applying the concept of the *de facto* monarch, for both kings were regnant monarchs by virtue of a nationally recognized possession. In brief definition, three distinctions were made: "An Usurper is one, who comes in by Force, and continues by Force. A King *de jure* is one, who comes in by lineal Descent, as next Heir, and whose Right is owned and Recognized by the Estates of the Realm. A King *de facto* is one, who comes in by Consent of the Nation, but not by Virtue of an immediate Hereditary Right...."¹⁸

The Church of the later Stuarts had occasionally horrified itself with the speculation of what would happen to its teaching of the divine right of hereditary succession if a *de facto* monarch should come upon the throne. When Charles II failed to produce a legitimate heir to the throne, it worried much about the prospects of a disputed succession. But with the failure of the Monmouth rising, it had been content to leave the conjecture alone, only to be shaken with the reality of *de facto* four years after James became king. The *de facto* argument was not confined to Church circles alone, but affected every thinking Anglican from the lordly Nottingham to the honest Edmund Bohun. Nottingham took the oath of office to what he believed was a *de facto* monarch, while Bohun asserted that Coke's interpretation of a "*Rex de facto*" was the modern equivalent of the primitive Christian's submission to the emperor in possession.

The man who brought *de facto* to bear most strongly on the Revolution situation, however, was William Sherlock, Master of the Temple. Sherlock was one of the age's better preachers, respected by all. From the time of his *The Case of Resistance* (1685), one of the better attacks on Catholicism, he was regarded by his brethren as one of their ablest protagonists. Burnet thought him a "clear, a polite, and a strong writer,"¹⁹ and with a reputation higher than most men's, his support of Sancroft and the nonjurors after William and Mary's coronation was regarded by that

group as invaluable. After he was suspended from his duties on August 1 for failure to take the oath, he wrote a *Practical Discourse of Death*, a work which was taken by Dodwell and other nonjurors as a sign that he was preparing himself to stand off from the government to the death.²⁰ Then, suddenly, "On Lords day the 2. [February] Instant Dr. Sherlock did preach again that afternoone his Lecture at St. Dunstons Church, he stood up in the Congregation and made a short speech &c, telling them that because he had not taken the late Oathes, he had forborne preaching since the first day of August 1689, but he was now advised by the best Counsell in England, that he was not prohibited to Preach, and therefore he should proceede, to discharge that office and so went up into the Pulpit...."²¹ Morrice speculated that the "best Counsell" was an accommodation that the government had made in the nonjurors' favor, but since no arrangement was made for them to continue in their offices, the counsel Sherlock found came from another source.

One of Sancroft's last official acts had been to order the publication of *The Convocation Book*, written by John Overall, Bishop of Exeter in James I's reign, in which divine authority was said to give sanction to *de facto* governments.²² Sherlock read it, either in the published form, or, since he was in favor with Sancroft, in the manuscript the Archbishop held. In either case, Sherlock's thoughts and actions throughout the spring and summer of 1690 were giving alarm to the nonjurors. Sancroft apparently had asked Sherlock to re-read Overall's work, no doubt in hopes that its many condemnations of rebellion would have effect on the wavering Levite; but Sherlock replied that the canons specifically instructed the subject to give allegiance to the government of a conqueror when it was "thoroughly settled," or face the consequences of a sin. To disown the Revolution, he maintained, was to disown the Convocation's teachings. It was clear that the *Convocation Book*, "reconcil[e] the Doctrine of Passive Obedience and Non-Resistance with a Submission and Allegiance to Usurped Powers, when their Government is thoroughly settled."²³ In early November, Sherlock completed his break with the nonjurors with the publication of his *Case of the Allegiance due to Sovereign Powers*. "Dryden's Hind and Panther had not raised so great

an uproar. Halifax's Letter to a Dissenter had not called forth so many answers."²⁴ Morrice noted that within a few days of the book's appearance, three replies to it were already in print; and although he himself could not agree with Sherlock's views, he felt that it might do much good in winning over the conservative element.²⁵

Sherlock was attacked viciously by both Whig and non-juror, though it was the latter group to which he directed his arguments. He was aware of the ground he could take by basing his work on *The Convocation Book*, showing that though the motives of usurpers might be evil, still the subject need not be associated with that evil. "The Law does not deny [James's] Legal Right," he said, "but yet may reasonably deny him to be King, when he is out of Possession." Henry VII's "Statute of Treason tells us what is Treason against him who is King, not against him who should be, but is not King." Sherlock was struck by the fact that in the case of usurping kings, Parliament had worked with them in the formation of law, indicating that it regarded the authority under which it met as legal if not legitimate. This proved that "be he King *de facto* or *de jure*... Parliaments have always favored the King in Possession." Possession of the throne, then, apparently became the rule by which one judged kingship. It was known that the crown itself removed all defects, therefore it was reasonable to conclude that "the King *de facto* has Authority... from the Possession of the Throne, to which the Law it self, as well as the Principles of Reason and Religion, have annexed the Authority of Government."²⁶ In these few words Sherlock shifted the Anglican sacredness of majesty from the person to the office of the monarch, and, whether or not he was conscious of the transition, gave that majesty to the law which upheld the office.

Sherlock's arguments for a *de facto* monarch appeared in many other versions of Anglican argument, and while the Master of the Temple would not go the full length in making a conqueror in possession a *de jure* monarch, there were others who did, maintaining that "it is an uncontestable Maxim of our Law, which makes it Treason to resist the King *de Facto*, altho it be in defence, and to maintain the Right of the King *de Jure*. So that Possession is not only,

as we us'd to say, eleven Points of the Law, but is in this Case all twelve. . . the Right of the King *de Facto* is confirm'd both by Law and Gospel, and therefore must be unquestionable, when there is no such thing as a King *de Jure* to oppose Him: For by Forfeiture King James made of his Right, I do not at all doubt but our present King is *de Jure* as well as *de Facto*.²⁷

There was one difficulty, at least, that conquest theory had to overcome. One Jacobite writer agreed that conquest was a good claim to any throne, but what, he wondered, could be the status of the conquered nation? Surely all Englishmen now must consider themselves slaves, and their property and persons forfeit to King William.²⁸ Here again Anglican theory rested its case on the usage of law and history. William's conquest, it was shown, had not been a conquest of the nation and its laws, but of King James only. William had made his claim against James. When that claim was satisfied personally, the nation's representatives assented to its being put into force by an act of Parliament. Since William had had no contest with the nation, he had not made a conquest of its people, but instead had bound himself to rule according to the laws of his adopted kingdom.²⁹

When seventeenth century Englishmen viewed the long continuity of the constitution, notwithstanding conquests and usurpations, they understood that conquests had to do only with dynastic changes. If a conqueror wished to succeed in England, he was required to confirm the fundamental ancient rights of the English. William III had indeed conquered England, but like the first William, he enjoyed the support of the nation only by confirming its constitution: "though our Nation has been often stormed, our essential Laws and Customs were never carried [away]. The Romans governed us, in great Part, by our own Laws, and the wisest of their Lieutenants found we were more easily governed by Gentleness and Justice, than by Force. The Danes made no Alteration in our Constitution; and the Saxon and Norman Invasions ended in Treaty; and the Saxon Government was homogeneous to our Temperament. . . ."³⁰ The immemorial English constitution, together with the institution of Parliament, had remained little changed since the Saxons first

introduced their form of government from the forests of Germany, for the people's consent had ever been the measure of the success of conquests. Both Burnet and Sherlock agreed that the true test of a usurper's right to the throne consisted in the ancient right of the people to confirm his title. William's invasion was consequently aimed at wresting James's title from him, and had not been a contest between two nations. The people's liberties remained untouched, for in a sense the Revolution had been a victory of the people: "May not a Nation be conquered by a major party within it self? Nay, was England ever conquered otherways?"³¹

The path of conquest theory was by no means smooth. There were many fine points that could not be explained, such as that concerning the duty to be done to the rightful but dispossessed king. Sherlock was troubled by the exact time at which one could say that a usurper's government was safely settled and allegiance be given to it without perjury. Bohun badly crippled his own conquest theory when he declared that "all Subjects, right or wrong, are bound to stand by their Lawful Princes in their most unjust Quarrels: and if at last they are subdu'd, their Allegiance must be reserved for the injurious beaten Prince till he die or freely resign...."³² Some of the older generation, like Sir John Bramston, who took the oath years after the Revolution, felt a sense of guilt in the "rebellion" of 1688, even though they had nothing to do with its settlement. The feeling seems to have been that in taking the oath, one automatically became an accomplice. Sherlock had men like Bramston in mind when he tried to convince his readers that subjects were guiltless who innocently withdrew their support from a lawless king and allowed him to escape from his conqueror. This was not rebellion but merely "non-assistance." Even in the case of a general revolt of a nation, he protested, "though it should be wicked and unjustifiable, yet it seems to excuse those, who had neither hand nor heart in it, from their sworn defence of the King's Person, and Crown, and to make their compliance with the National Government innocent and necessary...."³³

Sherlock's compliance did not go without notice from his many enemies. A favorite story of the day had it that

Sherlock made a deal with the government, for shortly after his taking the oath, he was appointed Dean of St. Paul's, replacing the newly-elevated Tillotson. Others said that even more than Overall's *Convocation Book*, he had been convinced by William's victory at the Boyne in July, 1690. Still another tale credited Sherlock's wife with bringing him into the government, for this domineering woman was known to have the Dean well in hand. One day as Mr. and Mrs. Sherlock passed a shop, a London wag nodded after them, "There goes the Dean of St. Paul's with his reason for taking the oath."³⁴

Later, in the early winter of 1692, a trap was laid for the unsuspecting Edmund Bohun. In that year Nottingham appointed Bohun government licenser, the post recently vacated by one James Fraser, who had replaced Roger Lestrangle shortly after the Revolution. Under Fraser's direction, for he was one of the more extreme Whig writers, many of the "old and trayterous books of 1640" Bohun complained of were reissued. Fraser himself contributed many extreme contract pamphlets and effectively barred the more conservative Anglican publications. The Church saw to it that Fraser resigned after he went too far by licensing an attack on the *Icon Basilike* and its supposed author, Charles I. With Bohun's appointment, the Anglican position on the Revolution received a better hearing at the licenser's office. Bohun was greatly concerned by the rift the oath had caused in his Church. His major interest was in winning over the nonjurors to a full compliance with the Revolution. His zeal was to prove his undoing, however, for one day a certain Richard Baldwin appeared at his office to submit a work called *King William and Queen Mary Conquerors*. What Bohun never learned was that the work had been written by the notorious Charles Blount, plagiarist and man of no religious scruples. Blount had made his name by attacking religion and by stealing from Milton's forgotten *Areopagitica* enough garbled material for a pamphlet pleading for freedom of the press. What is so striking about the work he composed especially for Bohun, is that it was a perfect imitation of the Church of England's Revolution theory, based "upon Principles not in the least Antimonarchical, or suspected to be so; without either asserting the Popish deposing Doctrine;

or that the People of England are the Sovereign Masters, and may call [the king] to an Account...; or even affirming that a King of England may be deposed...." What may have caught Bohun's eye, too, was that the author stated his indebtedness to Bohun's *History of the Desertion*: "It seems to me to be written with great Judgment, and hath... contributed more to my Satisfaction, as to the Lawfulness of paying Allegiance to Their Present Majesties, than any one Tract..." Needless to say, Bohun read the manuscript "with incredible satisfaction," granted the *imprimatur*, and within a few weeks it was being discussed and praised by the clergy of London and the two universities.

The hoax was far from complete, for it was shortly pointed out to the House of Commons that the title page of a new work licensed by the government asserted that William and Mary ruled as conquerors. Conquest theory was detested by those who upheld popular sovereignty, and since most of the Parliamentarians never read beyond the title page, it seemed an insult to the crown and the nation. The contract Whigs, together with Bohun's enemies, summoned the poor man before the bar to account for his actions. Bohun, always a shy man, was cowed even more when, because of his deafness, he could not hear all the words the Speaker addressed to him. He replied badly, bringing down rude gales of laughter. Yet, in his way, he stood his ground before the mighty House, never denying that he had, in full awareness, licensed the book in question, asserting that such a book might well win over some of the nonjurors. Even then Bohun did not realize that the word "conquerors" could be offensive. Not until after the hearing was the distinction made clear to him. In a short time he was dismissed, and when he appeared again, it was to hear that he would be relieved from office, jailed, and fined nineteen pounds, twelve shillings, and nine pence. Bohun had counted on the position of licenser as a chance to keep his son at the university and to hold on to what little estate he had, but with this loss, not only of his name, but of his livelihood, total ruin seemed not far off.³⁵

Bohun was small game compared with the real object of the Commons' inquiry--Gilbert Burnet, Bishop of Salisbury. Burnet was a man whose vehemence and tactlessness had

made for him many enemies. He was perhaps the main object of the nonjurors' attacks, and his inconsistent views on the Revolution had placed him beyond the admiration of the contract Whigs. Indeed, Burnet's political position after the Revolution shows a rather unusual transition. The pamphlets he authored while he was a member of William's invasion party were characteristic of the usual attacks on passive obedience and nonresistance, with a purely secular approach to politics. Yet, sometime during the summer of 1689, with the publication of *The Pastoral Letter*, he was expressing sentiments about conquest and *de facto* monarchy he would have condemned during the Revolution's warmest period. It may have been that he became convinced of the purely Anglican position as put forth by Lloyd and Stillingfleet; it may have been that he found it politically expedient for the nation to forget the radical ideas that had fired men to action against James. In a letter dated September 7, 1689, he commented on one of the conquest theory tracts, saying, "As for the printed sheets, I do not see any great matter in them but What may be easily answered. what [the author] insists most on as to the Conquest, has been often and fully answered; for it is certain that William the Conqueror only conquered Harold and his party but not the nation, and though he was in many things rigid and cruel and broke many of our laws, yet he still governed according to the law as to the main. Yet upon the whole matter I do not think that now, when we are at quiet, it is convenient to write much upon this subject of proving the right of the people's defending themselves when the whole constitution is in danger of being overturned. That is a question fit to be laid to sleep; for in quiet times there is no occasion to dispute it, and whensoever a new occasion is given by the violence of the government to examine it, authors and matter will be found to support it."³⁶

Burnet's pragmatic approach to ideas was not the attitude of an idealist, for he had little patience with theory for its own sake. During the early days of the Revolution he had used the "rights of Englishmen" cry until there was danger his audience might take him at his word, placing those effective limitations on William which he originally meant for King James. Contract theory had been of use

against a popish tyrant, but nothing less than passive obedience would do for William's Protestant regality.

It may have been this spirit of expediency that some members of the House found useful as a weapon against the Bishop of Sarum. Immediately after Bohun's censure and dismissal, Burnet was brought in to answer for *The Pastoral Letter* and for its contribution to conquest theory. The attack seemed to have been led by a Joseph How, a member of Parliament whom Evelyn described as "Little better than a madman," and although a large number of the House felt that there was much of use in his book, still it was condemned. Someone began to cry out Burnet's name, and before long the whole House, rocking with laughter, was crying "burn it, burn it!" Within two days, the *Letter*, along with *King William and Queen Mary Conquerors*, was condemned to be burned by the common hangman. Charles Hatton punned that Burnet "hereafter... would... only be called Bishop Burnt." On January 24, 1693, the day before the bookburning, the Lords passed a resolution "That the Assertion of King William and Queen Mary's being King and Queen by Conquest, was highly injurious to their Majesties, and inconsistent with the Principles on which this Government is founded, and tending to the Subversion of the Rights of the People." The Commons unanimously concurred, with the addition of these words: "injurious to their Majesties Rightful Title to the Crown of this Realm."³⁷

If men like Fraser and Blount enjoyed a bad joke at the expense of Bohun and Burnet, there was a more serious side to conquest theory which needed clarification both for non-jurors and Williamites. Most of the latter failed to see why the Church regarded William's usurpation as worthy of the subject's allegiance when that of Cromwell's was still held as a sinful rebellion. If any *de facto* government required obedience under law and Church's canons, why was one case different from the other? Sherlock answered this rather well on the familiar ground that the Protector's government, unlike William's, made no pretense of governing with the consent of the nation. Cromwell's regime was never settled and it "had not a National Consent and Submission," existing completely by rule of the sword. The Revolution of 1688 had been rather a recovery of basic liberties, for in its set-

tlement everything was done to secure the correct functioning of the old constitution against the innovations of both popular and monarchical tyranny.³⁸

To those among the Williamites who soured at the sound of "conquest," Lloyd and others provided an alternative to this harsh word. William had warred in behalf of the English people, his title should be that of "restorer and deliverer." William Stephens preached before the Lord Mayor that to defend the liberty of a nation when it was threatened was the most glorious thing upon earth, and "he that is such a Deliverer, has a Name above all other Titles: And who would change this Style for that of Conqueror?" William's conquest was a true defense of the Protestant religion, laws, and property; and in the grandiloquent rhetoric of the Bishop of St. Asaph, as William's "Landing was without Blood, so was all his March without Blood, and it ended in a Conquest without Blood. Such a Conquest as the Sun makes upon a Mist, that only disperses it, and clears the Air from it and makes the People glad that it is gone. The thick Mist of Popery is gone, I trust in God, so as to return no more."³⁹ Thus conquest theory paved the way for the conservative's acceptance of the Revolution by basing its arguments on established principles in theology and historical precedent.

CHAPTER 6

The Divine Right of Providence

In his "Discourse Concerning Submission to Divine Providence" (1693), John Norris set it down as a fundamental commonplace "that there is such a thing as Providence in general, and that God does concern himself in the Government and Management both of the Material and Intellectual World, by ruling and ordering the Motions of the former, and Events of the latter."¹ Like the belief in Biblical truth or the orderliness of nature, providence was held to be one of the basic attributes of a God who, in the broadest sense, provided for all the beings of His creation. Like divine right, providence was a popular belief. Few people denied that everything in life had its meaning, that each mishap, each stroke of good fortune, was part of a providential plan. The Reformation had reinforced this essentially Augustinian concept through Calvin's formulation of a destiny that could not be avoided; and while Anglicanism rejected double predestination, the average English churchman believed that he and all men played a part in a greater scheme, the end of which could not be foreseen. During the later Stuart period, the writings of Jurieu emphasized that great men were the instruments of God's earthly plan; Bishop Bossuet of the Gallican Church issued his *Discours sur l'Histoire Universelle* (1681), which, although it was a reply to Burnet's *History of the Reformation*, did not dispute Burnet's use of providence, but expanded on it in a greater historical setting. Burnet looked at the establishment of the Church of England as a result of providence's great design. When he and the Prince of Orange saw all their plans for the invasion

coming to a successful climax, the Prince took him by the hand, asking, "Will you not believe in predestination?" "I will never forget," the chaplain replied, "that providence of God which has appeared so signally on this occasion." Not only Burnet, but Atterbury, Robert Fleming, John Norris, Moore of Norwich, Sherlock, Sharp of York, Lloyd, Patrick of Ely, practically every noted churchman of the Revolution discoursed and preached on providence, raising it to as great a theological consideration as passive obedience enjoyed in the years before 1688. Tillotson even worked out a theory of providence that excluded the need of man's active participation in worldly affairs.² William himself believed there could be no suitable explanation for the part he had played in history than that providence had selected him to lead a Protestant coalition against France. The role of providence in history always had been stressed in Anglican homilies, especially those dealing with the Armada defeat, the Gunpowder Plot, and the Restoration; but the Revolution raised the prestige of the idea far above anything it had enjoyed before.

The emphasis placed on providence by churchmen at the end of the seventeenth century, apart from its relation to the Revolution, was part of a larger problem that faced the Church in the growth of deism. The rise of a mechanical theory of a universe operating under second causes may well account for Tillotson and others stressing that it was as essential to believe in God's personal providence as it was to believe in God. Changes in the fortunes of kingdoms and empires, it was said, had been made by God's providence, partly to instill in those who observed them a spirit of piety and morality, but also to keep men aware of God's governance. When Sherlock justified the Revolution as an act of providence, he pointed out that many would find his doctrine of providence distasteful, especially if they were republicans who did not believe that kings reign by God's authority. But since scripture and the Church of England maintained that kings rule by divine right, providence must have had a hand in the Revolution. Otherwise, Sherlock argued, William's conquest would have been meaningless. Though the age of miracles was past, and God no longer worked prodigies to convince man of the truth of his revelations, "whoever from hence will conclude, that he never supersedes the ordinary course of things, that he

does not sometimes withhold, or promote, or stop, and revolt the Wheels of Nature in their Roats, for the relief of the Good and Righteous, or the punishment of Atheistical and Wicked Men; must be driven to this Conclusion, that the Church of Christ is less dear to him that that of Moses...."³ Was not the same providence that aided the early Christians as powerful and vigilant in William's reign?

Providence, in its widest application, did not mean merely a law of history, but was applied to the whole creation. In the workings of the universe and the natural world, men observed the "preserving providence" which regulated the laws of matter; in the "governing providence" they observed God's concern with, and direction of, human affairs.⁴ Providence, then, also meant divine causation in the everyday world of nature, the changing seasons, rain and storm, the very cycle of life. But, as Burnet put it, "the whole Springs of Nature are wound up by [God], so that all things are in some sort of his doing," and if all second causes were thus secretly directed in the mechanical world, and all human motives were, on occasion, divinely influenced, then it was but logic to assume that during great events God could force nature out of her normal channel to accomplish His purposes. In this humanistic age, it was the governing providence in human affairs that most interested men. Indeed, man, the supreme expression of creation, was providence's main concern. Among men, Christians were esteemed as of providence's special interest, among Christians those who were Protestants. It goes without saying that the Church of England was at the top of providential priority.⁵

If providence was a general rule of natural causation, and if that causation found supreme expression in human affairs, providential determination could be regarded as a law of universal history. The Bible, of course, served as the basis for this Christian interpretation, in which every historical detail belonged to a grand pattern. Burnet especially, as one of the age's leading historians, looked at history in theological terms, in which the historian's task was to vindicate the ways of God to man. In his view of Protestantism, the reformed Church of England was

Christianity's highest expression and the special ward of providence. William Fleetwood, in his *Essay upon Miracles* (1701), made a detailed history of how God worked through providential miracles to bring about His will. These miracles, it was held, were occasionally essential since the law of nature, which operated under second causes, could not alter its course in the face of human crises occasioned by man's perverse use of his liberty. Because of his pride, man frequently sought to defy divine sovereignty to alter the divine purpose. Therefore it was God's necessity to establish a superintendent providence which could overrule the counsels and powers of men, to bring about the divine will, if necessary by occasionally changing the course of nature to determine issues of war or peace.⁶

The national observances in the Church calendar perpetuated the habit of thinking in terms of historical providences: "Witness an Invincible Armado, threatning our Kingdom with perpetual Slavery of Soul and Body, dispers'd and ruin'd by the irresistable Power of God....Witness the dark designs of Hell, to destroy our Laws and Law-makers, our Church and State at one blow, betrayed and confounded by a kind of super-natural, and propheticall impression.... [These proved] there is not any Church on Earth, that has had more Signal Providences, to approve it the immediate care and concern of Heaven, than that we are Members of."⁷ Gunpowder day and May 29 especially were repetitions of the old providential theme. It was even demonstrated how Henry VIII, originally a popish prince, fitted into the grand scheme. This "high-spirited Prince, a zealous Assertor of the Popish Cause, and a Writer against Luther," laid the foundation for the Reformation in a manner which otherwise would have taken much longer, for his personal quarrel with the Pope was used by providence to establish the reformed Church of England.⁸

In observing providence at work in history and the perfect balance it seemed to maintain between evil and good, a doctrine emerged that "nothing can in Reason be admitted to be a Revelation from God, which does plainly contradict his essential Perfections."⁹ The consequences of any historical act were the measures of providence's intention, for providence was not mere fortune and caprice. Good will be

rewarded and evil punished by some agent, natural, human, or supernatural. The divine justice was most commonly expressed by the word "judgment," a singular act of punishment by God for some sin that was or was not known to the sinner. Wars, famines, plagues, any of these may be judgments. Robert Fleming's *A Discourse on Earthquakes, as Supernatural and Premonitory Signs to a Nation Especially as to what occurred in the Year 1692* was a curious mixture of fact and religious interpretation in terms of judgments. The year 1692 had seen an earthquake in London, frightening some into thinking that there would shortly be "heavy judgments from Heaven." People had become familiar with the judgment that was Cromwell's reign, the plague, the great fire, the Dutch war, and the most recent judgment, the reign of James II. The Church's general interest in providence in William's reign was reflected in Sherlock's "The Language and Interpretation of Judgments," which showed providence to be the justice of God by punishment. Yet however severe the judgment, decisions "were always design'd for wholesom and excellent Ends."¹⁰

Churchmen of the Revolution, then, considered providence as a hierarchy of divine causes: on the lowest plane, it ruled nature and the universe; next it considered man and his general history; then Christianity, especially Protestantism and the Church of England. Since Anglicans believed their Church was under the temporal guidance of the state, then providence's ultimate concern was with the affairs of government: "If God demonstrate his Providence in any thing here in this World, . . . he exercises it in the Governing, Defending, and Protecting of publick Persons and Societies."¹¹ Atterbury echoed these thoughts when he said, "since the Age of Miracles ceas'd, as it did, when the Testimony of the Gospel was fully Seal'd, the chief way, in which God hath been pleas'd to give Extraordinary Indications of his Power and Providence, hath been by such Signs of the times, such Wonders of Government as" the age's great political upheavals.¹² Such great changes were God's way of achieving political justice. There was ample Biblical justification for these views, since Jehovah's direct concern with the governments of Israel provided the Church with its basic knowledge of pre-Christian political theory.

This, and a scholarly knowledge of the providential history of Europe, led churchmen to the conclusion that since the actions of governments affected the well-being of every individual, God's primary point of concentration was on politics, where the battle of good and evil assumed epic proportions. In great public transactions, "God has reserved to himself a transcendent Right (as it were a Court of Equity). . . to mitigate that rigorous procedure, and redress those unequal Judgments [of human politics], which might otherwise reflect upon his Wisdom or his Justice."¹³

God's governance of the world was thus taken in its most literal political sense. What might well seem to the twentieth century little more than superstition, was for the Revolution Church an assumption that demanded belief. The divine right of kings, and of hereditary succession, had suffered such rude shocks from the meeting of the Long Parliament in 1640 to the "abdication" of James II, that very few dared to preach that a king of England was the Lord's anointed. A few brave souls, such as Allix and Johnson, ventured into the world of total secular politics by condemning divine right entirely. Their more theologically grounded brethren could not bridge this chasm, however, without a proper transition. If absolute divine right was to lapse, it needed to be replaced with a sanction equally as divine. This transition was found in the divine right of providence, which found universal acceptance because it was but one shade removed from the sacredness of personal majesty. Monarchical divine right had made kings responsible only to God for their actions; but if He were to judge a particular king unfit, in a "judgment," by raising up a prince to destroy the proud and mighty tyrant, then God's governance would be vindicated by an act of providence. God ruled the world; kings ruled as God's vice-regents; therefore if one king were changed for another in a conquest, then God had provided for the change. The providential possession enjoyed by William III formed the divine right of the *de facto* monarch; and so a form of sacredness was carried over to the conqueror. He was, after all, the instrument by which God executed His will on the rightful but fallen king.

William Sherlock's *Case of the Allegiance* displayed the strength of adaptability that remained in divine right after

the Revolution, and was the clearest exposition of the new divine right of providence. Sherlock was not, however, completely original in his formulation. The providential conquest and deliverance theme had been in the air throughout the autumn and winter of 1688-1689.¹⁴ Sherlock had been hard at work on the idea, however, throughout the summer of 1690, and by August the major lines of its development were clear to him.¹⁵ He based his entire argument on Biblical writ and on Overall's *Convocation Book*. In brief, his argument ran: "God governs the... world, removeth Kings, and setteth up Kings, only by his Providence; that is, then God sets up a king, when by his Providence he advances him to the Throne, and puts the Sovereign Authority into his hands; then he removeth a King, when by his Providence he thrusts him from his Throne, and takes the Government out of his hands: for Providence is God's Government of the world by an invisible influence and power, whereby he directs, determines, overrules all Events to the accomplishment of his own Will and Counsels..."¹⁶ There were many ways that a king was advanced to the throne: by the election of a people; by conquest, which Sherlock felt was the visible original of most English governments. In matters of succession, there were two main categories: "Divine Entail," as in the Biblical sense of a direct grant from God, and "Humane Entail," made under the laws of particular countries; "but all these ways, or any other, that can be thought of, are governed and determined by the Divine Providence, and the Prince thus advanced is... truly placed in the Throne by God...." Thus Sherlock added a new dimension to divine right by maintaining that there was no theological conflict between a legal hereditary entail and a possession derived by conquest: "It is all but Providence still, and I desire to know why the Providence of an Entail is more Sacred and Obligatory than any other Act of Providence, which gives a Setled possession of the Throne?" Babylon and Egypt had ruled over the Chosen People by God's judgment, just as Saul, David, and Solomon had ruled over them by His mercy. The distinction between kings *de jure* and *de facto* related only to the laws of the land, but when considered in the light of providence, all kings had God's authority if they were manifestly set up by Him. Regardless of the

human legal right of one king over another, the great court of heaven had overruling jurisdiction in its providential acts against which man was powerless. God's primal concern with government for the sake of human society meant that His judgment could not err, neither could it be resisted.¹⁷

A companion work to Sherlock's *Case of the Allegiance* was William Lloyd's *God's Ways of Disposing of Kingdoms*. Not only was this work more consistent with traditional divine right, but it exhibited an erudition beyond what Sherlock could muster. Lloyd took for his text the verses from Psalm LXXV, "For Promotion cometh neither from the East, nor from the West, nor from the South. But God is the Judge; He putteth down one, and setteth up another." What gave his book respectability was that the glosses were complete with elaborations from James I's works, remarkably suited to the English Revolution's case: "'Though no Christian ought to allow any Rebellion of People against their Prince, yet doth God never leave Kings unpunisht when they transgress these Limits.'" Lloyd also linked providence more closely with the responsibility of kings to God: "'As a Judge, [God] administreth Judgment and Justice both which are said to be the habitation of his Throne. Particularly when he decrees a Conquest of any King or Kingdom; it is either as a Judgment on them for Offences against himself, or it is by way of Justice to others whom they have injured.'" Just as the temporal power of the sword to enforce justice cannot be denied, "so of God, that when he puts down one, and sets up another, he doth it as a Judge, even [as a] Judge among Gods."¹⁸

The providential theory of Edmund Bohun, less sophisticated than his preceptors' of the cloth, was yet the most common Anglican approach to providence. Bohun believed quite simply that the providence of God watched over pious princes to preserve them from violence, while those who degraded their office by becoming tyrants were not allowed to end their days in peace. "We are safe," he affirmed, "If we do our Duty, and submit to and pray for those Powers that we find set over us, by Men as the Instruments, by God as the great Disposer of Crowns...."¹⁹ And this was by far the most popular expression of providential divine right, appealing to the people's desire to lead quiet, safe

lives, in timeless resignation to the ways of this world. The right and wrong of an issue mattered little compared to its reality; for "sometimes [God] builds us up, and sometimes he pulls us down; but whatever is the success, God is the Author, and Kings are but the Instruments of the Revolution: Which as it is too mysterious for us to understand, so 'tis too sacred for us to oppose."²⁰

This divine right of providence theory obviously had sprung from the necessities imposed upon the Church by the Revolution. When Lloyd or Burnet talked about the irresistibility of providence's disposal of kingdoms, they obviously meant that the Revolution was not to be opposed because it was providentially divine. It may have been perfectly true that the Old Testament proved regal authority to be founded by divine providence, but some said this method of sacred investiture had such a peculiar relation to the Biblical government of Israel that it could not be applied to any modern constitution, unless it could be proved beyond doubt that a divine designation had been made.²¹ It was vital, then, to prove providential right in the Revolution. Theory and fact had to be linked.

The first step taken in completing this linkage was in the definition of what constituted a providential act: "First, When it is so surprizing a work, that we can assign no other Cause, from which it does, or can proceed, but God only. Secondly, When, beside the unaccountableness of the Cause, we see the effect is such as we may reasonably believe that God is concern'd for. Thirdly, When we see there was a great and near danger of losing that which God was concern'd for, if this had not happened for its preservation. I think these three that I have named are sure tokens by which we may Judge, without danger of mistake, that any thing that happens in this manner is of God's doing."²² The events of the Revolution were scrutinized in Anglican sermons and tracts throughout William's reign for facts that fitted these requirements.

That there had been danger to the Church of England during James's reign, none could dispute. The destruction of the Church of England and the subversion of English liberties would bring ruin to Protestantism and liberty all over Europe. The popish plan seemed so clever, was carried for-

ward with such subtlety, that when the Church finally became aware of the danger it seemed that Catholicism must surely triumph. Then suddenly the plotters broke through the bonds of secrecy and propriety and attempted to carry off liberty and religion at one stroke. "We may remember we were given up for lost by all our Friends in Europe, and did think so to our selves, it being then impossible for us to imagine from whence our Relief should come."²³ And yet, Burnet asked, "Why went [the Jesuits] so fast and so barefac'd? Why grasp'd they so much all at once? Why was the Hook so ill covered when the Bait was thrown out?... In a word, all this blasting of Counsels, and defeating of their designs by their own means, was of God, and must be owned to be his doing."²⁴ This was the first proof of God's ordering of the Revolution: the exposure of the Jesuit plot by its own impatient zeal.

The events of the Revolution provided the real arguments for a providential right. On December 23, scarcely a week after the Prince of Orange had entered London, Burnet set the tone of future providential sermons by preaching before William on the text, "It is the Lord's doing, and it is marvellous in our eyes." Flushed with victory, Burnet told his auditors, "we have before us a Work, that seems to our selves a Dream, and that will appear to Posterity a Fiction: a Work about which Providence has watched in so peculiar a manner, that a Mind must be far gone into Atheism, that can resist so full a Conviction as this offers us in favour of that Truth." God had deliberately prospered the Catholic powers in order to unite Protestant Europe against them; He had united the usually divided Dutch to a complete support of William's undertaking. Then Burnet asked the worshippers to "consider the Steps of Providence... the Prodigies and Miracles of Providence, that have attended our Deliverance...."²⁵

Burnet was not speaking to an unsympathetic audience, for the providential theme had been common from the time when William's plan of invasion was first rumored. Even then some men regarded it as a deliverance sent from heaven. The week William entered London saw many of the clergy offering prayers of thanksgiving that "God in his

wonderfull mercy has freed us from Slavery both in body and soule by this great and noble Instrumēt."²⁶ Many people marveled at the "Protestant wind" that not only blew William's sails westward but kept the English fleet in port. Burnet and many others took this as a direct sign of divine intervention. Tillotson studied the case of Job and the question God had posed to him, "'Hath thou entred into the treasures of the Snow? hath thou seen the treasures of the Haile? which I have reserv'd against the time of trouble, against the Day of Battel and War.'" The Archbishop was led to the conclusion that one way in which providence worked was through the control of the weather, as in the case of William's kindly wind.²⁷ Patrick of Ely, struck by the same phenomenon, felt that God "turned the Winds... to be so favourable; that if they had been absolutely at [William's] own Disposal, he could not have commanded them to be more obsequious to him, then he found them. For when he was brought to our Coast by a strong Gale, in a very speedy Course; and had overshot his Port; the Wind changed immediately, and brought him back to his desired Haven."²⁸ Lloyd, however, made the most of providence by stating that no matter what William's personal motives were, God had singled him out to be the instrument of James's judgment. The bishop gave even greater credit to the winds in that "They directed him which say to sail. They chose him a landing place, the best perhaps that could have been found in this Kingdom."²⁹ As if to bear out these assertions, from the little town of Ruan-Minor in Cornwall came the story of how, on William's coronation day, although the church was locked up, the bells rang "for severall hours in great harmony." When it was observed that no one pulled the bell cords, it was felt that "the noise was rather in the aire than in the Steeple." Could this be another sign of heaven's favor?³⁰ The month, day, and year of William's landing at Torbay were also propitious. The day before had been their majesties' wedding anniversary as well as William's birthday: "Shall I call this our Birth-day? or rather the day of our Resurrection?"³¹ Tillotson's impression was "That God seems in this last deliverance, in some sort to have united and brought together all the great deliverances

which he hath been pleased to work for this nation against all the remarkable attempts of popery, from the beginning of our Reformation. Our wonderful deliverance from the formidable Spanish invasion designed against us, happened in the year 1588. And now, just a hundred years after, God was pleased to bring about this last great and most happy deliverance. That horrid gunpowder conspiracy, without precedent, and without parallel, was designed to have been executed upon the Fifth day of November; the same day upon which his Highness the Prince of Orange landed the forces here in England, which he brought hither for our rescue ..."³² Finally, the swiftness of William's success seemed so sudden and surprising, that nothing but an almighty hand could have performed it, "none but [God] who fram'd the Machine, and understood the several Movements of it, could so unexpectedly, and with so little noise, have shifted so important a Scene in the World's great Theatre; ... [it] is a thing that cannot be parallel'd in History, and which can only be resolv'd into the overruling Providence of God."³³

Besides the few days in London when the usual business of the city was disturbed by popular demonstrations against the Catholics after James's flight, there was no period of lawless anarchy or even of sporadic fighting against William's advance guard. So peaceful was his succession, so universal the acceptance of his actions, that churchmen looked upon the sudden union of the nation on the issue of the Revolution as a miraculous union of minds. Some obstructions there were, but the wonder was there were not more. Had this comparative unity been providentially achieved? It was known that providence frequently worked through the hearts of men, redirecting human purposes to a concurrence with the divine will. The insufficiency of human planning was an ancient theme, especially in political affairs, "because it depends upon so many contingent causes, any one of which failing the best laid design breaks and falls in pieces..., Besides an unaccountable mixture of that which the Heathen call'd Fortune; but we Christians [call] by its true name, the providence of God... does frequently... confound the wisdom of the wise, and... turn their counsels into foolishness."³⁴ More than this, God frequently controlled men's thoughts to achieve his purposes.

This was commonly supposed to have happened at the Restoration, and what God could achieve once, He could do again. "It is Opinion that governs the unthinking sort of Men, which are far the greatest part of the Body of a Nation. And when all these go together, they are like the Atoms of Air, which though taken apart they are too light to be felt, yet being gather'd into a Wind, they are too strong to be withstood. But he that brings the Winds out of his Treasures, he also governs these, and turns them which way he pleases. It is the same great God, that rules the roaring Waves of the Sea, and the Multitude of the People."³⁵ Gilbert Burnet was markedly impressed, not only by the lack of public demonstration on the part of the "unruly multitude," but by the absence of disorder at a time when England was without a government. Not only was there no looting and vandalism, but mobs had failed to materialize when conditions would have given them the greatest freedom for demonstration. There was thus good reason to suspect that providence had been at work in bending men's wills to a support of the Revolution.³⁶

The Lords and Commons were not insensible to the value of providential theory, either as divine truth or as propaganda. Upon the framing of the Bill of Rights, a clause was inserted with met with no opposition: "the said lords spiritual and temporal and commons, seriously [consider] how it hath pleased Almighty God, in His marvellous providence and merciful goodness to this nation, to provide and preserve their said majesties' royal persons most happily to reign over us upon the throne of their ancestors..." When the proclamation was read, hailing William and Mary as "KING and QUEEN of England, France, and Ireland...&c.," it was affirmed, "Whereas it has pleas'd Almighty God, in his great mercy to this kingdom, to vouchsafe us a miraculous deliverance from popery and arbitrary power; ...our preservation is due, next under God, to the resolution and conduct of his highness the prince of Orange, whom God hath chosen to be the glorious instrument of such an inestimable happiness to us and our posterity..."

A Revolution that had been providentially directed had to be providentially protected. If there were any danger that the forces of evil would triumph in counter invasion, it

certainly would be to God's benefit to protect the fruits of His political creation. With William leading the Protestant cause against the French powers of darkness, the war against James II and Louis XIV took on the nature of a crusade. With each success, first in Ireland, then on the Continent, the view became general that the crusade was blessed. The victories of the Boyne and at the siege of Limerick first caught the Church's attention. William's personal command of the Irish campaign, his many escapes from death, and his victory over the renowned arms of France, indicated to Lloyd that heaven had been with the King. Could anyone imagine how things must have gone had there been no William to assist in the salvation of England?³⁷ At Mary's death, Jurieu wrote an eloquent *Pastoral Letter* in praise of the providential success of the Revolution. When William's life was nearly taken in the Turnham Green plot, the author of *An Impartial History of the Plots and Conspiracies Against the Life of his Sacred Majesty, King William III* showed how "God bared his Arm, [and] shielded his Anointed and our Deliverer" time and again. Bishops Patrick and Moore compared the exposure of the 1696 plot to the providential discovery of the Gunpowder Plot. Other churchmen exhorted the nonjurors to "no longer work to combat the workings of Omnipotence... 'Ye shall not go up to Fight against your Brethren, for this Thing is from [God]!..."³⁸ The Treaty of Ryswick in 1697 gave the final seal of approval to the Revolution. Not only was James II's claim destroyed by Louis XIV's forced recognition of William, but the collapse of mighty France itself was regarded as a providential wonder.³⁹

The argument for a providential Revolution had its dangers of course, and Anglicans were warned not to look on the mere seeming favor of providence alone as a sufficient argument of the goodness of any cause.⁴⁰ The Williamite divine right of providence was a means of continuing in modified form the more personal divine right of Stuart kings. Robert Jenkin, Master of St. John's College, Cambridge, did a masterful study of Sherlock's providential possession theory with this in mind. His criticism, although on the whole favorable, was honest enough to admit that this new divine right was actually an able effort to keep a rightful

king from the throne by an adaptation of the divine theory that had made him powerful in his kingship. Divine providence, furthermore, was an argument fit only for revolutions and other extraordinary occurrences. In normal times, he pointed out, a steady diet of providential theory would be too unsettling for the running of any government which must continue its business under ordinary laws.⁴¹

Yet providence was an attractive argument which even the nonjurors could use. They talked about the fact that Queen Mary had become mortally ill in the very month that "her Father labour'd under an unnatural Rebellion," and that she died in "the Month wherein she was proclaimed."⁴² But this was a feeble use of a theological argument that the Church employed to better advantage. It must be remembered that providence was not the whole of Anglican theory, but it was a necessary supplement to its legal position. The doctrine of conquest and the *de facto* monarchy was the legal side of Anglican justification, designed to show William's right under law; justification by providence was the theological counterpart aimed at balancing the legality of William's conquest with a greater moral right. The constitutional precedents established by Henry VII's reign, if used as its sole argument, would have left the Church liable to a charge of Machiavellism; but with William's right to the throne granted morally by God's greater designs, no Anglican need have refrained from supporting the new government. Thus the idea of providence enjoyed a brief but intensive period of consideration by the Church during the years of William's reign. If a casuist like Burnet could admit "how dangerous and deceitful an Argument this from Providence will ever seem to be," he also would be sure that the groundwork were well laid in theory as well as fact before a providential revolution could be proved.⁴³ The Church was equal to the task, for providence was still the age's leading concept of natural and historical causation, into which the Revolution easily fitted.

CHAPTER 7

Divine Right and the Defense of Royal Supremacy after 1688

The seventeenth century concept of divine right was essentially a popular theory, proclaimed in the pulpit, published in the market place, witnessed on the battlefield. No one philosopher developed it; it was powerful in that it was held as a universal truth among all conditions of men. Four ideas were involved in the belief: that monarchy was a divinely-ordained institution; that hereditary right was indefeasible; that kings were accountable to God alone; and that nonresistance and passive obedience were enjoined by God. With the possible exception of the second, one idea could not be separated from another without doing damage to the whole. If, for instance, subjects retained the right of rebellion, then divine right resided in them and not in the king. If the monarch were subject to the will of the people, then the people were holy, and this the Church could not believe. Besides, there were the Biblical precepts to consider (that "the powers that be are of God"), which showed that Old Testament kingships were divinely ordained. The Church did make one change in the older form of the idea, for in formulating the divine right of providence to set up one king in the stead of another, it solved the theological problem of hereditary right and its sacredness. Thus divine right was saved by the transition it made after the Revolution by being linked to a greater universal providence which politics could not touch.

There was no end to the sources of divine right, as Selzer showed in his *History of Passive Obedience*. The good Anglican could cite any one of hundreds of the century's

sermons to support his argument--he could use Spinoza, Hobbes, Filmer, the discourses of Bishop Hooper, or the poetry of John Donne--or but take down his copy of the popular *Whole Duty of Man* and read that kings, as the ministers of God, are never to be resisted. Some few of the reconstructed churchmen of the Revolution indeed tried to demonstrate that divine right had been only a Restoration Tory policy imposed on the people as a millstone to weigh down their inclination to rebel, but by far the greater majority continued to nurse the old idea and to make new contributions to its literature. If divine right suffered a setback because of William's elevation, it was to come back briefly but powerfully during Anne's reign. This discussion, therefore, of divine right and its concomitants from 1688 to 1702 is a prelude to the sunset glory of the idea before the coming of the Hanoverians closed the issue.

Much of divine right theory was a lingering heritage of Tudor kingship. In Henry's and Elizabeth's day, the monarch was regarded as the supreme center of the national microcosm. "From the prince as from a perpetual well-spring, cometh among the people the flood of all that is good or evil," wrote Sir Thomas More. The most intimate desires of the king, his faults and his virtues, were the first causes of national blessings or woes. Indeed, three religious revolutions were accomplished and took their courses from the private proclivities of three Tudor sovereigns. The tradition of active kingship was still strong enough to make Revolution churchmen reflect that princes "are called Gods [because] they are Instruments of Great Good to the World; the Chief Instruments of Divine Providence, to Preserve, and Procure the Present Well-fare, and Worldly Happyness of Mankind. . . ." ¹ The personal power of the king, in the Elizabethan sense, was capable of influencing the whole chain of being: "Because Kings are the great Instruments of the Divine Providence in the World, they are those great Wheels which move and alter the whole scene of humane Affairs; every Irregularity in their Motions is soon felt, and causes very fatal Convulsions in the State; their Mistakes are like the Eclipses of the Sun, but more portentous and ominous than they, their Smiles or Frowns are like the kind or malign Influences of the Heavens,

which revive drooping Nature, or threaten an universal Ruine...!"² Burnet, who deplored James's power, compared William to the sun, who, without mercy could scorch the earth, but instead blessed England with his beneficent rays. He no doubt remembered James when he remarked that a bad king was an instance of God's anger with a nation, a plague worse than war, fire, or famine.³

In some quarters, sentiments of divine right remained unaltered by the experience of the Revolution. "Revelation and Christianity," it was still affirmed, "give Princes and Magistrates the Name and Title of God... not as any Objects of Religious Worship, but as partaking some Qualities and Perfections like to those of God, and other Superior Beings, who are far above Ordinary Men.... Princes are called Gods, in respect of their Power and Authority, as they are the Ministers of God... Appointed and Commissionated to Govern the Lower World under him...."⁴ The same divine right phrases appeared regularly from the pulpit and the press-- "God's viceregents upon earth" -- "To Rebel against [the prince] is to Sin against our own Soul... to stop the Breath of [our] Nostrils, or to forsake... God"--"Sovereign Princes [are] the Images of Divinity on Earth" and have "an immediate delegation of [God's] Authority."⁵ Even Burnet, ever the logical casuist, fitted divine right into the natural order by pointing out that all men partook of the divine image, but just as man was above the lower animal creation, so magistrates were above mankind in general as God's deputies on earth. The final chapter of Burnet's *History of his Own Time*, although written well after William's death, contains a curious description of the ideal prince. Although he states that "princes are made for the people, and not the people for them," Burnet reasons that they "are exalted for the good of their fellow-creatures, in order to raise them to the truest sublimity, to become as like Divinity as a mortal creature is capable of being." Because a king should consider himself as exalted by God, he should be revered by all as "in some sort a God on earth...."⁶ Sherlock, whose *Case of the Allegiance* was largely concerned with divine right, assumed a semi-divinity in all monarchs because God ruled in all the other kingdoms of the world as well as in Israel, and therefore all kings ruled by God's

authority.⁷ Toward the end of William's reign especially, divine right was revived with greater intensity. In 1702, the Reverend William Binckes delivered his famous sermon before Convocation once more comparing Charles I to Christ, restoring monarchical divinity in general and raising it above anything it had enjoyed before.

While most of the clergy continued to preach divine right—and it must be remembered that this right was given to William's title—very few continued their belief without some sort of modification. Burnet believed that a king was God's minister in the true sense only when his chief care was the maintenance of religion. Liberal Anglicans generally were willing to concede some sacredness in the monarch if he ruled with high regard for the rights of his subjects.⁸ A unique distinction began to appear, based on the general pronouncement that all power is from God; that while the essence of sovereignty came from God, the exact laws by which kings ruled were those made by the nation: that "Sovereign Princes have their Authority from God, but their Laws are the Laws of Men...." In even a cursory study of the Bible and history, it was clear that in different ages many forms of government existed, all of them empowered by heaven under Romans 13. Thus, regardless of the methods used in choosing supreme magistrates, their power was a gift from God. Providence of course was the unifying rule; for if one were to link the belief that all power was of God with that which stated that He providentially disposed of kings, then the conclusion would be that government in general was divine.⁹

The belief in nonresistance, as the distinguishing character of the Church of England, was even stronger than divine right itself. It was deeply rooted in the Elizabethan fear of the fifteenth century's civil disorder, the dread of the Pope's deposing power, and, later, in the fear of puritan levellers. It found expression in Elizabeth's second book of homilies, the canons of 1606 and 1640, and the oath of supremacy. During the civil wars Parliament, in fear of the consequences of acting in opposition to it, pretended that its army fought not against the king, but for his authority. After the Restoration nonresistance was fortified by Charles's corporation oath, his Act of Uniformity, and the Militia Acts

of 13 and 14, Car. 2, which denied that Parliament had the right to make either an offensive or defensive war against the king. At the time of Lord Russell's execution for his part in the Monmouth rebellion, Burnet and Tillotson, who attended him, warned him that if he did not accept the doctrine of nonresistance it was likely he would not attain salvation. Monmouth himself was told he could not belong to the Church unless he acknowledged nonresistance. Little wonder that when James was on the throne he counted on it as an idea so strongly ingrained that whatever he might do, any rebellion would be discouraged by the Church. The Anglican had considered himself shackled by nonresistance, for whatever James was about, "Suspensions and Jealousies of a Prince's sinister Designs are no sufficient Grounds for Subjects violently to assert their Rights, but in this Case the Event of things must be left to Providence."¹⁰

The Prince of Orange had not been blind to the possible uses of the English regard for nonresistance. During the invasion he let it be known that any resistance to him was resistance to legally constituted authority, even informing the English fleet that any action against him would be traitorous to the English nation.¹¹ After the settlement Sherlock and others hastened to assure the people that "Those who believed the Doctrine of Non-resistance and Passive Obedience to be a good Doctrine before may think so still, and be never the less Friends to the present Government."¹² As to the more radical Williamites who wrote against nonresistance, their conclusions must ultimately lead to a condition of anarchy, for no government could hope to exist unless its laws were obeyed. Christianity rested on nonresistance: Christ had submitted himself to death; St. Stephen had not resisted those who stoned him; the good Christian always believed that it was better to suffer than return evil for evil.¹³ Besides these higher appeals, nonresistance was considered a means by which "to confirm the honest vulgar in their duty and allegiance." The Church pointed out that "he who preaches up... the Unlawfulness of Resisting Superiors... is little likely to be a Disturber of Government, whose Original he acknowledges to be only from Heaven, and accountable only to that Tribunal." Nonresistance, as a valuable support of William's

government, could not be dispensed with because of the religious fear it instilled in the people. Without it, the right of rebellion could well become a useful Jacobite tool.¹⁴

Anglicans held nonresistance to be a revived practice of the primitive church, which, it was believed, had never sought to destroy the pagan governments placed over it, but had won them to Christianity by love. It was the Roman Church which had abandoned this means for the Jesuit method of using "Prisons and Tortures" as a "proper means to convince the Understanding." The popish practice of waging wars in the name of religion was a gross departure from early practice and belief. True Christianity followed the submissive rule of Christ, winning converts by its example and its teaching. The aim of this much-repeated theme was to persuade Jacobitical nonjurors that "Resistance on the account of Religion [is] unlawful."¹⁵ There was always the danger the peaceful nonjuring element in the laity, as in the clergy, might be imposed upon by shrewd arguments to take up James's cause actively, unless everything were done to restrain them with a constant reminder of the passivity of the early Christians under the most relentless usurpers. The plea was an Anglican plea, for it was hoped that nonjurors would not help in destroying the Church of England by aiding the restoration of James. Nonjurors were implored to remain neutral at least in the event the English and Irish Catholics should attempt a counterrevolution. In fighting for James they would not only commit the sin of rebellion, but would find themselves fighting against their Church.

The third part of the triad, passive obedience, also suffered little in the respect given it by the Anglican in William's reign. In the passive sense of not giving active support to evil commands, it was the Christian alternative to rebellion. Although passive obedience was "not totally forgot," and "though not yet struck out of our Homilies... some very needlessly and through wrong Notions of the late Revolution have disclaimed" the doctrine.¹⁶ As to the Revolution, passive obedience taught that it was the subject's duty to "Suffer, not to act," calling for a passive resignation to James's flight and to William's succession. Bishop Sharp proclaimed that in this light he would preach obedience

and submission to the government, and that it was his duty to do so.¹⁷ Thus, while passive obedience proved an impediment to the nonjuror, others found the Revolution perfectly consistent with its dictates, making their acceptance of the new government an ordinary act of obedience.

Nothing was easier than for many Anglicans to find that passive obedience was due to the powers that be, and for others to declare that it was a doctrine "of which no Church need be asham'd, and no King can be afraid: . . . all that Obedience which the Scripture requires us to pay unto the King, we must now look upon as devolv'd upon their present Majesties. . . ."¹⁸ It was surprising to those who thought that passive obedience had been discredited by the Revolution to find in a short time that "now it is treasonable to deny it" because it supported William's government.¹⁹

Of course the Church addressed its plea for obedience to the crustier nonjurors who would always look at the Revolution as an act of usurpation. If a connection with primitive Christianity could be made, so much the better. The nonjurors were reminded of Christ's submission to Pilate, and told that obedience to established laws was a Christian duty, even though they might be the laws of a heathen prince. When these laws were repugnant to divine law, even then the Christian must quietly submit. Those who had acted sinfully in bringing about the Revolution "have cause to expect God's heavy Displeasure; but they that contribute no evil to the Change, but submit to it when publickly settl'd, are perhaps one sort of the Meek that shall inherit the Earth, in yielding that active Obedience which St. Paul requires to the Powers or Authorities in being. . . ."²⁰

In passively obeying the government of the Revolution, the subject also would find himself in tune with the law of self-preservation, that "great and fundamental Law of Nature [which is] the Magna Charta of all Constitutions, and the very End and Design of Government it self."²¹ The respect given to self-preservation did not mean, as it came to mean in the nineteenth century, a selfish regard for the law of the jungle, but simply the natural instinct that drove all creatures to live, even above the greatest impediments. God had implanted this life force in His creation, therefore

"we are bound to preserve that Being, which God has given us, by all just and lawful ways."²² The law of nature was applied to convince the nonjurors, many of whom suffered great financial loss by their deprivations, that when men were overpowered by force, with no other recourse but to submit, the law of nature allowed them to preserve themselves and their families from ruin. If an ideal was totally in conflict with "Man's safety, it must give place to Necessity, and absolve him of his Duty, when his Duty would destroy him," for "in matters of Government, it is an unalterable Right of Nature to submit to Force."²³ It was mere foolhardiness that every Englishman should follow King James to complete ruin. If James had fled his nation to preserve his own safety, his subjects, to secure themselves against anarchy, were free to obey the authority that enforced the laws. There is evidence that this argument convinced some reluctant Anglicans that obedience to the new government was permissible, for rather than "continue to expose my self and my Family to Ruine," one author felt bound to "pay Obedience to a Prince that not only protected us, but also maintained all the Laws...."²⁴ The *Autobiography* of Sir John Bramston contains a revealing entry illustrating just this point: "Marrie, if [James] returne, I do think our allegiance will also returne to him. We that are private persons cannot judge whether his absence be voluntary or forced, whether feare or what secret cause he had to goe wee cannot judge. By his absence it became necessarie that Governement should be by some bodie, to avoid confusion. There can be no Governement without submission to it, [and it can] have no assurance of submission but by a religious tye and obligation; the constant practice in all states is by oath to oblige obedience. When the Government is fixed, obedience becomes necessarie to it, and conscience obliges privat persons to yeild obedience, as well as prudence and safety to prevent anarchy, and the rable from spoilinge and robbinge the noble and wealthy. These assertions and reasons seem to me to arise out of pure necessity."²⁵ The Church's arguments on obedience and self-preservation were not wasted on Bramston and others like him who finally took the oath to William.

The most interesting use made of passive obedience by

the Church was that which demanded obedience to the decisions of Parliament as the high court of England. Early Church doctrine was revived again to show that the Christian was bound by the laws of the particular state in which he was resident. His religion was universal, but his citizenship was confined to, and took its nature from, the national state. Obedience to law had been recognized legally under Constantine. Christians then had received civil rights which placed them even more under the claim of the law.²⁶ In addition to this, each society had found it necessary to have a chief governor to interpret the laws. If each individual were left to his own interpretation there would be no concurrence. Courts could claim no authority in their judgments. God as the author of society had vested its officers with the power of law enforcement, therefore it was the duty of Christians to submit to their authority. Every citizen is bound by the determinations of his representatives in Parliament, the Church reminded the nonjurors, and therefore every Englishman must recognize as king he whom Parliament designates. Likewise, in the ordinary proceedings of a court of law, if a case is decided in favor of one man over another, the loser must submit to the decision even though he feels the decision to be morally wrong. The loser must take all action consistent with the legal decree as if he himself had concurred in its making. This was but the theoretical side of the fact that in England "what a Act of Parliament recites or declares to be Law, is so."²⁷ After a Parliamentary vote, all subjects are bound in law to agree with the decision, and pamphlet after pamphlet repeated that "if once matters come to a Publick Vote, as in this Case of ours they necessarily did, the Law of Reason...dictates, That the Lesser Part should yield to the Greater; and this so, that in all matters of purely Civil Right, every Private Man is in reason bound, either to submit to the Major Vote, or to leave the Society."²⁸ No less than this, the Church's loyalty had to conform to the civil judgment in William's case. So evident did this seem that it "would be a Notorious Contradiction to the Doctrine of PASSIVE-OBEDIENCE...for private Persons not to Rest Satisfied with the Decisions of those, whose Office it is to judge" in matters of kingship.²⁹ By affirming Parliament's

right to declare what is law, the Church appealed to the nonjuror's basic respect for law. Those who refused the oath had done so on legal as well as moral grounds. The nonjurors had considered themselves irrevocably bound by those acts of Parliament which secured the person of the king from rebellion and his succession from violation. The Church showed that in the Revolution neither religion nor law suffered, since no less a power than Parliament had altered the laws it had first established. If it could determine the succession in a new line, the same obedience that had been due to the old succession must be transferred to the new, for both were the will of Parliament. In the eyes of the Church the new succession was above question, since "The Possession of the Throne, by the Act of the People of England is now unquestionable; we have no Liberty left us, either to dispute the King's Title, or deny him our Duty. Give unto Caesar the Things that are Caesar's..."³⁰ Thus divine right and passive obedience devolved, with only slight modification, upon the House of Orange. It could not have been otherwise, unless Anglicans were willing to concede that God's reign in England ended with James II's abdication.

The imperative which drove Anglicanism to transfer divine right from James II to William III was reflected in the conviction that the monarch is the motive force of government. No issue so occupied the thoughts of the Revolution's contemporaries as the constitutional place of the king. In the late seventeenth century can be found the seeds of future Parliamentary development, even of modern responsible government, but enough has been written in the past few years to show that all the machinery of the cabinet, party organization, monarchical limitation, and bureaucratic organization existed in such crude form in William's reign that it would be an error to say that the Revolution in any way developed them. David Ogg had the Revolution Settlement in mind when he said, "It is one of the paradoxes of English history that the parliamentary constitution dates from an Act which diminished the royal power so little, and from the rule of a king whose prerogatives were so great."³¹ Perhaps it might be as well to date the growth of the modern constitution from a more advanced period, for during the

Revolution era the will of the prince was to a great degree the will of the nation. The Tudor concept of kingship, in which state omnipotence was centered in the crown, still found expression in the belief that when a prince was popular there were few limits to what he could accomplish. If, as Lecky says, each reign from 1660 to 1714 represented a whole scheme of policy or theory of government, it was because the decisions of each monarch were of paramount consideration to the formulation of policy and theory. Neither political party throughout the period could control policy except as the sovereign's policy favored one party over another. In even the last phase of the struggle with the crown, as the Whigs lost control of Queen Anne's council, they bent every effort, not to destroy royal prerogative, but to secure the favor of a monarch in Hanover who would restore their power. It was this princely favor to which parties looked, for it was still the supreme sanction.

The Bill of Rights, which left theories of sovereignty to the determination of the individual, was a feeble attempt to curb certain evils in the suspending and dispensing powers and the infrequency of Parliamentary elections. But from 1689 to 1701 there were few outright attempts to place limitations on the use of the prerogative. Between those years William was free to manage affairs in much the same manner as his Stuart and Tudor predecessors. Prerogative was looked upon as a positive means of doing good by way of mercy or justice, and little was done to hamper it. Under it William had supreme patronage in the creation of peers and bishops and a host of minor governmental and ecclesiastical officers, the pardoning power, the right to incorporate towns, and the right of granting citizenship. He gave value to the coinage, could confiscate the land of felons, summon and prorogue Parliament and Convocation, appoint and dismiss judges and crown ministers. He had the power of the veto (which he used five times), the right to declare war and peace, and control of foreign policy. Besides these William enjoyed the personal majesty that went with being a king, the center of society, the model for manners and fashion. The awe that majesty inspired was embodied in the superstition

of the therapeutic value of the king's touch which was supposed to cure the disease known as "the king's evil." Although William never exercised the touch, both Charles II and Anne made great use of it. Through all these things, William, in his office and his person, held a kingship which potentially might have risen to the eminence of Tudor practice. If William had been younger and English, if his children had survived him to build a tradition, if he had not had to rely on Parliament for supplies, he might well have succeeded where George III a century later was doomed to failure.

William himself was alive to the possibilities of active kingship. Since the writings of Plumb and Pinkham it is no longer possible to view this monarch as a dispassionate observer, only interested in the success of grand ideas. From the start, as Prince of Orange, he had watched the situation in England closely, waiting patiently for his chance to bring England into his great coalition. For a time it seemed that the Whigs' effort to supplant both James and William with Monmouth's claim would succeed, and although the Exclusion Bill miscarried, William never forgot or forgave that party for ignoring the possibility of his claim. When at last James became personally incompatible with the major parties, William grasped his chance and never relaxed his direction of affairs until he hurried Parliament into granting him full regality. The risk he had taken was great, but its success, barring accident, was as sure as William's ability could make it. Each detail had been looked to, from the timely addition to the House of Orange's motto ("I will maintain" became "I will maintain the Liberties of England and the Protestant Religion"), to the supervision of the elections to the Convention Parliament.³² When once settled on the throne, he wisely made appointments irrespective of party. He expressed an earnest desire to have the revenue of the crown settled on him for life, saying he could not be a king till that was done. His treatment of Parliament worried his supporters,³³ for he was concerned with little besides financial support and impatient with the rest. No Parliament could meet while he was absent from England, and Mary, although his equal on the throne, was left with little to do. When a

permanent means of financing the war was established, one critic exclaimed, "Oh! Happy Change for England, where the Prince hath got such complying Parliaments, that he hath Money given him as much as he will ask, without the least Danger of their Denial...."³⁴ As one reads Morrice's diary of the early years of William's reign, the government's alertness to possible dangers is made clear in frequent references to arrests of printers and agitators for minor acts of Jacobitism. As the years wore on, even Burnet, William's greatest supporter, thought he detected certain tendencies toward absolutism in the king's behavior. In short, William III was what Carlyle would have called a "real king," with more in him of a Frederick the Great than many historians are willing to admit, perhaps the last "real king" of England.³⁵

Whatever William was, he was far from popular during much of his reign. His imperious attitude, his solitary habits, his refusal to confide his innermost thoughts to any but his Dutch ministers, his decision to live at remote Hampton Court, these made for an "early and general disgust" which from the start had "gone on in a very visible increase and progress."³⁶ But if William failed to win the hearts of the people, he was capable of becoming a symbol of national patriotism. When the full details of the Turnham Green Plot became known, all ill humors were overcome by the sudden realization of how close England had come to losing its protector. The delighted Burnet wrote to the Electress of Hanover that "This black conspiracy...has kindled in all men's minds a zeal for the King and a horror of King James beyond what I am able to express." A "loyal association" was formed which swore to avenge William by any means if his life should be taken. Parliament rushed through an act declaring that "Whereas there has been a conspiracy...we declare that His Majesty is rightful and lawful king...and we engage to assist each other in the defence of His Majesty and his government."³⁷

There were many good Anglicans like Nottingham who did not sign the association, not because of a lack of loyalty, but because of the bill's "rightful and lawful" clause, which few churchmen, no matter how devoted to William, could recognize. The question of the title was to plague the nation until the end of the reign, for *de facto* theory

had taken too great a hold. This need not have caused difficulty, for *de facto* theory, by its very name, merely asserted fact without asserting justice. Whether James or William was the rightful monarch mattered little to the Anglican, at least in theory, for allegiance was due to that king who in fact possessed the throne: "for neither our Saviour nor his Apostles bid Christians enquire into the Right and Title of the Roman Emperors, but bids them to obey them under whose Government it was their Lot to fall..."³⁸ Thus another practice of primitive Christianity was held up as an example: St. Paul had in his epistle to the Romans exhorted his flock not to trouble themselves with the nature of titles—these things were beyond them and not to be bothered with. Whatever a king's right, or lack of it, the Christian as a Christian looks upon him who actually administers the government as his king, otherwise "it was of indispensable necessity for the Apostles to have made an exact draught of Politicks, fram'd according to the Nature and Rights of the Government, which they ought to have transmitted to their Successors in writing..."³⁹ But as matters stood, the Church could not pronounce on titles, nor could its people, purely on the basis of their religion, discuss the title to the throne.

The basic problem that had plagued dynastic changes in England was that the qualifications for kingship had never been defined, but had existed in the marginal domain of the law. It was not until the Act of Settlement of 1701 that a monarch had to fulfill certain requirements before his elevation. The *de facto* concept, based on ancient English practice, was designed to fit into this partial vacuum, for law itself had always hesitated before the majesty of a title. Right by providence was a deification of fact, and yet it too reflected the age-old attitude regarding the sanctity of regality. Church arguments stressed that private citizens went beyond their capacities when they judged the fitness of a king's title. "Is it for every Subject to be the Judge or Arbitrator of what is so much above him? If so, he were then not only no Subject, but more than his Sovereign himself, or any earthly Sovereign whatever..."⁴⁰ It was pointed out how in the case of the Duke of York, whose claim to the throne came before the king's justices in the fifteenth

century, the judges declared that the matter was too high for them, touching the king's high estate and regale, which was above the law, and could only be determined by the high court of Parliament. In the case of Henry VII likewise, whose title was as doubtful, the lawyers were of the opinion that the people were not bound to examine the titles of their princes, but were to submit to him that was in possession.⁴¹ Tudor concepts had held that the ordinary rule of law could not be applied to princes' titles, not even to blood ties, if weightier reasons existed. The three estates of the realm had examined the cases of James and William and had declared for William; if this body "shall not be thought sufficient to determine it, I wonder who can, or may do it? For as particular Persons are less capable of making so exact a Judgment, so if every one should undertake to decide it, we must be reduc'd thereby into a helpless state of utter Confusion."⁴² The title was above the consideration of every subject, and since the law of England took no notice of such a thing as prescription in point of sovereignty, the good Anglican should submit to the prince that reigns.

The Church could give attention to the fact that when the contract theory was eliminated from the final form of the Bill of Rights, so was all pretense that King James had been personally judged by Parliament to be unfit for the throne. Not only did Parliament follow this principle by not calling the king to account, it "did not so much as declare that the King is accountable." The sermons of January 30, commemorating the trial and execution of Charles I, repeated this theme, lest some should still labor under the misunderstanding that Parliament had deposed James and that consequently it had established the right to judge kings in the manner in which Charles had been judged. The Convention Parliament had honorably undertaken, not to judge or depose, but only to consider whether the throne was vacant, and if it was, how it must be filled.⁴³

The defense of the royal supremacy upon which the Church embarked was distinctly related to its close connection with the crown. Anglicans no doubt felt that the crown required their support against the imputation that the people had the right to determine the succession. If control of the crown by the people were established, it followed that the Church

would be under the same popular control. To avoid this possibility many of the nonjurors refused to come into the government, and a movement from within the Church declared for a greater relaxation of state control over the Convocation. Thus, on the one hand, Anglicans found themselves battling against a pretended popular right to complete sovereignty and against the demand that the Church separate its connection with the state. Against both it fought for a divinely granted sovereignty under God's delegation but above popular delegation. Ultimately, the Church succeeded in maintaining its Erastian connection by upholding the right of the crown to deprive clerics for state reasons and by defeating the arguments for an autonomous Convocation.⁴⁴

The question of popular versus royal supremacy in politics was another matter, however, for here the Church was dealing with a trend that went considerably beyond church-state relations. The disintegration of theological politics began to appear in the attacks made on the religious awe that once surrounded monarchy, for "men wrote and spake of the king with as little respect or ceremony as of the constable of the parish."⁴⁵ It was regarded as a wonder that the actions of the king and the great lords of the state should be debated and judged by common citizens. Ministers were exhorted by one author to "stop the gangreen" of growing disrespect for magistracy by preaching with renewed emphasis that it was a duty to God to uphold and respect the king and his officers. His blind hatred towards the dissenting "king killers of 41" drove Charles Leslie to repudiate limited monarchy in any form, for he thought he saw in Parliament the same fermentations that once before had destroyed the crown.⁴⁶ The House of Commons was the special target of many Anglicans because it was felt that a Parliamentary despotism would be created if the House succeeded in raising its power above the crown's, creating "four hundred arbitrary sovereigns" instead of one sovereign king. Those democrats "who would have the Prince accounted the common Servant would themselves be esteem'd the uncontrollable Masters of the People when they are but in the Service of the Prince..."⁴⁷ If ultimate sovereignty were placed in the people, the king, said Stillingfleet, would be but a servant of the people, and there would be

nothing to hinder the establishment of a commonwealth. Even if it were true that the people had set up William by compact, they nevertheless had consented "to set one over them with Supreme Authority; and the Supreme Authority is that, which hath no Superiour, and therefore cannot be resisted: For if the Supreme Authority may be resisted, then to be sure all Inferiour Authority may be resisted too, and so all Government must be dissolved, for want of any sufficient Authority to manage it. It follows then, that there must be a Supreme Authority somewhere in all Governments, and in a Kingdom this Supreme Authority must be in the King ...!"⁴⁸ Though England has a mixed constitution there is a point at which ultimate authority rests, either in the people, in which case they must rule directly, or in the king, who rules above them. The king's role is to be above party, to be a defender of the nation's safety if one party should become too strong, by restoring the proper balance of interests. If in the pursuit of the national interest it becomes necessary for the prince to suspend particular laws, then he must do so. By his acts the prince is a law unto himself, "for whatever Command brings with it Authority to require Obedience that very Authority doth plainly impress upon it the Character of a Law."⁴⁹

The honor that was due this sovereign power was paid by the Church in sermon upon sermon to the very person of his majesty. Not only was glorification of William consistent with the new doctrine of divine right by providence, but well before the Turnham Green Plot and the Treaty of Ryswick, it helped to make William popular by stressing his unselfish devotion to England and its religion. Kingship itself continued to be extolled as the purest form of sovereignty. The cult of Charles the Martyr was celebrated with fervor, as before the Revolution, his execution called "one of the greatest Sins that ever was committed by any People that profess'd the true Religion; except only the Jews rejecting and crucifying their Mesias..."⁵⁰ Burnet of all churchmen loved to praise William to the heavens, talking of the "deliverance of England" by the "blessed instrument" of providence, extolling him as "the man whom [God] has made so strong for Himself, whome he made first the Instrument of saving the best Church and People upon Earth [and then]

the Deliverer and Darling of Mankind."⁵¹ Burnet was not alone, for Bishop Wake compared William to David who saved Isreal from the tyranny of Saul. At the Battle of the Boyne, William risked death countless times, but thanks to providence, said Tillotson, "God was pleased to step in for his Preservation, . . . For I do not believe that . . . any mortal man ever had his shoulder so kindly kiss'd by a Cannon bullet."⁵² William was divinely spared to continue his great deliverance of Europe. The king's tremendous industry impressed the Church, and it published the fact that whatever success England enjoyed on the field and at the council table was due to William's energy and ability. Atterbury summed it all up in making William the very model of a seventeenth century prince: "we have now at the Head of our Troops, and our Councils, a Prince, who hath happily join'd together the Extremes of Martial and Political Virtues; and knows as well how to Govern a Free People by their own Laws and Customs, as to Command Legions: Who, whether in the Cabinet, or in the Field, is still equally in his Sphere; and is always indifferent, either to War, or Peace, Any farther than One, or the other, shall conduce to the Good of his People, and the General Interest of Mankind."⁵³ Thus the Church bent every effort to further the interests of William's royal supremacy in his person, his title, and his relation to the constitution.

CHAPTER 8

The Elizabethan Ideal: Disillusionment and Hope

One assumption that most nineteenth century historians seemed to make was that the men who participated in the Revolution of 1688 were imbued with a spirit of democratic progress—that whether they were conscious of it or not, Burnet, Somers, Marlborough, Godolphin, and others were trying to pave the way for the establishment of Parliamentary supremacy, the cabinet system, and were looking ahead to the day when monarchy might be definitely limited. This assumption was no doubt a part of the belief in institutional "progress," which looked at all historical figures as either heroes or villains depending on whether they furthered the interests of Whig democracy. We must be broad enough today to realize that this view is unhistorical, that the motives that impel men to action take rise from their peculiar relation to their age, progress to one period sometimes meaning atavism to another. The men who were affected by the Revolution were fully conscious that some change had been made. Indeed they employed the word "revolution" with the idea of change in mind. But if they themselves thought they had reached another level of perfection in the "progress" to an ideal state, it is difficult to find proof of it. They believed that an ideal of sorts had been attained; for while there were some who believed that the ancient constitution had been restored, others, especially of the Church, looked on the Revolution as a return to the perfect Church-state unity that was believed to have existed in the time of Elizabeth I. It is noteworthy that both these views interpreted the Revolution as a restora-

tion, and not as a step toward a future utopian or democratic polity.

Since the meaning of the term "revolution" has been brought up, it might be well to ask at this point, in what sort of a revolution had the Church taken a part? What did revolution mean to the seventeenth century? Modern historians, like Brinton and Merriman, when referring to the upheavals of Cromwellian England, use the word "revolution" in the modern sense of great and total constitutional and social change. And although this concept of revolution was beginning to take form in the seventeenth century, the far more common use of the word was in the sense of a revolving, a change of fortune, or of status: "the Revolutions of Day and Night."¹ One pamphleteer told the story of a man who "injoined his Relations to bury him with his Face downward, saying, That in a short time the World would be turned upside-down, and then he should be the only Person who lay decently in his Grave.... there has been a considerable Revolution...."² The Shakespearean concept of fortune played an important part in the word's meaning, as is seen in Atterbury's concept of "great National Changes... which carry a People at once from the extremity of Bad, to the Height of Good Fortune...."³ In political affairs, revolution meant a change in dynasty. In this sense Burnet and Stillingfleet spoke of "the Revolution of 1660."⁴ It is clear then that "revolution" meant quite another thing to the contemporaries of 1688 than to us. The nature of the Revolution of 1688 has remained the same, but the word has changed its meaning. This change has caused historians no little trouble, for they have been forced to tack on qualifying words like "conservative" or "bloodless," to a word that originally needed no further explanation. "Perhaps," one modern writer has noted, "It is time we abandoned the phrase ['The English Revolution'] and the system of muddled and superficial generalization that goes with it."⁵ We may well be on the way to such a corrective if we can but view "the Revolution" in its seventeenth century context, and as the result of that century's political thinking.

Many Anglicans hoped that the Revolution would provide a means whereby the nation could be saved from the growing cancer of disunity. The constitutional struggles of the

century, especially since 1640, were gross departures by king and people from an earlier state of Christian union. Since Elizabeth's death, England had entered a century of faction, symptomatic of a fall from grace. It was hoped that one effect of the Revolution would be the restoration of order and the disappearance of the destructive tendencies of faction. The relatively good accord between William's government and the populace encouraged some to believe that "we have it in our Power to be happy if we will; it is an old and most certain Maxim, That none can hurt England while there is a good Correspondence between the King and his People..."⁶ With the nonjurors and Jacobites threatening to disrupt this correspondence, the theme of many a sermon exhorted men to "peace and union" and "mutual charity." The wave of sympathy that spread over the nation after the Turnham Green Plot's discovery was so strongly directed to William that it was hoped it might finally confirm the nation in a patriotic and personal loyalty to William, as well as open the eyes of the nonjurors. Burnet had looked on the Revolution as a marvellous means of restoring England under William to "One Church and one Body, as it has one Head," reaching the halcyon days of Queen Bess, when England was the center of the fight for liberty and Protestantism. Perhaps after the successful close of the war with France the time would soon come when "All Factions and Parties will be sunk and forgotten; there will be no Whig nor Tory, no Jacobite, no Church-party, Court-party, nor Country-party: for the Interest of Court and Country will be one and the same, which has not been known since the Death of Queen Elizabeth..."⁷

The reference to the glories of Elizabeth's time was more than a nostalgic yearning for a past period of greatness; it was a striving for fulfillment of the Elizabethan ideal of the Reformation. The English Reformation had been a supreme expression of national sovereignty, a movement that had restored the empire of England to its ancient independence, with one church for one people. Above it had been Elizabeth, whose devotion to the commonweal of England raised the nation to a degree of glory that never since had been equaled. The good will of the people had allowed the Tudors, it was understood, to exercise as much power as they

could want, because it was used in their behalf.⁸ This popular despotism was, in effect, what Anglicans such as Burnet offered William. Like Elizabeth, William was Protestant; like her he had vanquished a popish prince. The good bishop advised the prince to follow the example of Elizabeth, and study the interest of the nation. To accomplish this, frequent progresses should be made so that every place could be visited every seven, eight, or ten years. Burnet cautioned the prince, however, to accept entertainments only from those who could best afford them, so that great lords would not view his coming, as they had Elizabeth's, as a financial catastrophe.⁹

William's success in gaining the financial confidence of the nation, in having an adequate source of revenue to carry on the war, encouraged Burnet to write that "Q. Elizabeth's Days seem to return again upon us, in which the Purses of the Subject were that happy Queen's never-failing Treasure, who reckoned that their Money was never more their own, and never better placed, nor better employed, than when it was in the Queen's Hands....When we see the same Confidence in the Crown returning in the Nation, which has been so long and fatally interrupted, we may then reckon that our Kings are become truly great, and the Masters of the whole Property of England, not by the strained and false Pretensions of a devouring Prerogative, but by the surest and best-grounded Dominion, which they have over the Hearts of their People..."¹⁰ The war for which William required his subjects' purses, reminded many of the Elizabethan position a century before. William too, it was said, was an excommunicant, his lands declared forfeit to the King of France, so that just as Elizabeth united the nation against a Spanish threat, William united it against a French threat. In 1691 the danger of a French invasion fleet bore too close a resemblance to the Armada threat for these neo-Elizabethans to allow it to pass without notice. They called for a completion of Elizabeth's policy by destroying Continental popery. Nearly every phase of William's policy was compared favorably with Elizabeth's; even when Burnet spoke of the king's fostering of the Toleration Bill, there was a hint that he felt its provisions were consonant with Queen Bess's early view that "windows" should not be made into men's

souls. Perhaps no clearer picture can be given of the ideal that most Anglicans looked for in the Revolution's fulfillment than in the hope "that both we and all round us, when we reflect on the 88 of this Age, may almost forget the 88 of the former, and that our second 5th of November may wear out the Remembrance of the 1st. And to conclude all, for I can rise no higher; May the Happy and Glorious Days of Queen Elizabeth be darkened and eclipsed by the more Happy and more Glorious Reign of KING WILLIAM and QUEEN MARY." ¹¹

There was another side to the bright Elizabethan hope, one of disillusionment with "the miserable Estate we have fallen into from that happy and glorious Prospect of things which we had in 1688 and 1689..." ¹² Robert Fleming, who was much preoccupied with the ways of providence, thought the war with France, which had gone none too well in its early phase, signified God's displeasure and might well mean that a heavy judgment was to be passed on England. The unity that Anglicans hoped would come out of the Revolution was not forthcoming, for while it seemed that religion, property, and liberty were saved, men were still at cross purposes: "I had thought it had been love to God and man, good-will and peace upon earth, that had been hereby intended to reflect back glory to God in the highest; And is all to end in a Party?" ¹³ Thus, to most Anglicans, the source of their disillusionment came from the continued machinations of party politics. Party organization at the end of the seventeenth century was not the orderly and sophisticated thing it was to become, but was instead a hodgepodge of factions milling behind the scenes, clawing each other over every issue that came before the nation. To the churchmen whose ideal polity stressed complete unanimity behind the throne, the creation of political parties was one of the sinful legacies of the civil wars, and in a general sense, according to Hooker, had been born out of the various forms that the Reformation had taken outside of the Establishment. Whatever its sources, parties were regarded as the most fatal plague the body politic could endure. The malignant growth of disunity had spread since the Reformation until party grew from party. Why, it was asked, had this happened when the Church had remained the same

since Elizabeth's day? Its doctrines had suited Englishmen then, why not now? It had been hoped that "among other good effects of the late Happy Revolution, we, who were delivered from a Common Enemy, might become better Friends to one another,"¹⁴ but the illusion had dissolved before the unabated strivings of party politics.

Parties were in the lowest esteem, not merely because they divided the nation from its best interests, but because each party aimed at destroying the other in its attempt to control the Crown. They were a means for gaining power, their perpetuation of old prejudices a means to discredit other parties.¹⁵ During the factionalism of Anne's reign, Swift studied contemporary opinion on parties and concluded that people feared either Whig or Tory because of their ultimate aims: why should the Whigs continue their activities unless at heart they were republicans; why should the Tories stand so fast for the crown unless they were absolutists?¹⁶ By 1694 Bohun felt that the Whigs would either transform England into another commonwealth, or William would return from the French wars with an army strong enough to maintain royal prerogative. The more rabid monarchists demanded Parliament be forcibly unified by purging all those who disagreed with their conservative sentiments. Few people could see how parties would long continue, for if the voters gave governmental power "to the Papists they'd restore it to King James, and that would displease, as well as expose the Williamites. If they should commit it into the Hands of the staunch Church of England Men, they would be sure to give it again to King William, and that would enrage the Jacobites and Republicans. If they should give it to the Presbyterians, they would keep it themselves and set up a Commonwealth, seize the Kings and the Church Lands, and disoblige the Monarchists and the Episcopal Party. If they give it to the Independents, instead of beating the Sword into Plow-shares, they would hammer it into bloody Axes....The Chiliasts would keep it in their own Hands 'till Christ came; and the Socinians would dethrone him from being a King, as well as from being a God..."¹⁷ The organic nature of society, furthermore, dictated that no part of the body politic could safely usurp the functions of other parts. The eye cannot dispense with the hand, the

head requires the feet, and all members must regard their need for each other.¹⁸ Nor should the prince encourage one party more than another; it was party-taking and party-making that overthrew Charles I, shook the throne of Charles II, and destroyed James II. Burnet's fear of a party controlled ministry caused him to warn the prince against the dangers of a party-minded cabinet. The prince should be above parties, a "patriot-king" in the sense that Bolingbroke was to use the term. A man's wisdom was to be the criterion for being chosen a minister, not his party connection. Burnet set forth a proposal that would facilitate the choice of loyal ministers by the settlement of 250 pounds yearly upon the kingdom's brightest youths for their education in government so that "a prince might have a constant nursery for a wise and able ministry." Until then, the king should pick his servants secretly to discourage cabals, and their selection should be made on merit alone.¹⁹

The constant appeals to unity throughout William's reign embodied the vision of a restored Elizabethan polity, but the hoped-for dissolution of party activities was never realized. Yet there was a brief period at the end of William's reign when it seemed that all the wishes of the Church would be fulfilled. In 1701, the state of the nation was little changed in its apathetic attitude towards the government, despite the brief rallying events of the Turnham Green Plot and the Treaty of Ryswick. Parties still clamored for control of the ministry, there was still the basic split between the "country and the court," and the squires and merchants still pursued opposite ends. The Convocation of 1701 evinced a split between the Lower and Upper Houses greater than that which had appeared in 1689. William found it impossible to convince the council and the nation that it was to their interests to enter the new War of the Spanish Succession. Then, in September, 1701, James II died at St. Germain, a monarch who, as characterized by Burnet, suffered one fatal flaw, for "if it had not been for his popery, he would have been, if not a great, yet a good, prince." Louis XIV wasted little time in recognizing the thirteen year-old pretender as James III. This event provided William with as much support as he could have wished. Now the nation took the lead in a demand for war;

addresses and petitions poured into London expressing its abhorrence of Louis's pretensions in conferring the English throne upon his candidate. The addresses renewed the nation's vow of fidelity to the Protestant succession, and although the Act of Settlement had been mainly a Tory act, it soon became the rallying point for both parties. The addresses of Parliament in support of the War reflected William's sudden popularity. They not only rejected the "Prince of Wales's" claim, they went on to add to the articles of the alliances that no peace should be made until the French king made full reparation to William for breaking the Treaty of Ryswick. Commons passed an attainder against the pretender's regent, Mary of Modena. So strong was the movement for William and the war that those who could abide neither were forced to feign enthusiasm for both.

Consonant with this enthusiasm, Parliament formulated a new oath of allegiance which demanded every office holder in Church and state to swear that William's title was "rightful and lawful," and that the theory of divine hereditary right be denied. Many divine rightists were able to take the oath because hereditary succession had lost its divinity. William, the Church had shown, held his throne by the new divine right of providence. Nevertheless, the 1701 oath can be said to mark the official end of divine right as a theory of sovereignty by driving it from the constitution. When Parliament declared the belief in divine hereditary right legally abhorrent, the Stuart idea of monarchical divinity became incompatible with patriotism, the national interest, and the Protestant succession.

It is one of those ironies of history that the one who had endeavored to win the support of the nation, who had worked so long for a unification of the Protestant world, was to disappear from the scene at a time when it seemed all his hopes would be fulfilled. Providence had raised William to the throne of England, it had guarded him through many a battle, but in March, 1702, shortly after Parliament rose in support of the new war, William's horse stumbled on a mole hill. The king suffered only a broken collar bone, but his health, which had never been sufficient to the demands he placed upon it, was not good enough to restore him. The ideal that he symbolized to the Church never bore fruit,

and in Anne's reign the temporary unity that enlisted the nation in war exploded in the shattering factiousness of Augustan politics. Political ideals and practices passed beyond the grasp of the clerical theorist, but if Anglicans failed to understand what was happening to their polity, their hopes at least reveal the strength that existed in the ideal of Elizabethan unity, giving a new perspective in understanding to the Revolution.²⁰

CHAPTER 9

Providence, Patriotism, and Progress: The Legacy of Divine Right

It cannot be denied that the divine right of kings as a living idea survived the Revolution; but the form it took after 1688 showed that the essential concept of monarchical divinity adapted itself to an unusual precedent, and was projected well beyond the uncomplicated formulations of the Caroline Church. Two aspects of the idea disappeared almost as soon as William ascended the throne: that hereditary succession was inviolable, that kings are accountable to God alone for their ministrations. Except in the writings of the nonjurors, it is nearly impossible to find one reference to either concept after 1688. Providential right took the place of hereditary right in the matter of succession, but in the matter of accountability to God, there was a more complicated transition which started with a revival of the ancient concept of the *salus populi*.

Peter Allix stated that the mediaeval canonists, with the exception of "Gratian and some flattering Monks," had always understood that the monarchy was to be limited by the public good.¹ The ancient Roman law, *Salus Populi Supreme Lex*, which ordered that the rule of conscience in things political was the public welfare, was linked by the Anglicans of the Revolution to the verse in Romans 13, "[the magistrate] is the Minister of God to thee for Good," which made the magistrate morally accountable for the public good.² God's first intention was to preserve human government, therefore any act which prevented society from disintegrating into a state of nature, though it might in itself be sinful, yet if it preserved human society, acquired a virtue of its own. Sermon and tract followed one

upon another, repeating that allegiance must be given to William's government for the very sake of the public peace and good. Thus the protection of the public good, while it implied accountability to the people, also was understood to allow the king any power which would preserve it. Therefore, if nonjurors detected illegality in William's reign, they should suspend their judgment, realize that William did what he did to maintain the *salus populi*, and give allegiance to their protector.³

Another concept, which at the same time extended providential divine right and limited its older use, was that which transferred divine sanction from the person to the office of the king. Early in the Revolution it was observed that "our Allegiance to James the Second was not to his Person absolutely, but respectively, as he sustain'd the Character of King; and therefore as we ow'd no Allegiance to him before he was King, so neither can we owe him any now, if he cease to be so..."⁴ Stillingfleet, in his plea for unity behind the new government, treated the question of the new oath of allegiance as of little importance because he assumed that the office and not the person required obedience. Sherlock made use of his providential right argument to show that when a servant became master, his social capacity changed, and when a subject became a king his political status changed with the assumption of his new office.⁵ There were various ways in which men could come to the throne, by "Hereditary Right, The Election of the People, the Nomination of God, a Divine Entail, And Conquest;" but all these went to show that no man could have God's authority unless he held the office, "for God's Authority is the Authority of Government." The conclusion was that the office and personal capacity of kingship were separable.⁶ This separation of man and office meant not only that the "natural Person" could be divided from the "politick Capacity" of the monarch, a division that was not recognized as entirely consistent with the old constitution,⁷ but also implied a divinity of the political institution of monarchy. If it was true that "Dominion and Government makes a King," and that "the Succession of the Crown of England is not by Divine Right, but by Political Institution," then a *de facto* monarch was automatically a

de jure monarch, for " 'tis not the Title, but the Office, that makes him a King...."⁷ In later years Swift, among others was to uphold this view. What is perhaps more interesting is that the divine right transformation made the office of king sacred, no matter in whose hands it was held, and kings could still be said to be "in the Place of God... and are Gods, though not by Nature, yet by Office..."⁹

The king, of course, occupied only a part of the constitution. If divinity was derived from his office, then how much greater must be the sacredness of government in general. Keith Feiling suggested that one weakness of divine right was that it neglected to place monarchial above other forms of government, but if the idea had been so inflexible, it would never have survived in the Revolution Church's ideology. When William's Parliamentary succession destroyed the pretense of rule by hereditary succession, Anglicans found little difficulty in proving that divine right none the less could exist in his kingship. Hereditary succession had never been the single divine form; government alone had been the essential. Burnet, Lloyd, and Sherlock agreed that various constitutions and governments, regardless of form, were all invested with divine right, that obedience and nonresistance were to be yielded to government in general, whether monarchial or republican. With divine right firmly transferred to government in general, it was but a short step to the making of William's government, and the English constitution in particular, the object of divinity. William held the chief office of state, and in that capacity he was God's minister. "Allegiance... is a Duty that every Subject by the Law of Nature, owes to his Country, and consequently to the supreme Power thereof; that is, to his Country as the End, to the King as the means to that End."¹⁰ One can see the birth of the modern concept of statism. Some Anglicans reasoned that "the first and highest Treason is that which is committed against the Constitution... and such Crimes against the Person and Dignity of the Supreme Magistrate, are only made and declared to be so, by reason of the capacity he is put into by the Constitution," and for this reason he is "rendered Sacred in his Person, and inviolable in his Regal Honour..."¹¹ Those who resist the nation, resist God, and become (in our familiar terminology)

"Traitors to the State" ¹² Divine right, by being thus associated with the state, called for a new concept of treason as a crime, not against the king's person, but against the nation, and thus laid the foundation for the inviolability of the modern state.

The reverence paid to primitive Christianity, although still strong enough to make primitive practices powerful arguments for passive obedience, was a sentiment, too, that was undergoing revision. Some Anglicans came to the conclusion that the primitive Christians had lived under different circumstances, for the emperors had been absolute: "but it is quite otherwise with us. We are settled upon a Gothick Model, our Princes make no Laws without our own Consent; they are obliged to the execution of Laws made by our selves with their Consent; they have no Power to dispense with the breach of them by others, nor to invade them themselves." ¹³ The early Christians had no Magna Carta or Charter of Liberties with which to plead their civil liberties, and therefore had to accept the role of the martyr. Burnet believed that the ancient precepts of submission should apply only to the constitution of each government. ¹⁴

This theme, that obedience is measured by a nation's laws, marked the end not only of the rule of primitive Christianity in politics, but tended to transfer allegiance and obedience to common law and the legislature. Peter Allix, among others, produced authority after authority—Aquinas, Grotius, Fortescue, Bracton, Fleta—to show that the king's power had ever been measured by law. ¹⁵ Passive obedience should be yielded, then, only to the extent of the king's lawful power, and only as the king commands by law. "Therefore 'tis from the Statute-Book, not the Bible, that we must judge of the Power our Kings are invested withal, and also of our own Obligations, and the measures of our Subjection." ¹⁶ If James had commanded his subjects lawfully, keeping the constitution as his guide, he would have found the nation obedient. But when he made his will the supreme law, disregarding the national interest, he forfeited all claim to obedience. Bishop Sharp maintained that the common pretense that passive obedience tended to introduce tyranny was quite untrue, since passive obedience made no prince absolute if by the constitution he was not already so. ¹⁷

The laws of the nation, which Lloyd extolled as "the Bond

of Union between Prince and People," and not the personal laws of the prince, were the extent of the subject's obedience.¹⁸ This new passive obedience to law was recognized at the time as a gross innovation in the theory, but others witnessed that the clergy had never "meant any other Obedience than an active Conformity to the Intent of the Law, or a Passive Submission to the Penalties of it."¹⁹ A new meaning of rebellion transformed the older concept of an act against the king's commands, to an act directly against the letter, the power, and the end of the law. Thus the non-jurors were attacked for their belief in a total and blind obedience, for "Passive Obedience to the Law of the Land, is the Doctrine of Jesus; Passive Obedience to the will of the Prince, is the Doctrine of Judas; a false and traitorous Doctrine, whereby all civil Governments and legal Rights are betray'd to arbitrary Power."²⁰ To resist the king, it had been said, was to resist the ordinance of God, but the Revolution Anglican altered the maxim so that to resist the law of the constitution was to resist God's command. The transition that passive obedience underwent in William's reign, to laws instead of to men, was reflected in the recognition that Burnet ultimately gave to the supremacy of the legislature over the executive as the true power of the state. With Swift the transition was complete, for he unquestioningly assumed that supreme sovereignty resided in legislatures, which must be absolute and unlimited in all governments.²¹

While divinity and obedience were gradually shifting to the office of the monarch, to the government and its laws, the doctrine of providence was undergoing certain changes in anticipation of future ideological developments. Providential right maintained that William had been raised by God's will, yet it was equally true that the representatives of the people had voted to confer the crown on William and Mary. Link these facts, as did the Church, with the belief that God frequently controls men's thoughts and actions to bring about His will, and the conclusion will be close to *vox populi, vox dei*. Nature proved that "where an Appetite is universally rooted in the Nature of any kind of Beings, we can attribute so general an Effect to nothing but the Maker of those beings."²² Could this mean that man's necessity

was God's will? In the Old Testament, both Saul and David had been crowned, not only with the divine designation, but with God's demand that the people of Israel receive them as their kings. The case proved to one author that there could be no orderly or lasting government without the consent of the people, tacit or expressed.²³ From these various sources, the Revolution Church fashioned a simple formula which stated that while God's power existed in all government, the particular species were the work of man: "the Frame of every Government is a humane Structure; and though God does impower and authorize every Government, yet he has left the Choice of the several kinds, to the Parties, and has promist to bless them in the just Administration of their several Choices..."²⁴ The Convention Parliament, some even averred, had been directly under God's influence in choosing William. Bishop Lloyd pursued the thought to the conclusion that even republics enjoyed a delegation of God's power, for under their constitutions providence worked through the will of the people to elect the magistrate.²⁵ This trend of thought, perhaps innocent of its democratic implications, continued in Anne's reign, finding expression in Robert Fleming's interesting *The Divine Right of the Revolution*: "the best title that any prince can have to a throne, is his being chosen by the people, declaring their choice by proper representatives. For if God did leave David's title imperfect, until this was done, by what can we (who live now in these last days) judge of the right of princes, to whom no Samuel is sent immediately from God, with a commission to annoint and proclaim them such?...in defiance to all the Jacobites in the world, I say, that our late glorious king had, and our most excellent queen has, as just and uncontested a title and right to the throne of these nations, as ever David had to that of Israel....The voice of the people is the voice of God, in this case, declared as remarkably and illustriously in the coronation of her Majesty, as it was in that of David!"²⁶ Quite unconsciously the providential divine right of "high Toryism" was grafted onto the tree of democratic thought.

Providential theory, together with a literal application of the old Testament, provided a rejuvenation for the cen-

ture's flagging spirit of nationalism. A favorite casuistical approach was the comparison of Old Testament history with contemporary developments. England, like Israel, had frequently forgotten God to worship false idols, and had suffered the same sort of judgments for her sins. Just as Israel alone had discovered the one true God, so had England restored the one true primitive Church from the heathen image worship of the polytheistic papists. William proved to be England's David, and under his leadership guided by the true Church, Anglicans felt they were approaching the fulfillment of a divinely ordained destiny. Only a little imaginative effort was needed to discover that England must be the new Israel, the English a new chosen people. The Revolution surely had been a sign indicating God's favor, so "why should we question the fullest Security to all our Interest, if we make good our part in this Covenant? Why should we doubt his presence with us, as well as with the Jews, if in all we do, we are with him? Why should we think he will not be always ready to hear us, if we have our Ears open to all his Commands? Or why...should we not conclude, 'Happy is the people that is in such a case, nay happy is the people whose God is the Lord.'"²⁷ No matter how low England's fortunes might go, God would never allow her destruction. Bishop Sharp mused over the Biblical exhortation, "Let the multitude of the Isles be glad thereof," and reasoned that the "Isles" must mean Britain, for it was the British Isles "which now at this day (God's ancient People the Jews being for their Infidelity long ago rejected) are the principal Seat of his Church and Kingdom..."²⁸ Burnet was more impressed by England's progress, and affirmed "without any arrogant preferring our own Nation to others," that England, since the Reformation, has had many of the distinguishing marks of the Jewish nation in the blessings she has received. More than any other, he was responsible for a renewed national spirit in William's reign. He worked out a theory of history in which England had struggled with the powers of darkness since the Reformation to become Protestantism's great champion. He affirmed that England's constitution was the model for Europe, for Peter the Great, "a mighty Northern Emperour, cover'd with Laurels, and us'd to Victories, resolving to raise his Nation, and enlarge his

Empire, comes to [England to] learn the best Methods of doing it, and goes away full of Wonder, possessed with truer Notions of Government." Burnet bristled with national pride and loved to describe his nation's advantages: its climate was kind and fruitful, its insular position allowed the wealth of the world to flow in without exposing the nation to conquests, its liberties were the envy of all enslaved peoples but its government was strong and steady, and its religion, reformed of innovation, was the just glory of the Reformation. Burnet was convinced that England was under the special influence of heaven. It had a mission to continue the glorious work of God so that "the Name of Englishman and a Protestant may have a sound all over the World, that may give terror as well as create Esteem," and the Revolution "may in due time attain to its full perfection..." Burnet thundered his message in sermon after sermon, inquiring whether the English are "to be made the Instruments of spreading the Light of the Gospel in its Purity, to other Nations, as we have been already honoured to be the Instruments in this Glorious Reign, to give the Affairs of Europe another Face, a truer Balance, and the Prospect of a firmer Establishment? For let the Men of Envy and ill-nature look thro' our whole History, and see where they can find, in any Age since we were a Nation, that we appear'd with so much Glory, and made so great a Figure, not only over our Neighbourhood, but over the whole World, as we do in this Reign. This disposes a Man to hope, that the whole Designs of Heaven are not yet accomplished: but that what we have seen is a Noble Pledge of somewhat further, that is yet hid in the Counsels of God, but is to break out in due time."²⁹ He was joined in his chauvinism by men like Lloyd and Bishop Jane—even Tillotson wondered what providence had in store since it was clear that England's good cause was sanctioned by God.³⁰ Thus, after nearly a century of internal preoccupations, the Church prepared the nation for its prolonged eighteenth century conflict with France by providing it a spirit of destiny and dedication which would result in a century of world dominance.

Finally, a legacy of providential theory which was to grow into a major faith of the coming centuries, was that of an ever-ascending progress. As the churchmen of the Rev-

olution worked out the implications of their new divine right of providence theory, they saw in God an infinitely wise being who took in the whole eternal round of cause and effect, with whom nothing fell out but by appointment. Added to God's concern for human affairs was the belief that all things in the master plan worked for good to those who loved God: "all that which we call Judgment and Vengeance is unaccountable, unless it serve for the doing Good to the World. . . . From hence it follows, that all Events whatsoever, that ever did, or do, or shall happen in the World, either with respect to Nations, and Kingdoms, or with respect to particular Persons, are really the Best that could or can happen."³¹ This optimistic view, as yet a static concept, needed the driving force of historical inevitability. God had shown himself willing to help in the deliverance of the Revolution, but for the continuance of His aid, it was believed, man must work for and earn His further blessings. These were essentially theological points, but their concern for the success of Anglicanism, and their hope for the future greatness of England, led churchmen to believe that providence would ensure such progress. There is evidence that some were already thinking in terms of material progress at the same time they preached providence, for the thin line between the two ideas was bridged when providence was said to be the progressive law of English history.³² At the Peace of Ryswick, one thanksgiving sermon sketched the possibilities in terms that merchants could understand, for they were told that the wealth of the Indies and of other distant lands was waiting for their trading vessels. Now that the seas had been made safe, the remotest lands could be exploited and the greatest treasures amassed.³³ God had been won to England's good cause. This, in seventeenth century casuistry, was as close to the idea of progress as the age could come. But nevertheless, the "heavenly city" of the eighteenth, and the "self-help" of the nineteenth century, can be detected in this plea made at the very start of the Revolution era: "we ought not to stop the course of [providence], till it has had its full effect; nor to daub matters by slight and palliating remedies. We see now before us the most glorious beginning of a noble Change of the whole

face of Affairs, both with relation to Religion, and the Peace of Europe, that we could have wisht for...we may, if we are not wanting to our selves and to the Conjecture before us hope to see that which may be according to the Prophetic style, termed a new Heavens, and a new Earth."³⁴ The Church had thus picked up the thread of Elizabethan nationalism and added to it the conviction that England's greatness, by its divine providential right, would progressively increase, and in amplifying this thought in sermons and writings, helped to found a spirit of manifest destiny which would establish two empires.

CHAPTER 10

Conclusions: The Place of Anglican Theory in English History

One fact that will strike many students of the Revolution era is that not once in the Anglican literature cited in the preceding pages has the name of Locke appeared. There is no comment, no mention, not even a hint that churchmen were aware that John Locke had written two treatises on government, supposed ever since to have been the prime Whig defense of the Revolution. Either churchmen did not read the treatises, which is unlikely, or for some reason they felt no necessity to refute or discuss them. Locke has been associated for so long with the Revolution that his name should perhaps appear some place, and some relationship established for him with Church theory.

The omission of references to Locke in Anglican argumentation can be explained by the possibility that his works were considered as no better than the usual mass of contract literature that appeared in the wake of William's accession. When Locke's writings joined the two well-known uses of social contract, those of Hooker and Hobbes, the Church might have regarded them as merely re-statements. It may be, too, that because Locke did not argue on the plane of constitutional and legal history, an all but universal pursuit of educated men, and because he was not a Biblicist, as was Filmer, his documentation and evidence was regarded as weak. Locke did not discuss government and policy in terms of theology, and he totally ignored the place of the Church of England and of religion in his theory. Thus, he might well have been considered as having ignored the prime issue behind James's fall and William's sudden elevation—

religion. Whatever their reasons for ignoring Locke, he was certainly not considered by Anglicans as the Revolution's arch-proponent of Whig contract theory.

Locke had never intended to write a justification of the Revolution. It has been known for years that the first of his letters on toleration was published well before the Toleration Bill came before Parliament. But it is only in recent years that Locke has been shown to have formulated his thoughts on government well before the fact of the Revolution. It has been taught that Locke's work was "a wonderfully effective justification" which "rationalized" the Revolution, a "supreme example of the way in which political event interplays with political thinking," but, Peter Laslett concludes, "nevertheless, it is quite untrue."¹ Locke's work was indeed full of every hope that the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries could wish for, but it said very little to his nation in his own time. His influence on the American and French Revolutions has been justly emphasized, but in England, natural rights theory, by the end of the eighteenth century, was demolished by the dispassionate logic of Hume. Locke became the foundation of modern democracy, but his contract theory was as hypothetical as divine right monarchy was accused of being. Divine right casuists at least had the Bible to quote, but until the utilitarians made a science of it, the democratic implications of the contract had only a fictional state of nature to support them.

Revolution historiography has never bothered itself much with the Anglican justification of the Revolution. Historians of the nineteenth, and some in the twentieth century, have dismissed it because it was not regarded as main stream thought. Von Ranke was interested in the rise of the national state, consequently he ignored ecclesiastical theory. Modern surveys, like those of Sir George Clark and David Ogg, have little to say on the subject because they as well are not interested in theological influences in politics. The Anglican justification to them is clearly anachronistic in a period which saw the dawn of the enlightenment and the wars for empire. Thus the one really complete study of the Church's position, that of Macaulay, has been allowed to stand. His view, which rejected the Church's ideas as purely Tory and Jacobitical, has been the standard interpre-

tation for the past century. Macaulay, the herald of Whig progress, could hardly be expected to be impartially disposed to the Church, because "it is difficult to respect a minister of religion who, while asserting that he still adheres to the principles of the Tories, saves his benefice by taking an oath which can be honestly taken only on the principles of the Whigs."² With this disposition, Macaulay found nothing but cant in Anglican theory. His great namesake, G. M. Trevelyan also admitted that "the ultimate view that we take of the Revolution of 1688 must be determined by our preference either for royal absolutism or for parliamentary government,"³ and there was no doubt that Professor Trevelyan would be on the side of the angels—Whig parliamentary angels. He was equally taken up with the story of constitutional progress, was concerned only with the "permanence and growth of the Revolution Settlement," and gave little space to those ideas that failed to survive the Hanoverian ascendancy. This is not to say that these giants of English historiography are guilty of slanting history by their certain omissions, but that they looked at the Revolution in the perspective of men who felt that they were its political beneficiaries, as indeed we all are. This view can be dangerous because it frequently assumes that those Anglicans who spoke the language of divine and providential right, even though they directed it to William's government, were men who were deliberately and perversely holding back England's bright democratic future. In other words, the "Whig historian" has often run the risk of being unhistorical, and has often fallen the victim of that risk. Even a Church historian, the Very Reverend Norman Sykes, fell under the Whig spell when he said, "It was evident that little defence of the new *regime* could be anticipated from the majority of the tory clergy, whose hearts were still moved towards the exiled Stuart king."⁴ There is evidence that this stereotyped view of the clergy, derived from Macaulay, is a distortion.⁵ Perhaps something is done to erase it if it is realized that because some churchmen refused to believe in the contract, they were not necessarily absolute monarchists, that because others continued to talk of divine right, they were not necessarily Jacobites, and that because many believed in the Tudor ideal, they were not opposed to

progressive national policy. Years ago, Figgis pointed out that the seventeenth century's approach to government, based on nature and God, was a pole apart from the nineteenth's concept of a utilitarian state, and yet we insist on interpreting the Revolution as a modern occurrence, when its causes were deep in renaissance and reformation ideologies.

A large part of the problem of misinterpretation arises from the view that the Revolution was a product of Whig ideals which unified the whole nation. A careful study of the pamphlet literature of the age soon reveals that the Revolution of 1688 was far from being "the most satisfactory in history since it embodied the wishes of the whole country."⁶ Others have tried to stress that the "glory of the 'glorious Revolution' [consisted] in the reconciliation of parties," and that it "produced, in a few months, a united nation hurling defiance at Louis...!"⁷ Enough has been said here and elsewhere to show plainly that at least until 1696, or even 1701, England was a distracted nation, rarely united on any issue. Furthermore, the tendency towards this historical simplification has been fortified by the belief that policy and theory can be conveniently categorized under Whig and Tory. Assuming for the moment that these two parties existed as formal organizations, the position of the Jacobites was by no means inconsiderable in the 1690's, so that it would be quite false to dismiss the standing of this third party in the nation. The real point is, however, that "Whig" and "Tory" were merely generic terms for loosely united knots of men who clustered around certain leaders.⁸ Even when contemporaries spoke of these two parties, they understood their titles to be terms of derision or convenience, and not as symbolizing two groups with planned programs, tactics, and ideologies. How could one speak of a "Church party" when that group might include a Sherlock and an Allix, a Burnet and an Atterbury? If we wish to understand intelligently the politics of the Revolution we must think more in terms of men and understand that Whig, Tory, and Jacobite were rather literary figures of speech than concrete forces.

The traditional handling of divine right after the Revolution has been to declare that "it was no longer possible to

teach the divine right of kings and the duty of passive obedience, after a king had been deposed and another chosen in his place;" that although the idea "lingered on as a religious sentiment, it ceased to be a political force after the Revolution."⁹ To prove these assertions, it is suggested that the large number of bishops and clergy who took the oaths "was an indication that there was no vitality left in the theory as a political force."¹⁰ But it is more true to say that because the clergy did believe in William's divine right by conquest and providence, and for this reason took the oath, that there was actually much vitality left in divine right as a political force. The settlement made in 1689 was worded to accommodate the idea, for if the Church and its members were forced to admit that divinity in some form did not exist in an English government, the whole fabric of belief—primitive Christianity, royal supremacy, abhorrence of rebellion and disobedience—would be a useless decoration. It was precisely because the clergy believed that the Revolution was consistent with these general precepts that they could take the oath.

It has been unduly emphasized that the Bill of Rights completed the triumph of contract theory when "an agreed contract was freely made between Crown and people."¹¹ It has led many to conclude that divine right was suddenly destroyed in the Revolution. But no one who has read the works of Leslie, or who understands the roughshod politics of Anne's reign, can come to a like conclusion. Even I. Deane Jones, whose primary interest was in constitutional progress, has agreed that divine right was "responsive to real political problems; that it was a working and useful theory and did not lose its influence or value until its work was done..."¹² Its work was not done until at least 1715. Lecky had established beyond much doubt that the Revolution Settlement was in grave danger until the Hanoverian succession was well secured under George I.¹³ Not until then was a monarch's possession clearly the work of a legislative act and his title of human creation; not until then was providential conquest a theory that could be dispensed with.

There were, indeed, many gaps in the line of defense that Anglican theory drew around the Revolution. Despite

the case for the continuing influence of divine right, it must be admitted that its arguments frequently were warped. It was from the first interested in salving the conscience of the nonjuror, and in this preoccupation other groups were ignored. Sherlock went so far as to state that because "one Prince is at present placed in the Throne, and the other removed out of it, does not prove, that it is God's Will it should always be so, and therefore does not divest the dispossessed Prince of his Legal Right and Claim, nor forbid him to endeavour to recover his Throne, nor forbid those who are under no obligation to the Prince in possession, to assist the dispossessed Prince to recover his Legal Right. .!"¹⁴ Small wonder that arch-Williamites attacked Sherlock for his lack of enthusiasm, for this conciliatory allowance might leave room for Jacobites to hold office while they plotted treason. Thomas Bruce, Earl of Ailesbury, took the oath to William as a "Garrison Oath," others regarded it as a "temporary oath," while many more were unwilling "to acknowledge [William] to be any thing more than a King DeFacto, and that all the Submission they yielded to him is of force, and that they are under no obligation when that force is removed, and others thinke it is neither Wisdome nor Policy to act under him any longer, being confident that as things are managed the late King will returne."¹⁵ Some clergymen took the oath merely to prevent the spread of latitudinarianism.¹⁶ *De facto* theory did win many potential nonjurors to the support of the government, but it was often not the sort of support that could be called ardent loyalty, at least from the contract Whig point of view.

Many of the men who carried the old doctrines over to the new regime were themselves the chief targets of both Williamite and nonjuror. Nearly all of them had participated in the cult of nonresistance and divine hereditary right in Charles II's reign. When the Revolution seemed to sweep these ideas away, it would presumably have swept the men with them. When Tillotson and others remained in their stations, they were called trimmers,¹⁷ and, of course, Sherlock was the arch-traitor. What made these charges close to truth is that men like Burnet seemed every bit the opportunist, for eternal verity stood little chance when one of its guardians admitted that "all general words how large

soever, are still supposed to have a tacit Exception and Reserve in them, if the Matter seems to require it."¹⁸ Burnet could on the one hand declare that the scripture has no bearing on modern politics, and on the other, assure his parishioners that the Bible demands obedience to William's government. It was easy to ridicule such apparent knavery.

Macaulay, after he studied the bewildering mass of Anglican literature, could only conclude: "The truth is that the theory of government which had long been taught by the clergy was so absurd that it could lead to nothing but absurdity. Whether the priest who adhered to that theory swore or refused to swear, he was alike unable to give a rational explanation of his conduct. If he swore, he could vindicate his swearing only by laying down propositions against which every honest heart instinctively revolts, only by proclaiming that Christ had commanded the Church to desert the righteous cause as soon as that cause ceased to prosper, and to strengthen the hands of successful villany against afflicted virtue."¹⁹ The modern scholar who subjects himself to Anglican arguments in sermons and tracts is frequently tempted, if he goes no deeper than a cursory reading, to agree. Sometimes he even detects the same feeling of futility in his material, as when Sherlock admits, "set aside this Principle, That all Sovereign Princes receive their authority from God, and I grant that Non-resistance is nonsense..."²⁰ There was a definite weakness in the doctrine of providential right, for it gave sanction to any political act, once that act was completed. Sherlock's Williamite and Jacobite critics hastened to expose this fault by drawing from it the conclusion that any pirate who could win the throne was to be regarded as a lawful monarch.²¹ Sherlock himself was aware that providential rights might encourage continual revolutions. But he tried to assure himself that rational men would not entertain perpetual treason.²² Some readers thought worse of the providential argument, which to them prostituted providence for the sake of private interest, "making it a Sanctifier of any successful Mischief or Murder, of any Side, of contrary Parties, and to patronize Mens worst Imperfections."²³ Those churchmen who claimed that the Revolution had not been a rebellion were called hypocrites, for it was obvious that

the only reason the Church did not cut off James's head was that he slipped out of its hands.²⁴

And so the clamor against the clergy's participation in political disputes grew steadily through the years. It was an age of ecclesiastical politics, but equally true is the fact that a new age was about to break free from the old ecclesiastical bounds. Men were tiring quickly of the scholar's use of the Bible and his painstaking application of Biblical citations to each episode in the Revolution's development. "The Bible is designed for Religion, and not Politicks. And altho there be two Books of Kings contained therein, yet since there is no Book of Parliaments, it cannot be supposed to have any relation to the English Constitution..."²⁵ Bible citations had had their day, for in politics they were "no more to us, than... a tale of Tom Thumb, or Guy of Warwick!"²⁶ The clergy, it was being said, "of all Men living... have the worse luck in Politicks.... If there be any Counsel more precipitate, more violent, rigorous and extreme than other, it is theirs.... Yet these are the men that must be cutting us out Schemes of Politicks, prescribing to Government, and determining the Rights of Princes. What a Hotchpotch have they made with their Kings *de facto*, their *Jure divino*, their Passivity and Non-resistance."²⁷ It must be admitted that the "Hotchpotch" of *de facto*, primitive Christianity, and providential right, expressed ideas that, however well-woven together by the artful casuist, were far too complicated for the mass of the reading public to grasp fully. Anglican theory could not compete with the universally understandable contract theories of which men were discoursing more and more. Natural rights philosophy was becoming more popular than the old Christian appeals to the general good.

The Church itself was not the best of examples to follow, especially when it became clear that all over England its clergy were smoldering with animosities and dissensions over the issues of the Revolution. Before the convening of the Convention Parliament, there had been a final attempt by the bishops to hold a meeting at Ely House "to find out something in which we can all agree, and the world may take notice of our agreement."²⁸ But the meeting never materialized, and a united Church position became a lost

hope when Sancroft refused its leadership. Not only did the nonjuring group do its best to ridicule the unfaithful, but within a few years the Church split into "high" and "low" largely as a result of the Revolution. An institution as influential as the Church was bound to lose prestige by these schisms, especially when the nonjuring clergy produced arguments from the Bible as cogent as those produced by the Church.²⁹ Finally, what must have exasperated those who tried to follow the Church's position was that the well-fostered notions of *de facto* and conquest were attacked in no less a place than the Anglican pulpit, on occasion, as lacking patriotism.³⁰

Keith Feiling announced some years ago that the "miserable self-delusions of the Conquest school could hardly satisfy the reason of post-Revolution Tory politicians. . . these might do for Doctor Sacheverell, but hardly for the signatories of the Association, or the authors of the Act of Settlement. If Toryism as a body of political doctrine was to survive in any shape, a bridge had to be found from indefeasible hereditary right to limited monarchy, and from nonresistance to the social pact."³¹ Enough has been said about the bridge that Church theory built between divine right and limited monarchy. What should be considered is Feiling's other charge: that the "self-delusions of the Conquest school" were of little effect on post-Revolution Tories. Nottingham and his group certainly felt there were no delusions in conquest theory, and this must have been true of that large, highly conservative party of society raised on Reformation theory and religiosity. When the providentialists drew their arguments from Texts of Holy Writ, they struck sympathetic chords in the public's general knowledge and fundamental respect for the Bible. In government, the king was, as he ever had been, the chief safeguard of national order; in the nation he was the man-god, anointed protector of the faith. As the subjects of Henry VIII had feared the recurrence of the Wars of the Roses, those of William III dreaded another Civil war. There was a sanctity in the crown, despite the inroads of secularism, believed in by the lowest peasant and maintained by the Tudor-Stuart concept that divine control was especially exclusive and essential in the case of kings.

No one but God could make a king, but He did not always

make his choice unmistakably clear. In 1691, John Ashton was tried for treason for attempting to restore his deprived monarch. The interesting part about the case is that Chief Justice Holt had to use the 1352 Statute of Treasons (25 Ed. III) to determine the case. But while the Statute defined what was treason to the king, it was found that it did not make clear who was to be considered king.³² This matter of rightful kingship, which the constitution had never defined, was not a mere academic point to those who considered the oath as a question that involved eternity, "Lest I should be Hang'd; And, Lest I should be Damn'd."³³ In one of his sermons, Sherlock felt constrained, before prayers were offered to the king, "to inquire, what Kings we must pray for. For though St. Paul makes no difference, there are some who do: Some there are among our selves, who withdraw from our Communion, because we pray in our publick Offices for Their present Majesties King William and Queen Mary...";³⁴ The good Anglican, as a Christian, had first to be assured by God's law that William's government was no less sacred than James's. This was the need that the "dark Labyrinths of Law and History" could not satisfy;³⁵ for it was at its pious Anglican parishioners that the Church aimed providential right, being anxious to assure them that the old principles were untouched and that the Revolution was consistent with God's plan. There was no need, indeed no right, the Church declared, to inquire into the imperial title. It was as sacred as Henry VII's, and it was just that Christians should look on James's flight as they had looked on the Battle of Bosworth Field, as a providential victory. Thus conquest theory, far from self-delusive, provided the Anglican constitutionalist with a most rational explanation of the Revolution.

These were the arguments with which the Church hoped to win the scrupulous. They were regarded as important enough for Sir James Tyrrell to incorporate in his mammoth compendium of Revolution issues, *Bibliotheca Politica*. Burnet penned his *Pastoral Letter*, full of providential and conquest justification, for the large conservative audience of Anglican clergy and laity, on whom he no doubt expected the arguments would have effect. Lloyd's *God's Ways of Disposing of Kingdoms* "had the most universal effect on

the fargreater part of the clergy," winning them to the new government.³⁶ Edmund Bohun recorded how "by letters and all ways else, I laboured to gaine over my friends; and had sometimes good success."³⁷ Old Sir John Bramston read Sherlock's opinions and was convinced of his sincerity and of the soundness of his argument; when he finally took the oath, it was no doubt because of Sherlock's influence.³⁸ If the convictions of the conquest school were, as Feiling says, "miserable self-delusions," then the faith of the major part of English society must be brought into question. It is extremely difficult for us to see any merit in what appears to our scientific eyes to be so much theological froth. The fact remains that the writings of Sherlock, Burnet, and Lloyd were responsible, not only for bringing over large numbers of thoughtful Anglicans, but for neutralizing the effects of the Jacobite's efforts to restore James, by continuing to remind Anglicans of their duty to maintain the peace, obey the law, and resist the temptation of rebellion. It was enough, for those who at heart decried the callous disposal of their sacred crown, to be Christians, if they could not be patriots. But beyond the neutralization of Jacobitism, providential conquest doctrine can be regarded in a truer light as reflecting and influencing the thought of the entire nation.

No more interesting example of the power that Anglican theory wielded for the Revolution can be given than by showing its effect on Whig theory. One author felt compelled to explain that because the Whig denies passive obedience and nonresistance, it does not follow that he is antimonarchic, but believes as much as any Anglican that kings must be all-supreme.³⁹ One lawyer, although no sympathizer with Church theory, felt the force of Henry VII's treason law to be great enough to describe its significance in terms that Sherlock and others had first used.⁴⁰ Another Whig pamphleteer who doubted the Church's loyalty still used its conquest argument to good effect, stressing that primitive Christians had often complied with revolutions in the Roman state.⁴¹ Admissions of another sort were made by one pamphleteer who confessed that "tho God do not chuse a King by any miraculous Declaration of his Will... yet (if that will satisfy) I will grant that he may direct and

incline the Hearts of the People to chuse one rather than another; and when they once have chose, God certainly does confirm it;... For I should be very unwilling to live under a Government where God has nothing to do...!"⁴² Apparently providential theory was borrowed to such an extent that when Abel Boyer in later years wrote his history of William's reign, he understood that the idea of William's providential right was a concoction of the "Whiggish Republicans."⁴³ It is testimonial to the importance of Church theory that Parliament itself made use of Passive obedience, for shortly after the Convention Parliament completed its business, a broadside was issued summarizing the assembly's reasons for crowning William. It concluded, "these Considerations, are in our Opinion, sufficient to remove the Grand Scruple about the Oaths. If the dissatisfied Party accuse the Convention, for making the Prince of Orange King, it is not my Duty to judge those above me, ...and they of the Clergy ought not to censure their Superiours, but obey according to the Law and Doctrine of Passive Obedience."⁴⁴ This rather curt order to be passively obedient to the decisions of Parliament lacked the eloquence of a Burnet sermon, but it made the same point.

The Church's part in the entanglements of Revolution politics produced the last great definition in England of a religiously centered polity. Divine right was not finished, as so many have declared, by the Revolution, or by the Act of Settlement, or even by the Hanoverian succession. In its unadulterated form, to be sure, it remained a static concept, cherished by those who chose to follow the Stuart cause to the end; but the general idea of a divinely granted right to rule shaded off into other channels. Divine right severed the connection with its seventeenth century origins and broke free of the hereditary succession when it was declared that "the King *de facto* has Authority... from the Possession of the Throne, to which the Law it self, as well as the Principles of Reason and Religion, have annexed the Authority of Government."⁴⁵ The unusual character of the Revolution brought home the fact that if a dynastic change could topple the whole frame of the constitution, then either hereditary succession or the constitution must give way. To save the one, the other had to be disqualified, and the

Church rightly invested, or reinvested, the law of the constitution with the divine sanction, forsaking hereditary right. As in the same manner that God appointed David with power only as he received the approbation of Israel, so the king ruled divinely as he was acclaimed by the voice of the nation.⁴⁶

Charles Mullett, in his article, "Religion, Politics, and Oaths in the Glorious Revolution," stated that the controversies which produced these ideological alterations ended in 1692; Norman Sykes closed the great days of Church influence with Anne's reign. But there were far broader repercussions of the Revolution Church's political thinking which appeared in Bishop Warburton's *The Alliance between Church and State*, which appeared again at the end of the eighteenth century when the *via media* became England's answer to the fanaticism and infidelity of the French Terror, and which Professor Laski associated with the Oxford Movement in the nineteenth century. As a state Church, the Anglican Establishment could not help but pose a national issue every time it declared a theological alteration in the national faith. There always has been this close interaction between Church and state, and it was natural that as long as the Church was joined to the secular administration, some sort of divine right should be transmitted from the days of Revolution providential right. Hume noted that of the two parties which held power in his England, the one still believed that government was of divine origin, and that to touch its form in any manner was little less than sacrilege. Holdsworth credited the legacy of divine right with the creation, in its modern, nontheological form, of Burke's conservative philosophy. Figgis's statement on the significance of nonresistance expressed the belief that divine right became part of our common heritage. To it we owe our sense of the "organic" nature of the state and our "law-abiding" attitude toward the law. Indeed, our very dislike of violent breaks with the past is a heritage of divine right, as is our belief that a nation must evolve its institutions over many generations in order for them to be lasting. When Bagehot spoke of the "strength of religion" that resided in the crown, he was not referring to a neo-divine right, but rather to that "mystic obligation" which

the humblest subject feels he owes the crown. All these are legacies bequeathed by the Revolution Church and its refashioned divine right.

Finally, there was the place of providence, the doctrine that elevated William and glorified the Revolution's achievements. This doctrine which was first formulated to give moral sanction to a political act, had, by the end of William's reign, revived the spirit of national pride. Under providence, Burnet told his readers, England would become the terror and envy of the world. In Robert Fleming's *Divine Right of the Revolution*, the hand of God was painted as England's real defense, and heroes like Rooke, Shovell, and Marlborough were not only glorified as heaven's soldiers, but as agents of Providence's greater plans for England.⁴⁷ Such a code was to carry men to victory from Wandewash to the Heights of Abraham; and when Fleming's book reappeared in 1793, there was yet a greater victory to be won. It would be ridiculous, and dangerous, to import all of England's later spirit of special destiny to the divine right of providence, but surely it helped to raise England out of the inglorious period of the Dutch wars, the sale of Dunkirk, and the secret Treaty of Dover to a prouder sense of self-realization.

The idea of providence is by no means dead. Although particular causes are no longer attributed to it, it is a very real force to some modern historians.⁴⁸ Beyond this consideration, there is evidence that providence, as used by the Revolution churchmen, and as connected with a positive destiny, was transformed into the dawning concept of progress.⁴⁹ It is no longer possible to hold, as Bury did, that progress was purely the product of Cartesian mechanical theory, for it is evident that when the Anglican spoke of a providence that could be influenced, of a universal plan for all creation, and of a special destiny for the new Israel, he had already started to think in terms of progress.

This discussion of the place of the Church's revolution theory has ranged freely and far, but no farther than the materials seemed to go. It has been conducted on broad lines, but only because so much of the evidence, too long neglected, has far-reaching implications. Too many have ignored the possibilities of the Revolution era's intellectual

dimensions. The reign of William III was significantly an age of transition, for it bridged the renaissance and the enlightenment, Reformation fundamentalism and secularist naturalism, it inaugurated the Newtonian universe, it saw the decay of English absolutism. This work has only explored one facet of this transitional theme, the last phase of the living idea of divine right and that idea's relation to the Revolution. But it is a facet which reveals that ideas do not appear and disappear with the suddenness of a kaleidoscopic twist, but are fashioned painstakingly by men who are forced to accommodate ideals to the sudden appearance of new realities.

FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER I

- ¹ *The Diary of John Evelyn*, ed. by E. S. De Beer (6 vols., London, 1955), IV, 608-609.
- ² David Ogg, *England in the Reigns of James II and William III* (London, 1955), 204; G. N. Clark, *The Later Stuarts* (Oxford, 1949), chaps. 6-8; Evelyn, IV, 601.
- ³ "A True and Impartial Narrative of the Dissenters new Plot," *Somers Tracts* (16 vols., London, 1748-1752), XI, 66; Ogg, 350-351.
- ⁴ "A Short and Sure Method," *Somers*, XII, 482a.
- ⁵ *An Impartial Enquiry* (London, 1692), 5; G. L. Cherry's estimate of the number of Jacobites in the Convention confirms this figure: see his "Legal and Philosophical Position of the Jacobites, 1688-1689," *Journal of Modern History*, XX, no. 4 (December, 1950), 310; Lords and Commons Journals; White Kennett, *A Complete History of England* (3 vols., London, 1719), III, 542-547; Sir Charles Petrie, *The Jacobite Movement* (London, 1938), 107-108.
- ⁶ *Impartial Enquiry*, 2-3.
- ⁷ *An Account of the Late King James in Ireland* (London, 1690), 2; "A Proposal for an Equal Land-tax," *Harleian Miscellany* (12 vols., London, 1808-1811), IX, 507; W. H. Lecky, *History of England in the Eighteenth Century* (7 vols., London, 1892), I, 20.
- ⁸ "Some Reflections upon... the Prince of Orange's Declaration,"

- Somers*, I, 293, 300-303; Evelyn, IV, 614.
- ⁹"A Remonstrance and Protestation of all Good Protestants," *Somers*, II, 260; *A Justification of the Whole Proceeding of their Majesties* (London, 1689), 4, 24, 36.
- ¹⁰"A Speech of a Commoner of England," *Somers*, VII, 426-427; "A Speech to his Highness the Prince of Orange," *Somers*, I, 346-347.
- ¹¹"Remonstrance," 260; "A Letter to a Member of the Convention," *Somers*, I, 324-325; William Sherlock, "Reflections upon our Late and Present Proceedings in England," *Somers*, I, 318.
- ¹²See Petrie, Cherry, and George Hilton Jones, *The Main Stream of Jacobitism* (Cambridge, 1954); "The State of Parties," *A Collection of State Tracts for the Reign of William III*, (3 vols., London, 1705-1711), II, 208-217.
- ¹³It may well be that James's failure to lead an internal revolt after 1692 was caused by the inaccurate reports he received from England. Both he and Louis XIV were amazed that England stayed in the war; both expected either collapse or counterrevolution in James's favor throughout the war; see Ogg, 426.
- ¹⁴"A Short and True Relation of Intrigues," *Somers*, XI, 269; "A Letter to a Friend, concerning a French Invasion," *Harleian*, X, 117-118.
- ¹⁵"Narrative," 51.
- ¹⁶"The Dear Bargain", *Somers*, XI, 233, 239, 248.
- ¹⁷*Impartial Enquiry*, 13; Evelyn, V, 4; "The Price of Abdication," *Somers*, XI, 76; "Whether the Preserving the Protestant Religion was the Motive unto... the late Revolution?," *Somers*, XI, 419.
- ¹⁸"Speech of a Commoner," 427; "Letter to a Member of the Convention," 321.
- ¹⁹"Remonstrance," 263a.
- ²⁰"Preserving," 420.

- ²¹ Thomas Wagstaffe, "A Letter...giving some Account of the Last Sickness and Death of Dr. William Sancroft," *Somers*, XI, 277-278.
- ²² "Abdication," 71-72; *A Letter to Mr. James Parkinson* (London, 1691), 7, 23-24.
- ²³ "A Letter to a Friend, advising...how to free the Nation from Slavery for ever," *Somers*, I, 337-338.
- ²⁴ "Now is the Time," *Somers*, VII, 420; "Good Advice before it be too Late," *Somers*, I, 343.
- ²⁵ *Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos* (London, 1689), 17.
- ²⁶ Sir P. Georgeson, *The Defence of the Parliament of England* (London, 1692), 15-16; *Justification*, 4-5; *Quadriennium Jacobi* (London, 1689), 257.
- ²⁷ "Some Short Considerations," *Somers*, VII, 256; "Good Advice," 340; Gilbert Burnet, "An Enquiry into the Measures of Submission," *Collection of Eighteen Papers* (London, 1688) 119-120.
- ²⁸ "Considerations," 256; Georgeson, 23-24, 27; James Parkinson, *An Examination of Dr. Sherlock's Book* (London, 1691), 7, 22-23.
- ²⁹ Georgeson, 17-18.
- ³⁰ Burnet, "Enquiry," 120.
- ³¹ George Petyt, *Lex Parliamentaria* (London, 1689), 19-20. Compare Petyt's statement with the original of Sir Thomas Smith's *De Republica Anglorum*, ed. by L. Alston (Cambridge, 1906), 48-49; J. W. Gough, *Fundamental Law in English History* (Oxford, 1955), 7-8.
- ³² Georgeson, 17.
- ³³ "Preserving," 419. For samples of the type of Williamite propaganda judges employed, see *State Tracts*, II, 189-192, 195, 200, 201-208.
- ³⁴ *State Tracts*, I, 368-271.
- ³⁵ "King James's Declaration," *Harleian*, X, 159-162;

- ³⁶"New Looking-Glass for the Kingdom," *Harleian*, IX, 402;
"French Invasion," 122;
- ³⁷"The Jacobites Hopes Frustrated," *Harleian*, IX, 465.
- ³⁸Macky, *A View of the Court of St. Germain* (London, 1696),
iii, 11, 16, 21-25; Kennett, III, 738-739; Petrie, 109.
- ³⁹"A Late Voyage to Holland," *Harleian*, IX, 531-547.
- ⁴⁰"Considerations," 258.
- ⁴¹Evelyn, V, 233.
- ⁴²Sherlock, "Reflections," 317.
- ⁴³"Honesty is the Best Policy," *Somers*, VII, 439.
- ⁴⁴The Jacobites, "in effect...do nothing for themselves as
English men, nothing for King James as an English King":
"Parties," 211.

CHAPTER 2

- ¹Public Record Office, Baschet's Transcripts; and see Mary
Ransome, "Church and Dissent in the Election of 1710,"
English Historical Review, (January, 1941), LVI, 76.
- ²"Some Observations upon the keeping the Thirtieth of Janu-
ary, and Twenty-ninth of May," *Somers*, III, 180.
- ³*Loc. cit.*; Charles Mullet, "Religion, Politics, and Oaths
in the Glorious Revolution," *Review of Politics* (October,
1948), X, no. 4, 462-463, 474.
- ⁴Quoted in J. R. Tanner, *English Constitutional Conflicts*
(Cambridge, 1928), 9.
- ⁵J. H. Plumb, "The Elections to the Convention Parliament of
1689," *Cambridge Historical Journal* (1930), V, no. 3, 252;
A Defense of the Arch-bishop's Sermon (London, 1695), 26;
Keith Feiling, *History of the Tory Party* (Oxford, 1924),
302-303.
- ⁶*A Friendly Conference* (London, 1689), 1; Sir John Reresby,
Memoirs, ed. by Andrew Browning (Glasgow, 1936), 569.
- ⁷See *The Proceedings of the Present Parliament*; "English

Loyalty," *State Tracts*, I, 406-409; These are typical of those pamphlets which were aimed directly at clerical loyalty.

⁸ *Defence of the Arch-bishop's Sermon*, 2; Burnet, *Pastoral Letter*, (London, 1689), 1-3.

⁹ One critic compared the January 30 sermons to "the Italian Custom, to keep and shew Handkerchiefs dipped in the blood of those that were killed... to infuse a Desire for Vengeance...." See *Aminadiversions* (London, 1702); *Truth Brought to Light* (London, 1693).

¹⁰ Thomas Babington Macaulay, *History of England from the Accession of James II* (Everyman's Library edition, 4 vols., London, 1953), I, 243; C. H. Mayo, "The Social Status of the Clergy in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries," *English Historical Review* (April, 1922), XXXVII, 258-266.

¹¹ Gilbert Burnet, *History of His Own Time* (London, 1850), 529.

¹² "Letter to a Member of the Convention," 323.

¹³ Burnet, *History*, 528, 531; George Every, *The High Church Party*, 1688-1718 (London, 1956), 19-42; John Stoughton, *The Church of the Revolution* (London, 1901), 82-91.

¹⁴ Burnet, *History*, 689-692; Every, 75-104; Stoughton, 106-111; Francis Atterbury, *The Rights, Powers, and Privileges of an English Convocation* (London, 1701); Bartholomew Shower, "A Letter to a Convocation-Man," *Somers*, XI, 363-390; L. M. Hawkins, *Allegiance in Church and State* (London, 1928), 157.

¹⁵ "Letter to a Member of the Convention," 323.

¹⁶ Pierre Jurieu, *Seasonable Advice* (London, 1689), 1.

¹⁷ Herbert Butterfield, *Man on his Past* (Cambridge, 1955), 231-232.

¹⁸ Charles Leslie, *The New Association of those Called, Moderate-Church-Men* (London, 1702), 16; Robert Ferguson, "A Representation of the threatening Dangers," *Somers*, VII, 498-499.

¹⁹ Dudley Bahlman, *The Moral Revolution of 1688* (New Haven, 1957); Hawkins, 52.

- ²⁰ The comparison is Ogg's, 210, 198-200; Tanner, 260-261; Stoughton, 27.
- ²¹ Burnet, "An Apology for the Church of England," *Somers*, II, 532-540; "A Plain Account of the Persecution," *Somers*, II, 525-531; *A Defence of the Church of England* (London, 1691).
- ²² William Sherlock, "An Account of the late Proposals of the Archbishop of Canterbury," *Somers*, I, 289-291; Ogg. 210.
- ²³ T. E. S. Clarke and H. C. Foxcroft, *A Life of Gilbert Burnet* (Cambridge, 1907), II, 253; A. Tindal Hart, *William Lloyd*, 1627-1717 (London, 1952), 120-157.
- ²⁴ Henry and Lawrence Hyde, *The Correspondence of Henry Hyde, Earl of Clarendon*, ed. by Samuel W. Singer (2 vols., London, 1828), II, 214-215.
- ²⁵ Roger Morrice, *The Entiring Book* (Original MS diary in the Roger Morrice Collection of Dr. Williams's Library, London, England, nos. Q and R), no. R, 119; Stoughton, 41.

CHAPTER 3

- ¹ Burnet, *A Sermon Preached... April 11, 1689* (London, 1689), 7-8. The problem of anarchy and absolutism fascinated the eighteenth century. Hume, in his "Whether the British Government inclines more to Absolute Monarchy, or to a Republic," gave his decision in favor of the latter. Swift believed that arbitrary government was a "greater evil than anarchy itself; as much as a savage is in a happier state of life than a slave at the oar."
- ² See Benjamin Hoadly, *A Moderate Church-Man* (London, 1710).
- ³ John Moore, "Sermon... Preach'd... January the 31st, 1697," *Sermons on Several Subjects* (2 vols., London, 1715), I, 293.
- ⁴ Seller, 4; "A Dialogue between Two Friends wherein the Church of England is Vindicated," *A Compleat Collection of Papers* (London, 1689), 9th collection, 8; "Cursory Re-

marks," *Somers*, VIII, 202-203.

⁵White Kennett, *Ecclesiastical Synods and Parliamentary Convocations* (London, 1701), 1-2. Kennett was not completely right, for Courts Christian continued to exercise authority in divorce, probate, and other civil causes until the nineteenth century.

⁶Peter Allix, *An Examination of the Scruples of Those who Refuse to Take the Oath of Allegiance* (London, 1689), 18.

⁷*The True Test of the Jesuits*(Amsterdam, 1688), 5, 54.

⁸Leslie, 2-3, 5.

⁹"Querela Temporum," *Somers*, VIII, 123.

¹⁰Leslie, 6.

¹¹Sherlock, "Reflections," 313; Hawkins, 60-61.

¹²Sherlock, "Reflections," 315.

¹³Edmund Bohun, *Diary and Autobiography*, ed. by S. Wilton Rix (Beccles, 1853), 112.

¹⁴Burnet, *An Exhortation to Peace and Union* (London, 1689), 6.

¹⁵Macaulay, III, 54.

¹⁶Lecky, 107-109; Harold Laski, *Political Thought in England* (London, 1955), 56-57.

¹⁷*Dictionary of English Church History*; George Hickes, *Some Discourses upon Dr. Burnet and Dr. Tillotson* (London, 1695); Thomas Ken, *A Letter to the Author of a Sermon* [London, 1695].

¹⁸Burnet, *Reflections upon a Pamphlet* (London, 1696), 62-66.

¹⁹Morrice, R, 107.

²⁰*Ibid.*, R, 122.

²¹Edward Stillingfleet, "An Answer to the Paper delivered by Mr. Ashton," *State Tracts*, II, 105.

²²Burnet, *A Sermon Preached at the Funeral of the... Lord Archbishop of Canterbury* (Edinburgh, 1694), 14; Burnet,

- Reflections*, 97-98; *A Letter Writ by a Clergy-Man* (London, 1689), 7, 11.
- ²³ Bohun, "The Doctrine of Non-Resistance or Passive Obedience," *State Tracts*, I, 350.
- ²⁴ Hill, "Solomon and Abiathar," *State Tracts*, I, 648; *Defence of the Arch-bishop's Sermon*, 27; Edward Stillingfleet, "A Vindication of Their Majesty's Authority," *State Tracts*, I, 636; Samuel Bradford, *A Sermon Preach'd.. November 5, 1696* (London, 1697), 18-19; Allix, *Examination*, 1.
- ²⁵ Bohun, "Doctrine," 354-355; "Satisfaction tendred to all that Pretend Conscience," *Compleat Collection*, 11th collection, 22; Peter Allix, "Reflections upon the opinions of some Modern Divines," *State Tracts*, I, 467.
- ²⁶ "Querela Temporum," 119; "Dialogue... wherein the Church of England is Vindicated," 3; "A Resolution of Certain Queries," *State Tracts* I, 440; *Friendly Conference*, 16.
- ²⁷ Samuel Masters, *The Case of Allegiance* (London, 1689), 2-3.
- ²⁸ Theophilus Dorrington, *The Honour Due to the Civil Magistrate* (London, 1696), 15; Eyres, "Reflections upon the Late Great Revolution," *State Tracts*, I, 243-244.
- ²⁹ Sherlock, *The Case of the Allegiance due to Sovereign Powers* (London, 1691), iv.
- ³⁰ Stillingfleet, "Answer," 106.
- ³¹ Dorrington, 20; *Reflections Upon Two Books* (London, 1691), 46.
- ³² "Agreement betwixt the Present and Former Government," *State Tracts*, I, 410-411; Burnet, *A Sermon Preached... the 23d of December*, 1688 (London, 1689), 30; "Letter to a Member of the Convention," 320; Sherlock, "Reflections," 316.
- ³³ Sherlock, *Allegiance*, 49.
- ³⁴ Bohun, "Doctrine," 349-350, 367; Sherlock, *A Sermon Preach'd... January the XXXth*, 1691/2 (London, 1692), 20.

- ³⁵ Bohun, "Doctrine," 348; Sherlock, "Reflections," 312. Halifax aptly summed up this position when he noted in his *Political Thoughts*, "The People can seldom agree to move together against a Government, but they can... sit still and let it be undone."
- ³⁶ Sherlock, "Reflections," 316; Allix, *Examination*, 16; Masters, *Allegiance*, 23.
- ³⁷ "A Brief Justification of the Prince of Orange's Descent into England," *State Tracts*, I, 142; *Reflections upon Two Books*, 47-49; "Agreement," 413-417.
- ³⁸ This is essentially George Macaulay Trevelyan's position: see *The English Revolution*, 1688-1689 (London, 1956). Trevelyan leaves the false impression that the Bill of Rights retained the social contract.
- ³⁹ W. S. Holdsworth, *A History of English Law* (12 vols., London, 1924), VI, 279; J. G. A. Pocock, *The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law* (Cambridge, 1957), 229; Lucile Pinkham, *William III and the Respectable Revolution* (Cambridge, 1954), 234-235; Norman Sykes, *Church and State in England in the XVIIIth Century* (Cambridge, 1934), 34.
- ⁴⁰ "An Answer to the Author," *Somers*, I, 327.
- ⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 327-328.
- ⁴² "Agreement," 430; "Cursory Remarks," 225.
- ⁴³ Sherlock, *Allegiance*, 50.
- ⁴⁴ "A Modest Apology for the loyal Protestant Subjects of King James," *Somers*, III, 25; Hawkins, 43-44.
- ⁴⁵ "Great Britain's Just Complaint," *Somers*, III, 489; Ogg, 243.
- ⁴⁶ Morrice, Q, 516, 523.

CHAPTER 4

- ¹ The oath of supremacy was closely modeled on that of James I's. See Carl Stephenson and Frederick Marcham—eds., *Sources of English Constitutional History* (New York, 1937),

602; Ogg, 230, 233-234; Stoughton, 74; Trevelyan, *Revolution*, 147; Burnet, *History*, 522.

² Morrice, R, 111; Macaulay, III, 48-49, 57; Burnet, *History*, 530; Hawkins, 47.

³ *Friendly Conference*, 21; "Resolution," 445-452; "The present Case stated," *Somers*, III, 306-307.

⁴ British Museum Additional MS. 32, 095 ff. 327-328; *Friendly Conference*, 1.

⁵ *Friendly Conference*, 15-16, 17.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 18; "Agreement," 430; Edward Stillingfleet, *A Discourse Concerning the Unreasonableness of a New Separation* (London, 1689), 25.

⁷ *A Vindication of the Divines of the Church of England* (London, 1689), 5; Bohun, "Doctrine," 363-364.

⁸ Burnet, *Pastoral Letter*, 25; Thomas Newsham, *The Thoughts of a Private Person* (London, 1689), 13; "Obedience due to to the present King," *Somers*, II, 579; Sherlock, *Allegiance*, 16; Stillingfleet, *Discourse*, 8, 30; "The Trial and Examination of a late Libel," *Somers*, XI, 144-146; *Friendly Conference*, 28; James Fraser, "The Doctrine of Passive Obedience and Jure Divino disprov'd," *State Tracts*, I, 369.

⁹ Stillingfleet, *Discourse*, 5, 7, 12, 19.

¹⁰ John Williams, *A Vindication of a Discourse*, " *State Tracts*, I, 615-630; "Obedience," 578; "Resolution," 446; *Vindication of the Divines*, 12, 13; "A Dialogue between Two Friends, a Jacobite and a Williamite," *State Tracts*, I, 288, 298, 300.

¹¹ "Resolution," 442-443.

¹² Thomas Tenison, *A Sermon ... Preach'd ... February 16, 1689/90* (London, 1690), 3.

¹³ Thomas Beverley, *The Command of God to his People to come out of Babylon* ([London], 1688), 2.

¹⁴ Burnet, *A Sermon Preached... On the 26th of Novemb. 1691*, (London, 1691), 23.

- ¹⁵ See Peter Allix, "Some Considerations," *State Tracts*, I, 338.
- ¹⁶ Dorrington, 12-13; Hawkins, 77; William Lloyd, *A Discourse, of God's Ways* (London, 1691), 6.
- ¹⁷ Newsham, 1; Moore, "Sermon...January 31st, 1697," 298.
- ¹⁸ "Brief Justification," 135.
- ¹⁹ *Clearendon*, II, 266-267; *Friendly Conference*, 12; John Williams, *A Sermon Preached...11 December 1695* (London, 1695), 16-17.
- ²⁰ Lloyd, *Discourse*, 8-15.
- ²¹ Burnet, "An Enquiry into the present State of Affairs," *State Tracts*, I, 128-129; *Friendly Conference*, 20; Sherlock, "Reflections," 313; Hawkins, 63.
- ²² Allix, *Examination*, 3, 15; Allix, "Reflections," 468.
- ²³ Burnet, *Pastoral Letter*, 24-25; Stillingfleet, *Discourse*, 8.
- ²⁴ *Some Modest Remarks on Dr. Sherlock's New Book* (London, 1691), 25; *Letter writ by a Clergy-Man*, 6-7.
- ²⁵ Burnet, "Enquiry," 120.
- ²⁶ Masters, *Allegiance*, 9.
- ²⁷ Jeremy Collier, *Vindiciae Juris Regii* (London, 1689), 14, 19, 20-21.
- ²⁸ "Brief Justification," 135; "Considerations," 256.

CHAPTER 5

- ¹ Hill, 642-643.
- ² Eyres, 263.
- ³ Thomas Comber, *A Letter to a Bishop* (London, 1689), 23.
- ⁴ Hill, 644; Lloyd, *Discourse*, 19-20, 27-37; Burnet, *History*, 523.
- ⁵ John Bramston, *Autobiography*, ed. by P. Braybrooke (Cam-

den Society, Old Series, London, 1845), XXXII, 356-357; Lloyd, *Discourse*, 49-50.

⁶ Lloyd relied much on Grotius and Pufendorf: *Discourse*, 36; *Vindication*, 6; Burnet, *Pastoral Letter*, 20; "A Defence of their Majesties King William and Queen Mary," *State Tracts*, I, 187-191.

⁷ Bohun, "Doctrine," 361-362; Masters, *Allegiance*, 30; Burnet, *A Sermon Preached... 29th. of May, 1694* (London, 1694), 27; Herbert Croft, "The Naked Truth," *Somers*, III, 329-388; Burnet, *A Sermon Preached... 31st of January 1688* (London, 1689), 10-11; William Wake, *The Authority of Christian Princes* (London, 1697), iv-v.

⁸ Bohun, "Doctrine," 349-362; "A Letter to a Friend concerning the Behaviour of Christians," *State Tracts*, II, 160; *Letter Writ by a Clergy-Man*, 10.

⁹ Burnet, *Pastoral Letter*, 11-13; Burnet, *Reflections*, 146-147.

¹⁰ Comber, *Autobiographies and Letters*, ed. by C. E. Whiting (Surtees Society, CLVII, London, 1946-1947), II, 170-172; Comber, *Letter*, 24.

¹¹ Stillingfleet, *Discourse*, 30.

¹² *Reflections Upon Two Books*, 12-13, 42; Burnet, "Enquiry," 131; Burnet, *Reflections*, 149-150.

¹³ The attempt to forbid Parliaments from changing the treason law failed.

¹⁴ H. C. Foxcroft, *The Life and Letters of Sir George Savile* (2 vols., London, 1898), II, 51-52; Comber, *Letter*, 24-25; *Reflections Upon Two Books*; "Resolution," 453; Tindal, "An Essay concerning Obedience to the Supreme Powers," *State Tracts*, II, 455-456; Masters, *Allegiance*, 25; "Obedience," 579.

¹⁵ *Friendly Conference*, 2.

¹⁶ *Reflections Upon Two Books*, 38, 43-44.

¹⁷ Allix, *Examination*, 16.

¹⁸ Stillingfleet, *Discourse*, 30, 32.

- ¹⁹ Burnet, *History*, 649-650.
- ²⁰ British Museum Add. MS. 32, 095, ff. 359-360.
- ²¹ Morrice, R, 111.
- ²² See especially canon XXVIII: "If any man therefore shall affirm...that the subjects, when they shake off the yoke of their obedience to their sovereigns, and set up a form of government amongst themselves,...or that, when any such new forms of government, begun by rebellion, are after thoroughly settled, the authority in them is not of God: or, that any who live within the territories of any such new governments, are not bound to be subject to God's authority, which is there executed, but may rebel against the same... he doth greatly err." *The Convocation Book of MDCVI, Commonly called Bishop Overall's Convocation Book* (Oxford, 1844), 51.
- ²³ British Museum Add. MS. 32, 095, ff. 347-357.
- ²⁴ Macaulay, III, 300, 298-304.
- ²⁵ Morrice, R, 219.
- ²⁶ Sherlock, *Allegiance*, v, 4-5, 59, 65.
- ²⁷ Eyres, 263; "Agreement," chap. 8; *Reflections Upon Two Books*, 18.
- ²⁸ "Great Britain's Just Complaint," 486-489; Sykes, *Church and State*, 286.
- ²⁹ *Vindication*, 7-8.
- ³⁰ Charlwood Lawton, "The Jacobite Principles vindicated," *Somers*, III, 275; Bohun, "Doctrine," 350, 360-361; Comber, *Letter*, 18-21; *Letter Writ by a Clergy-Man*, 12.
- ³¹ *Friendly Conference*, 5; Burnet, *Pastoral Letter*, 20-21; Sherlock, *Allegiance*, 57; "Considerations," 255; Masters, *Allegiance*, 9, 17-18; J. W. Gough, *Fundamental Law in English Constitutional History* (Oxford, 1955), 160-173; Pocock, 234, 238.
- ³² Bohun, "Doctrine," 361; Sherlock, *A Vindication of the Case of Allegiance* (London, 1691), 6-7; Lloyd, *Discourse*, 56-58.

- ³³ Sherlock, *Allegiance*, 32, 50; Bramston, 356.
- ³⁴ Macaulay, III, 300-303; "A Word to a Wavering Levite," *Somers*, II, 546-553.
- ³⁵ Bohun was eventually appointed Chief Justice for Carolina in 1698. See: Bohun, *Diary*, 101-120; Macaulay, III, 530-535; Charles Blount, *Reasons Humbly offered for the Liberty of Unlicens'd Printing. To which is Subjoin'd, The Just and True Character of Edmund Bohun* (London, 1693); *An Account of Mr. Blunt's late Book, Entitled, King William and Queen Mary Conquerors* (London, 1693); Charles Blount, *King William and Queen Mary Conquerors* (London, 1693), iii.
- ³⁶ *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, of the Reign of William and Mary*. 13th Feb. 1689-April 1690, ed. by W.J. Hardy (London, 1895), 245.
- ³⁷ Kennett, III, 587, 650; Clarke and Foxcroft, 318; Macaulay, III, 537; Samuel Johnson, *Notes Upon the Phoenix Edition of the Pastoral Letter* (London, 1694); *Correspondence of the Family of Hatton* (2 vols., Camden Society, New Series, XXIII, London, 1878), II, 187-188.
- ³⁸ Sherlock, *Allegiance*, 47, 48-49; *Reflections Upon Two Books*, 64-65.
- ³⁹ Lloyd, *A Sermon Preached... Fifth day of November*, 1689 (London, 1689), 32; "Cursory Remarks," 200-201; William Stephens, *A Sermon Preached... Jan. 30th. 1693/94* (London, 1694), 18-19.

CHAPTER 6

- ¹ John Norris, "Discourse," *Practical Discourses Upon several Divine Subjects* (2 vols., London, 1693), II, 210.
- ² John Tillotson, "The Wisdom of God in his Providence," *The Works of Dr. John Tillotson*, ed. by Thomas Birch (10 vols., London, 1820), VI, 457.
- ³ Thomas Taylor, *A Sermon Preach'd... on the Second Day of December*, 1697 (London, 1697), 2-18; Norris, 211-213,

228-230; Tillotson, "The Power of God," *Works*, VII, 166; Tillotson, "Success not always Answerable to the Probability of Second Causes," *Works*, III, 98-121; Sherlock, *Vindication*, 63; Francis Atturbury, "The Wisdom of Providence," *Sermons and Discourses on Several Subjects and Occasions* (2 vols., London, 1723), I, 255; Bohun, "Doctrine," 354; John Sharp, "The Duty of Subjection," *The Works of the Most Reverend Dr. John Sharp* (7 vols., London, 1754), II, 3.

⁴ William Sherlock, *A Discourse Concerning the Divine Providence* (London, 1694), chap. 2.

⁵ Lloyd, *A Sermon Preached... On May 29* (London, 1692), 5-6, 7-8; Taylor, 14; Burnet, *Sermon... 23d of December*, 1688, 2, 5; John Williams, *A Sermon Preach'd... On January 30*, 1696 (London, 1697), 14.

⁶ Taylor, 2, 11-12; William Fleetwood, *An Essay upon Miracles* (London, 1701), 229; Sir Charles Firth, "Burnet as a Historian," *Essays Historical and Literary* (Oxford, 1938), 207; Clarke and Foxcroft, xlv.

⁷ Taylor, 22; see Burnet, *A Sermon Preached... On the 5th of November*, 1689 (London, 1689).

⁸ Samuel Barton, *A Sermon Preach'd... Upon the 16th of April* 1696 (London, 1696), 10-11.

⁹ Tillotson, *A Sermon Preached... the 27th of October* (London, 1692), 18; Sherlock, *Vindication*, 60; Edward Stillingfleet, *A Sermon Preached... Novemb. 29*, 1691 (London, 1692), 31-33.

¹⁰ "Dialogue between... a Jacobite and a Williamite," 298; Burnet, *History*, 583-584; William Wake, *A Sermon Preach'd... June 5*, 1689 (London, 1689), 24-27; Sherlock, "The Language and Interpretation of Judgments," *Sermons Preach'd Upon Several Occasions* (London, 1700), 339-369; Sherlock, *Vindication*, 59-61; Sherlock's other studies in providence: *A Discourse Concerning the Divine Providence* and *A Practical Discourse concerning a Future Judgment* (London, 1692).

¹¹ Symon Patrick, *A Sermon Preached... the 5th of November*,

(London, 1696), 27.

¹²Atterbury, "Wisdom," 251-252.

¹³Taylor, 12; Lilly Butler, *A Sermon Preached... January the 31st. 1697/8* (London, 1698), 3-5; Williams Jane, *A Sermon Preached... 26th of November, 1691* (Oxford, 1691), 2-9; John Moore, "Two Sermons before the Queen," *Sermons*, I, 119-165; Sherlock, *A Sermon Preach'd... December, 30, 1694*, (London, 1694).

¹⁴See "Obedience," 579.

¹⁵British Museum Add MS. 32, 095, ff. 347-357.

¹⁶Sherlock, *Allegiance*, 12.

¹⁷*Ibid.*, 2-3, 6, 13, 37, 44; Sherlock, *Vindication*, 16, 43, 45.

¹⁸Lloyd, *Discourse*, 1, 15, 21, 23; Burnet, *History*, 523.

¹⁹Bohun, "Doctrine," 353, 361.

²⁰Charles Hickman, *A Sermon Preached... 19 October, 1690* (London, 1690), 13.

²¹"Dialogue between... a Jacobite and a Williamite," 292.

²²Lloyd, *Sermon... May 29, 5*; John Moore, "Sermon... Preach'd ... April the 16th, 1696," *Sermons*, I, 273-278.

²³John Somers, "A Vindication of the Proceedings of the late Parliament of England," *Somers*, II, 342; Burnet, *Sermon... 23d of December, 1688*, 4; Patrick, *Sermon... 5th of November, 1696*, 22.

²⁴Burnet, *Sermon... 23d of December, 1688*, 13.

²⁵Burnet *Sermon... 31st of January, 1688*, 3.

²⁶Morrice, Q, 394; Bohun, *Diary*, 81.

²⁷Tillotson, *Sermon... 27th of October, 10-11*.

²⁸Patrick, *Sermon... 5th of November, 1696*, 23.

²⁹Lloyd, *Sermon... Fifth day of November, 1689*, 31; Lloyd, *Discourse*, 24-25.

³⁰Morrice, Q, 570-571.

- ³¹ Lloyd, *Sermon...Fifth day of November*, 1689, 31-32.
- ³² John Tillotson, "Thanksgiving-Sermon," *Works*, III, 23.
- ³³ Nicholas Brady, *A Thanksgiving-Sermon...Decemb.the 2d.*, 1697 (London, 1697), 15-16.
- ³⁴ Tillotson, *Sermon...27th of October*, 5.
- ³⁵ Lloyd, *Discourse*, 14; see also Taylor, 5-8; Atterbury, "Wisdom," 270.
- ³⁶ Burnet, *Sermon...23d of December*, 1688, 11, 29; see also Lloyd, *Sermon...Fifth day of November*, 1689, 30; "Considerations," 258.
- ³⁷ Lloyd, *Sermon...May 29*, 18-23; Symon Patrick, *A Sermon Preached...26th of Novemb.* 1691 (London, 1691), 7; *Reflections Upon Two Books*, 66; Tillotson, *Sermon...27th of October*, 27-29.
- ³⁸ Patrick, *Sermon...5th of November*, 1696, 27; Moore, "Sermon...April the 16th, 1696."
- ³⁹ Taylor, 21; Burnet, *A Sermon...Second of December*, 1697 (London, 1698), 13.
- ⁴⁰ Barton, 13.
- ⁴¹ Robert Jenkin, *The Title of a Thorough Settlement Examined* (London, [1692]), 17, 61-65.
- ⁴² *Defence of the Arch-bishop's Sermon*, 24-25.
- ⁴³ Burnet, *Sermon...23d of December*, 1688, 9-10; see also Burnet, *Sermon Preached... 19th Day of October*, 1690 (London, 1690), 6-8.

CHAPTER 7

- ¹ William Payne, *A Sermon Upon the Death of the Queen* (London, 1695), 4-5.
- ² Sherlock, *A Sermon Preached... May 29*, 1692 (London, 1692), 21.
- ³ Burnet, *Sermon...26th of Novemb.* 1691, 5-6.

- ⁴Payne, 3-4.
- ⁵Sharp, "Duty," 42; Stephens, *Sermon...Jan. 30th. 1693/4*, 24; *True Test of the Jesuits*, preface; Hickman, 24.
- ⁶Burnet, *History* 921, 923; Burnet, *Sermon...26th of Novemb. 1691*, 2-3.
- ⁷Sherlock, *Allegiance*, 4, 10, 11; Sherlock, *Sermon... January the XXXth*, 1691/2, 3.
- ⁸Burnet, *Sermon...Second of December*, 1697, 23; Allix, *Examination*, 21; Masters, *Allegiance*, 8; Somers, 347.
- ⁹"Cursory Remarks," 213-214; Jenkin, 59; Lloyd, *Discourse*, 14-19; Sherlock, *Vindication*, 43; Masters, *Allegiance*, 5-6.
- ¹⁰"Dialogue...wherein the Church of England is Vindicated," 5; Lloyd, *Sermon... May 29*, 18; Bohun, *The History of the Desertion* (London, 1689), 2.
- ¹¹Pinkham, 146.
- ¹²Sherlock, *Sermon...January the XXXth*, 1691/2; *Letter writ by a Clergy-Man*; Masters, *Allegiance*, 26, 31-34; Moore, "Sermon... January the 31st, 1697," 16-20.
- ¹³*A Modest Apology For the Suspended Bishops* (London, 1690), 18-19; Bohun, "Doctrine," 365-367.
- ¹⁴Bohun, "Doctrine," 366; Sherlock, *Allegiance*, 29; Seller, vi; Comber, *Autobiographies*, 238; Sherlock, *Vindication*, 79.
- ¹⁵Burnet, *Reflections*, 43; Tillotson, *Sermon... 27th of October*, 19; Francis Atterbury, "The Miraculous Propagation of the Gospel," *Sermons*, I, 163-164; Lloyd, *Discourse*, 37-45; Seller, 135; "The Pretences of the French Invasion Examined," *Somers*, III, 62.
- ¹⁶William Binckes, *An Expedient Propos'd* (London, 1701), 23; "Resolution," 441.
- ¹⁷Sharp, "Duty," 35; *Vindication*, 10; Lawrence Echard, *The History of the Revolution* (Dublin, 1725), 24.
- ¹⁸Hickman, 24; "Agreement," 433; "The Church of England's

Complaint," *Somers*, XI, 401-408; *Vindication* 5, 15.

- 19 "Letter to a Member of the Convention," 63; Bohun, "Doctrine," 347-348; Bradford, 23; Seller, ii; "Trial," 150; Peter Birch, *A Sermon Preached... January* 30, 1694 (London, 1694), 22; "Resolution," 456.
- 20 Hill, 645; "Dialogue between... a Jacobite and a Williamite," 294; Moore, "Sermon... January the 31st, 1697," 307.
- 21 "Dialogue between... a Jacobite and a Williamite," 287.
- 22 Burnet, "Enquiry," 120.
- 23 Sherlock, *Vindication* 12-14; Newsham, 2.
- 24 *A Modest Defence of the Government* (London, 1702), 5; Sherlock, *Allegiance*, 42; "Obedience," 578.
- 25 Bramston, 355.
- 26 "Dialogue between... a Jacobite and a Williamite," 295-296; Hill, 655; *Letter Writ by a Clergy-Man*, 5-6.
- 27 *Reflections Upon Two Books*, 43; Hill, 643; Masters, *Allegiance*, 25; Burnet, *Pastoral Letter*, 17; "Letter... concerning the Behaviour," 161, 165.
- 28 Bradford, 19; *Letter Writ by a Clergy-Man*, 9; *Reflections Upon Two Books*, 61-62; Sherlock, *Sermon... January the XXXth*, 1691/2, 21-22.
- 29 *Vindication*, 9; Hill, 642; Stillingfleet, *Discourse*, 9.
- 30 "Obedience," 581.
- 31 Ogg, 488.
- 32 Lecky, I, 13; Pinkham, chap. 4; Plumb, 107; Trevelyan, *Revolution*, 100-101, 111-112.
- 33 "A Letter to a Friend, upon the Dissolution of the late Parliament," *Somers*, VIII, 127.
- 34 "Modest Apology," 35.
- 35 Clarke and Foxcroft, 351; Burnet, *History*, 544-545, 702-703; Feiling, 268-269.
- 36 Burnet, *History*, 525.

- ³⁷ *Ibid.*, 624-625; Ogg, 427.
- ³⁸ Eyres, 263; Allix, *Examination*, 30-31; Burnet, *Pastoral Letter*, 11-13; Comber, *Letter*, 28; *Friendly Conference*, 18.
- ³⁹ "Letter. . . concerning the Behaviour," 162; Sherlock, *Allegiance*, 21.
- ⁴⁰ *The Great Question* (London, 1690), 41-42; *Reflections Upon Two Books*, 51.
- ⁴¹ Burnet, *History*, 522; *Reflections Upon Two Books*, 28-33.
- ⁴² Masters, *Allegiance*, 12-13; *Letter Writ by a Clergy-Man*, 10-11; *Reflections Upon Two Books*, 19-20, 39.
- ⁴³ Sherlock, *Sermon... January the XXXth*, 1691/2, 21; Hill, 642; Stephens, *Sermon... Jan. 30th*, 1693/4, 15-16; "Agreement," 430; *Reflections Upon Two Books*, 56.
- ⁴⁴ Hawkins, 47-48; *Defence of the Church*; Wake, *Authority; True Test of the Jesuits*, 2-3.
- ⁴⁵ Bohun, *Diary*, 87; "Cursory Remarks," 199-200, 206.
- ⁴⁶ Leslie, 14.
- ⁴⁷ Dorrington, 3, 29; "Cursory Remarks," 221-225.
- ⁴⁸ Jenkin, 59; Stillingfleet, *Discourse*, 18.
- ⁴⁹ "Dialogue between . . . a Jacobite and a Williamite," 286; Dorrington, 3-6, 27; "Cursory Remarks," 212-213.
- ⁵⁰ Lloyd, *A Sermon Preached... January the 30th* (London, 1691), 1-2; Hawkins, 56-57; Trevelyan, *Revolution*, 111.
- ⁵¹ Burnet, *Sermon... 5th of November* 1689, 31; Burnet, *Sermon... 31st of January*, 1688, 17, 28-29; Burnet, *Sermon... 19th Day of October*, 1690, 16-27; Firth, "Burnet," 206-207.
- ⁵² Tillotson, *Sermon... 27th of October*, 34-35; Wake, *Sermon... June 5*, 1689, 27-31; Brady, *Thanksgiving-Sermon*, 12-13.
- ⁵³ Atterbury, "Wisdom," 268-269.

CHAPTER 8

- ¹ Burnet, *Sermon... 23d of December*, 1688, 2; and see *Oxford English Dictionary*.

- ²"Dialogue... wherein the Church of England is Vindicated," 1.
- ³Atterbury, "Wisdom," 258.
- ⁴Clarke and Foxcroft, 259; Stillingfleet, "Vindication," 636.
- ⁵Peter Laslett, "The English Revolution and Locke's 'Two Treatises of Government,'" *Cambridge Historical Journal* (1956), XII, no. 1, 55.
- ⁶Dorrington, 31; *Great Question*, 26-27, 38-39.
- ⁷William Stephens, "A Letter to his most excellent Majesty King William III," *State Tracts*, II, 637; Burnet, *Sermon... 19th Day of October*, 1690, 34-36; Nicholas Brady, *A Sermon Preached... March 1, 1696* (London, 1696), 24.
- ⁸Lawton, 271-275; Stephens, "Letter," 637.
- ⁹Burnet, *History*, 920-921.
- ¹⁰Burnet, *Sermon... 19th Day of October*, 1690, 34-36.
- ¹¹Burnet, *Sermon... 26th of Novemb.* 1691, 18, 35; Burnet, *History*, 531; William Stephens, *A Thanksgiving Sermon Preach'd... April 16, 1696* (London, 1696), i-ii; Ferguson, 447.
- ¹²B____O____, "A Dialogue Betwixt a Whig and Tory," *State Tracts*, II, 371.
- ¹³Robert Fleming, *The Rod, or the Sword* (London, 1694), 26; *Great Question*, 29.
- ¹⁴Bradford, 25-26; "Parties," 208.
- ¹⁵Stephens, *Sermon... Jan. 30th.* 1693/4, 19; "Parties," 211.
- ¹⁶Jonathan Swift, "The Sentiments of a Church of England Man," *Prose Works of Swift*, ed. by Temple Scott (London, 1909), III, 52-53; "Cursory Remarks," 204.
- ¹⁷"Cursory Remarks," 222; Bohun, *Diary*, 122-123; Leslie, 11.
- ¹⁸Stephens, *Sermon... Jan. 30, 1693/4*, 22-23; Stillingfleet, *A Sermon... March 18th, 1693/4* (London, 1694), 17-22. It is interesting that Atterbury alone felt that party strife was healthy for the body politic: see "Wisdom," 265.
- ¹⁹Burnet, *History*, 920-923; Stephens, "Letter," 637.

- ²⁰ Burnet, *History* 696-700; Clarke and Foxcroft, 390; *Modest Defence*, 13-14; Trevelyan, *England Under Queen Anne* (3 vols., London, 1930), I, 158-159.

CHAPTER 9

- ¹ Allix, *Examination*, 25.
- ² "Resolution," 457.
- ³ Sherlock, *Allegiance*, 38-41; Moore, "Sermon... January 31st, 1697," 297; *Reflections Upon Two Books*, 64; "Satisfaction tendred," 21; Stillingfleet, *Discourse*, 5.
- ⁴ Masters, *Allegiance*, 15.
- ⁵ Stillingfleet, *Discourse*; Sherlock, *Discourse*, 356-357.
- ⁶ *Reflections Upon Two Books*; 15, 17; Sherlock, *Vindication*, 39, 44; Allix, *Examination*, 32; Burnet, "Enquiry," 131; "Obedience," 578.
- ⁷ It is "a very great wrong unjustly to devest the Person from the Office": *Reflections Upon Two Books*, 52-53, 58.
- ⁸ "The Letter which was sent to the Author," *State Tracts*, I, 378; Allix, "Reflections," 471-473; Lloyd, *Discourse*, 50-51; *Reflections Upon Two Books*, 20, 51, Allix, "Considerations," 337; Sherlock, *Vindication*, 37.
- ⁹ Payne, 6; *Reflections Upon Two Books*, 18; Swift, 69; Robert Fleming, *The Divine Right of the Revolution* (London, 1793), 34-35.
- ¹⁰ "Agreement," 437; Lloyd, *Discoures*, 6-7; Sherlock, *Sermon... May 29, 1692*, 16-17; "Four Questions Debated," *State Tracts*, I, 165; Bohun, "Doctrine," 267; Dorrington, 2, 14, 18; "Letter... concerning the Behaviour," 160; Sharp, "Duty," 39-42, 190; Sherlock, *Allegiance*, 1, 28; Sherlock, *Vindication*, 39-40; Richard West, "The True Character of a Church-man," *Somers*, II, 554-555.
- ¹¹ "Brief Justification," 136.
- ¹² Allix, *Examination*, 33.

- ¹³"Satisfaction tendred," 21.
- ¹⁴Burnet, "Enquiry," 123; Hill, 655; *Letter Writ by a Clergy-Man*, 4; Newsham, 6; Comber, *Autobiographies*, 284.
- ¹⁵Allix, *Examination*, 11, 22, 24.
- ¹⁶Eyres, 253; Ferguson, 488; Masters, *Allegiance*, 12-14.
- ¹⁷Sharp, "Duty," 44, 49.
- ¹⁸Lloyd, *Discourse*, 18; Burnet, "Enquiry," 121-122; "Dialogue... wherein the Church of England is Vindicated," 3.
- ¹⁹"Dialogue... wherein the Church of England is Vindicated," 5; "Trial," 144-150.
- ²⁰Stephens, *Thanksgiving-Sermon*, 24; Newsham, 10, Sharp, "Duty," 38, 41.
- ²¹Swift, 67; Clarke and Foxcroft, 480; Eyres, 261; Newsham, 5.
- ²²Moore, "Sermon... January the 31st, 1697," 298; "Considerations," 258; Taylor, 5-8.
- ²³"Considerations," 255.
- ²⁴Newsham, 3; "Cursory Remarks," 213; "Resolution," 443; Sherlock, *Vindication*, 42.
- ²⁵Lloyd, *Discourse*, 15-17; *Some Modest Remarks*, 22-23.
- ²⁶Fleming, *Divine Right*, 31-32, 34.
- ²⁷*Great Question*, 32; Wake, *Sermon... June 5, 1689*; 30-31. Burnet, *Sermon... 29th of May, 1694*, 20-27; Burnet, *Sermon... 5th of November 1689*, 6-7; Sherlock, "The Measures of Providence towards the Church," *Sermons*, 60-103; Fleming, *Divine Right*, 49.
- ²⁸John Sharp, *A Sermon Preach'd... 12th of November, 1693*; (London, 1693), 22-23; Atterbury, "Wisdom," 260-261.
- ²⁹Burnet, *Sermon... Second of December, 1697*, 18-19; Burnet, *Sermon... 31st of January, 1688*, 31; Burnet, *Sermon... 23d of December, 1688*, 32-33; Burnet, *A Sermon Preached... On March 12. 1689/90* (London, 1690), 22.

- ³⁰ Tillotson, *Sermon... 27th of October*, 31-32; Jane, 34; Lloyd, *Sermon... May 29*, 24.
- ³¹ Sharp, *Sermon... 12th of November*, 1693, 19-20; Atterbury, "Wisdom," 258; Taylor, 15-16.
- ³² Burnet, *Sermon... 26th of Novemb.* 1691, 1; Williams; *Sermon... 11 December*, 1695, 17; William Warburton, *The Alliance Between Church and State* (London, 1741), 17.
- ³³ Brady, *Thanksgiving-Sermon*, 7-8.
- ³⁴ Burnet, *Sermon... 23d of December*, 1688, 20-21.

CHAPTER 10

- ¹ Laslett, 41, 55.
- ² Macaulay, III, 56.
- ³ Trevelyan, *Revolution*, 175, 245.
- ⁴ Sykes, *Church and State*, 33.
- ⁵ Sir Charles Firth, *A Commentary on Macaulay's History of England* (London, 1938), 129-132.
- ⁶ G. P. Gooch, "Our Heritage of Freedom," *Maria Theresa and Other Studies* (London, 1951), 409.
- ⁷ Trevelyan, *Revolution*, 106; Trevelyan, *Queen Anne*, I, 106.
- ⁸ See Robert Walcott, Jr., "English Party Politics, 1688-1714," *Essays in Modern English History* (Cambridge, 1941), 81-131.
- ⁹ Cyril Garbett, *Church and State in England* (London, 1950), 86; Holdsworth, VI, 279.
- ¹⁰ Hawkins, 162.
- ¹¹ Trevelyan, *Revolution*, 146, 150.
- ¹² I. Deane Jones, *The English Revolution, 1688-1689* (London, 1931), 340-341.
- ¹³ This is the date Lecky used: 120-121, 272.

- ¹⁴ Sherlock, *Allegiance*, 26.
- ¹⁵ Morrice, R, 138, 141; Burnet, *History*, 522; Thomas Bruce, *Memoirs*, ed. by W. E. Buckley (2 vols., Westminster, 1890), I, 237; Resesby, 562.
- ¹⁶ Burnet, *History*, 541.
- ¹⁷ Charlwood Lawton, "A Letter formerly sent to Dr. Tillotson," *Somers*, II, 241-247.
- ¹⁸ Burnet, "Enquiry," 126.
- ¹⁹ Macaulay, III, 53-54.
- ²⁰ Sherlock, *Allegiance*, 36.
- ²¹ See Jenkin; Thomas Wagstaffe, *An Answer to a late Pamphlet* (London, 1690).
- ²² British Museum Add. MS. 32, 095, ff. 347-357.
- ²³ *The History of Religion* (London, 1694), xiv.
- ²⁴ "A New Test of the Church of England's Loyalty," *Somers*, II, 557-571.
- ²⁵ *Animadversions*, 25-26.
- ²⁶ *Remarks upon Dr. Sherlock's Book* (London, 1690), 15.
- ²⁷ "Plain English," *State Tracts*, II, 184.
- ²⁸ *Clarendon*, 508.
- ²⁹ Macaulay, III, 54-55.
- ³⁰ See Bradford, 20.
- ³¹ Feiling, 491.
- ³² See State Trials, XII, 803.
- ³³ *Friendly Conference*, 2.
- ³⁴ Sherlock, *Sermon*... May 29, 1692, 15.
- ³⁵ Sherlock, *Allegiance*, 2.
- ³⁶ Burnet, *History*, 523.

- 37 Bohun, *Diary*, 87, 101-102.
- 38 Bramston, 357-358, 372-373.
- 39 "Plain English," 181.
- 40 Tindal, 455-456.
- 41 "An Inquiry into the Nature and Obligation of Legal Rights,"
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- 42 Eyres, 260.
- 43 Abel Boyer, *The History of King William the Third* (London, 1703), in preface.
- 44 "The Opinion of two eminent Parliament-Men," *Compleat Collections*, 11th Collection, 33-34.
- 45 Sherlock, *Allegiance*, 59.
- 46 Fleming, *Divine Right*, 31.
- 47 *Ibid.*, 73.
- 48 See Herbert Butterfield, *Christianity and History* (London, 1949), chap. 5; also his *History and Human Relations* (London, 1951); R. G. Collingwood, *The Idea of History* (Oxford, 1945), 49; Christopher Dawson, *The Dynamics of World History* (London, 1957), 233-286; Reinhold Niebuhr, *Faith and History* (London, 1949), 119, 136, 142.
- 49 See Karl Lowith, *Meaning in History* (Chicago, 1949), chap. 4.

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
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
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